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This study intends to assess the discretionary powers and their functioning and 
effect within the context of the Saudi legal system; assess the current system’s 
credibility as a result of this practice; and lastly, attempt to analyse and propose a 
feasible reform process. Cognisant of the flaws and inconsistencies which emerge 
from the evaluation of the current system, the researcher believes that improved 
codification of the Saudi legal system, among other reforms, would lead to greater 
public confidence in, and improved support of, the functioning of the Saudi justice 
system in the modern age.  
The research is based on qualitative analyses of Islamic criminal law in the context 
of the Saudi legal system. An extensive study into the nature of the Constitution, 
types of punishments and the extent of judicial discretion will help the researcher 
in undertaking the study. Further, the researcher will apply Fuller’s principles of 
morality in law - criteria internationally excepted as being the basic measure to 
ensure the legality of any given legal system - to the Saudi system in an attempt to 
examine to what extent these principles are followed within KSA.  
The results of the study suggest that the Saudi legal system, particularly with regard 
to sentencing and punishments, does not fully comply with Fuller’s criteria of the 
morality of law which are reflected in international law. Rather, the scheme applied 
in KSA appears to suffer from ambiguities and irregularities. This analysis reveals 
the need for initiatives, such as the codification of law and the setting up of an 
official body which would be charged with reforming the current regime. Such 
reforms, it is contended, would improve the credibility of approaches to punishment 
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Glossary of Terms 
Adl: just. 
Ahad: the one. 
Al Waz: warning. 
Alamin: all creatures of the universe. 
Al-Aws and Al-Kazraj: main tribes which were living in Medina. 





Allah: God.  
Al-Musadarah: seizures. 
Al-Nafy: exile. 
Al-Taazier bil Qatl: death penalty. 
Al-Tahdid: threat. 
Al-Tashhir: Public disclosure. 
Al-Tawbikh: formal verbal warning. 
Amm: general. 
Ayahs: verses. 
Ayat-al-ahkam: verses of roles. 
Board of Grievances: administrative courts. 
Caliph: the Prophet’s successor. 
x 
 
Da’leel: rationalization of the Quranic provisions. 
Diya: blood money. 
Erth: heritage. 
F’al: the acts of the Prophet. 
Fasid: disapproved. 
Fatawa: formal legal opinion. 
Fili: actual. 
Fiqh: jurisprudence. 
Hadith: the act of transmitting and writing down the Prophet’s conduct. 
Haj: Pilgrimage to Makkah. 




Ijtihad: exercising independent reasoning. 
Imams: religious leaders. 
Iqrar: the approval of the Prophet regarding acts committed by his companions. 
Isnad: transmitter or transmitters of the Hadith from the prophet. 
Jinns: spirits. 
Khalwa: for the women not to be in company of males other than close relatives. 
Khass: private. 
Khul: divorce at the insistence of the wife. 








Matn: the substance of the Hadith. 
Miswak: a plant root. 





Qawli: verbal.   
Qisas: retaliation. 
Qiyas: analogy. 
Qurish: the dominant tribe which lived in Makkah at the Prophet Muhammad time. 
Raj’a: return. 
Sahih Bukhari, Sahih Muslim: basic collections of Hadiths. 
Sahih: valid. 
Sharia: the law of Islam. 
Sira: the personal history of the prophet.  
Sunna: the prophetic acts and sayings. 
Suras: chapters. 




Taqwa: doing good. 
Tazir: discretionary punishments. 




Usul-al-fiqh: assets of jurisprudence. 
Wajib deeds: obligatory deeds. 































Context and Purpose of Thesis 
In Saudi Arabia, Sharia or Islamic law is the main base for regulating all vital, legal, 
social and economic practices. The decisions of courts and judges are guided by 
Sharia laws and it is compulsory to give verdicts which follow the punishments or 
expiations laid out in Sharia law.1 There are two kinds of punishments in Saudi 
courts: fixed punishments and discretionary punishments. Fixed punishments are 
those which are clearly defined by Sharia sources to punish specific and defined 
illegal acts such as apostasy, adultery and drinking alcohol. In cases where Sharia 
laws do not provide clear guidance, the decisions are left to the discretion of courts.2 
A discretionary decision is therefore a verdict given for a crime for which there is 
no clear indicated punishment or guidance in Sharia. In such a case, a judge makes 
a decision according to his own understanding and knowledge of Sharia teachings. 
Such decisions range from providing official reprimands right through to detention, 
lashes and in some cases the death penalty.3   
As a result of the extent of discretion afforded to the courts in KSA, in many 
instances, the verdicts for similar kinds of cases may vary greatly from one judge 
to another. Al-Quhatani writes:  
“Fairness criteria in justice sentencing guarantees the existence of clear 
codes of law to judges to guide them in sentencing because in the K.S.A 
without these codes judges are sentencing with a considerable degree of 
personal discretion, whether classifying the crime, deciding the amount of 
punishment or compensation”.4 
For instance, if a woman is arrested for driving a car when it is illegal for women 
to drive and she is brought before the court for punishment, the consequences of 
 
1 Suhaiel Al-Fatlawi, Introduction to Saudi Law (1st edn Dar Wael For Publications, Amman 2012) 
22-26. 
2 The court structure contains from different levels of courts with different specializations, roles 
and importance including appellate courts and courts of first instance. The number of judges 
involved in case varies depending on the nature of every court and its position in the court 
structure and the nature of cases concerned. As will be discussed in this thesis, many decisions are 
left solely to the discretion of judges due to the fact that there is no set of codified rules from 
Sharia which judges can apply to their cases and even.   
3 Abdulaziz Al-Sakier, Discretion in the Light of Islamic Sharia (1st edn The National Center for Legal 
Publications, Egypt 2016) 54-58. 
4 Osama Al-Quahtani – Saudi writer and legal consultative, Why We Insist on Codification, (The 
International Arabs Economic Journal, 2017) available at: 
<http://www.aleqt.com/2017/08/02/article_1230151.html>, accessed 1 July 2019. 
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her actions may vary greatly. In this case, there is no Sharia article available to 
guide the judge and if this woman is questioned by five judges, each one is very 
likely to issue a different verdict from each other. The first may just order her not 
to drive again; the second may order her to receive thirty lashes; the third may 
imprison her for a month and so on. Thus, there will often be no consistency of 
punishment by different judges for the same crime.5 Notwithstanding this, however, 
it is a well-known fact that the functioning of the court system in Saudi Arabia is 
characterized by a high percentage of discretionary sentences as Sharia does not 
provide a clear guidance for every case. In fact, according to sources, verdicts for 
ninety percent of cases are reached using discretionary practices.6 In the 
discretionary system, where every judge decides verdicts based on his own 
individual understanding of Sharia teachings, the judgments which are given often 
become a source of considerable criticism and controversy. The apparent lack of 
consistency among the verdicts issued by different judges for similar cases has also 
led to a significant lack of credibility in the Saudi judicial system. 
In this context, the legal system of Saudi Arabia is widely criticized internally and 
externally for the breadth of discretionary powers judges possess and for its lack of 
alignment with modern needs. This study aims to consider the discretionary 
sentencing system of Saudi Arabia and its consistency or otherwise with 
international normative statutes of law. In order to better ensure compliance with 
international standards, this thesis will analyse the use of discretion in the Saudi 
criminal law system and explore alternative ways for the issues, particularly in 
relation to consistency in sentencing, to be resolved. It may be argued that, in it has 
become a matter of urgency for this difference of sentencing especially in similar 
cases to be addressed. As this research will show, the best possible solution to the 
problem is one which involves the codification of Sharia laws as a first step. It is 
the kind of reform which would realistically work in the context of the K.S.A. 
owing to two main reasons. The first one is that the main problem of the Saudi 
justice system is the absence of clear and sufficient laws available to judges and the 
 
5 Omer Al-Kuley, The Justice is Pleading (1st edn Saudi Center for Legal Research and Studies, 
Jeddah 2010) 175-180. 
6 Shakier Al-Essamy, ‘Codification of Discretionary Rules from Textual Crimes, and its Role in 
Actualizing Justice’ (PhD Dissertation, Naief University for Security Science, Riyadh 2014) p. 42-51.f 
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rational solution for this is codification. The second is the fact that Islamic law is 
the main law in Saudi Arabia, and is defined as such in the Constitution of the 
country.7 Hypothetically, to develop consistency in the legal system of Saudi 
Arabia and for it to align with international legal practices, it is crucial for the 
authorities to draw up a series of clear laws which would regulate the practice of 
judicial discretion through the codification of Sharia teachings.8 The codification 
of Sharia teachings will have many advantages for the judiciary and will be an 
invaluable first stage in the process of reform. Through codification, a specific and 
clear set of rules will emerge, allowing all stakeholders such as judges, lawyers and 
the public, to be fully informed and aware of the workings of the system and their 
role in it. It will also limit the number of variations and contradictions in judgments 
and will bring the Saudi legal system closer to complying with the norms and 
standards of developed countries which do follow Fuller’s criteria of morality in 
law.9  
There have been considerable changes in the modern world brought about by 
different economic, political, international and social forces and these changes have 
also had a profound effect on Saudi society. In order for Saudi Arabia to be able to 
cope with these changes, it is essential for the Saudi Arabian legal system to evolve 
and progress in order to adhere to Fuller’s morality of law which has become the 
normative criteria of international law and to implement the reforms necessary to 
achieve this. For example, the developed countries have official laws to be 
implemented by judges in courts. They are clear, published and well known to the 
general public. This helps in guaranteeing credibility and justice while sentencing. 
Even when judges have a discretionary authority, it will be clearly defined and 
limited by law.  
Notwithstanding the obvious appeal of codifying Sharia teachings in KSA, such 
reform is not without controversy. The idea is opposed by a number of Sharia 
scholars and judges for a variety of reasons which will be discussed in this thesis. 
 
7 Quasem Al-Tuhery, Importance of Codifying Discretionary Punishments- Applied Study in KSA, (1st 
edn Law and Economy Library for Publication, Riyadh 2015) p. 35-39.  




Despite this, however, there is in fact nothing in Sharia doctrine which prevents 
Sharia laws from being codified as suggested, provided Sharia principles are 
adhered to.10 Moreover, in Saudi Arabia, the King possesses the ultimate authority 
to pass legislation conforming to Sharia teachings and principles, and he is the 
ultimate authority when it comes to the final execution of different verdicts.11 
Thanks to this level of power, and the supreme authority wielded by the monarchy, 
the system of discretionary judgment can be easily reformed from the top down 
where such reform receives royal support. One mechanism for carrying out reform 
could be to set up an institution charged with evaluating cases and guiding judges 
while sentencing and for this institution to oversee the codification process as will 
be explained in later chapters. 
The areas where Sharia provides clear guidance can be retained while for other 
areas where Sharia does not provide clear guidance, examples of practices which 
help to create and sustain a functioning and effective legal system can be taken from 
other international legal systems and be examined to determine how feasible they 
are in the context of the legal system of Saudi Arabia. 
In this context, therefore, three main objectives for this research can be identified. 
The first objective is to explore the degree of discretionary powers judges and 
courts enjoy when deciding verdicts for different crimes. The second objective is 
to assess the credibility of the Saudi legal system given the presence and the extent 
of discretionary judgment within the system. The last objective is to suggest a 
feasible method of reform which will limit reliance on judicial discretion and 
increase the credibility of the legal system of Saudi Arabia.   
 
Research Question 
The research question of the thesis focuses on a critical examination of 
discretionary punishment in the Saudi legal system with a view to reform. 
 
10 Mohammed Al-Fuzan, The New Judiciary System in K.S.A-Comparative Study with Islamic 
Jurisprudence (Maktabat Al-Kanun for Publications, Riyadh 2010) 43-48. 
11 This can be clearly seen in cases where the king has cancelled or changed the punishment 
awarded by the court, see below for more. 
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In order to answer this question, the thesis divided into three parts. Part I contains 
the first three chapters which provide an introduction to the context of the study 
and form the basis for the analytical part. To achieve this, it details the main sources 
of law in the Saudi legal system which is Sharia. It explains the primary and 
secondary sources of Sharia and their main characteristics. After that it explains the 
structure of the court system in KSA the role of Sharia law in the KSA legal 
system’s procedures and the main characteristics of these procedures. Finally, the 
main kinds of punishment in Sharia law are described along with their 
characteristics.  
Part II provides an analysis of judicial discretion in the Saudi Arabian criminal 
justice system. It examines the discretion afforded to Saudi judges and the 
arguments for the curtailment of judicial discretion in Saudi criminal law. This part 
is concerned with the main drawbacks of the Saudi legal system which explains the 
growing calls for reform. Having regard to Professor Lon Fuller’s morality of law 
thesis, the research critically examines the Saudi law system and seeks to identify 
the main legal criteria which are lacking in this system and are in need of reform.  
Part III finally describes the mechanisms and strategies which have been adopted 
by developed countries to form a strong and an effective legal system which ensures 
morality and legality. This part also proposes a suitable way of reform in the Saudi 
legal system. It analysis the drawbacks in the Saudi legal system, the Saudi 
Constitution and the structure of the Saudi state in order to devise a realistic and 
viable proposal for reform.  
 
Research Methodology 
The research contained in this thesis combines traditional, doctrinal, and socio-legal 
methods of theoretical legal research. Since law can be examined from different 
perspectives such as from historical, comparative and anthropological viewpoints, 
this research has adopted an interdisciplinary approach by analysing the issues 
identified using different tools including historical and social analysis and reference 
to legal theories, practices and systems from different sources and contexts. Such 
an approach has been adopted with the aim of formulating a clear view of the whole 
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situation concerning judicial discretion in Saudi Arabia and has subsequently been 
able to postulate and evaluate a proposed system of reform to remedy this problem 
thus answering the main research question. 
This thesis seeks to provide a critical analysis of the practice of legal discretion in 
Saudi Arabia, examine the system in the light of international normative standards 
of law and then attempt to propose a reform process to remedy this. Consequently, 
the basic methodological approach that has been adopted is that of doctrinal 
analysis. First of all, the research comprises a review of the main literature in the 
three first chapters which explains the main sources of criminal law in the Saudi 
legal system, examines the Saudi courts structure and procedures, and then focuses 
on clarifying the law in relation to the main types of punishments, evaluating the 
extent of discretion vis-à-vis punishments under Sharia law and analysing the 
channels of judicial decisions. This is primarily aimed at evaluating whether or not 
the current system conforms to generally accepted legal standards. This part serves 
as the background and the context in which a doctrinal analysis is carried out. This 
analysis focuses on critiquing and analysing judicial discretion through an 
examination of how judges apply laws through sentencing and goes on to explain 
the different opinions for the four Islamic schools of jurisdiction as regards the 
practice of judicial discretion and its relevance in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
Following a doctrinal legal approach involves carrying out research into, and 
examining, the Saudi legal context, including its principles, concepts and doctrines. 
It entails an analysis and critical evaluation of the Saudi legal system, including 
examining the principles on which it is based and describing how it function, it 
requires the researcher to systematically analyse and categorise the existing law. It 
also involves undertaking a critical review of decision - making processes and their 
underlying policy.  
The doctrinal methodology will be applied to evaluate the implemented rules and 
the current legal system in Saudi Arabia. This methodology is significant in 
committing the research because it considered both conservative and innovative.12 
 
12 Shane Kilcommins, ‘Doctrinal Legal Method (Black-Letterism): Assumptions, Commitments and 
Shortcomings’ in Laura Cahillance and Jennifer Schweppe (eds), Legal Research Methods: 
Principles and Practices (CLARUS Press 2016) 12. 
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The former description refers to the fact that it considers the concept of legal 
institution and requites fidelity to existing rules. Meanwhile the latter description 
refers to the way it carries out a critical evaluation of the system and also proposes 
the necessary reforms. The doctrinal legal methodology is premised on a Rule of 
Law framework, which limits the arbitrary or the unlimited power of the country’s 
authority. In addition, it assumes that the law is normative, i.e. it guides and 
provides reasons for the actions.13 
Maybe one of the disadvantages of this method is when we examine law as a social 
endeavour.  This limits the amount of which certainty can be achieved. This is 
because it is social, legal propositions are not variable in the same way that 
empirical propositions are. Although this is a disadvantage, it is very important 
because with a socialized dynamic world and interactions, the existence of rules is 
very important- to ensure compliance, to maintain order and to regulate behaviour 
along some agreed lines.14 This is considered to be extremely important in the 
context of the Saudi legal system. The arbitrary decisions through the decision-
making process and the uncertainty in rules has caused social disquiet and led to a 
serious loss in credibility regarding the Saudi legal system and thus to urgent calls 
for reform. 
The next step is to apply socio-legal methodology while examining and evaluating 
the degree of effectiveness of the legal system in Saudi society. As the doctrinal 
legal research concerns itself solely with the normative function of rules which 
means it focuses on recognizing their prescriptive content rather than their actual 
effect. Socio-legal methodology attempts the address this key silence in doctrinal 
legal scholarship and adopts a more realistic approach to law as merely one form 
of regulation.15 This is through using a ‘social framework’ to asses or interpret  the 
factors which lead to the poor performance of the legal system and highlighting the 
different negative perceptions which are created by the way the law is currently 
interpreted and enforced. This will facilitate the identification of the root causes of 
 
13 ibid 11. 
14 ibid 15. 
15 Darren O’Donovan, ‘Socio-Legal Methodology: Conceptual Underpinnings, Justifications and 
Practical Pitfalls’ in Laura Cahillance and Jennifer Schweppe (eds), Legal Research Methods: 
Principles and Practices (CLARUS Press 2016) 116-117. 
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these problems associated with the current system and prepare the ground for the 
formulation of reforms proposals. 
Through this analysis of the way Saudi courts actually function, and with a full 
knowledge of their working procedure, we can better understand how the current 
legal system works and how the uncertainty in rules impact society at all levels on 
the one hand and the way of possible reform which is most suitable on the other. 
Using the doctrinal analysis method and by carrying out the necessary socio-legal 
research we can identify the social ills caused by this situation and take the 
necessary steps to remedy them. There are various tools available for carrying out 
legal reforms in any given scenario. In the context of Saudi Arabia making use of 
official governmental body would seem the most logical and productive step, given 
the nature of the Saudi state. This body would need to function as a vehicle for 
reform. In the light of this, chapters five, six, seven focus on suggesting 
recommended minimum standards for the current Saudi legal system. By 
presenting the famous theory of morality in law and the essential standards which 
are used to measure the extent to which any given legal system can be said to be 
moral we then possess an essential tool to proceed with a systematic evaluation of 
the morality of the Saudi system using as a benchmark Fuller’s famous eight 
standards of procedural morality in law. Once this analysis is carried out, it is clear 
that the Saudi legal system shows severe deficiencies and the importance of reform 
is therefore underscored. Thus, chapter seven explains mechanisms which could 
help the Saudi legal system to be more in line with the aforementioned generally 
accepted minimum legal standards.  
Finally, chapter eight focuses on analysing different criminal systems and 
sentencing polices as a preparation for the final chapter which concludes our 
analysis of the legal system in Saudi Arabia by examining the country’s 
Constitution and its governing order thus laying the groundwork for the formulation 
of proposals for effective reforms.      
Outline of Chapters and Parts 
The thesis is divided into main three parts, the first part is a descriptive part, which 
explains the legal context of the country as a solid preparation for the second and 
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the third parts. The second part is an analytical part, which examines critically the 
extent of discretion in the Saudi legal system, and as a logical result of this, then 
presents the concept of morality in law which is the basis of the vast majority of 
international normative law criteria. Therefore, this part examines the Saudi legal 
system in the light of these criteria exploring how much the legal system complies 
with these principles and as a result of this analysis is able to determine to what 
extent this system meets with the main normative criteria of international law. 
Finally, part three is concerned with the reform of the Saudi legal system. It begins 
by detailing reform mechanisms which would help to meet Fuller’s principles of 
morality in law, and reviews how different sentencing policies were adopted by 
different judicial systems in different countries with the aim of determining which 
of these policies would be most appropriate and effective given the particular 
characteristics of the Saudi legal system which entails an explanation and analysis 
of factors such as the nature of the Saudi Constitution, its political context, its legal 
structure and perhaps most importantly its capacity for effective reforms to be 
carried out. Therefore, the thesis has the following structure with the following 
parts and chapters:  
Part I: “Judicial Discretion in Sentencing and Punishments in Saudi Arabia: 
The Legal Context”  
Chapter 1, “Overview of the Sources of Islamic Criminal Law in the Wider 
Saudi Legal System”, defines the sources of criminal law in Islam that are 
implemented in the legal system of Saudi Arabia. The Islamic source for the legal 
system of Saudi Arabia is Sharia. It is the base upon which all laws concerning 
areas of life such as crime, legislation, social and economic conduct, as well as 
personal matters such as family and private life are based. Therefore, this chapter 
explains in detail the definitions of Sharia and its importance in Islamic 
communities and the lives of all Muslims especially in the context of Saudi Arabia 
where it functions as the main basis for the Constitution. After explaining its 
importance, the chapter presents the primary and secondary sources of Sharia. 
These are the sources from which Sharia laws are determined. The primary sources 
are Holy Quran and Sunna, while secondary sources are Ijma, Qiyas, Ijtihad, and 
Urf and their roles in the context of the Saudi legal system are explained.  
11 
 
Chapter 2, “Saudi Court Structure and Procedures”, specifically analyses the 
role of Sharia in the legal system of Saudi Arabia. It highlights how Sharia laws 
are incorporated in the judicial system of the country and explains the main 
structure and procedures of the legal system in Saudi Arabia. The analysis of the 
legal structure will serve to highlight the nature and procedures of the Saudi judicial 
system and the need for reforms to be carried out if it is to perform adequately in 
the modern world and to reach the required level of efficiency and fairness. 
Moreover, the chapter will explain how judges in Saudi not only use Sharia texts 
as the main source for the laws they apply but how they also incorporate Saudi 
traditional norms when reaching their legal decisions.  
Chapter 3, “Law in Relation to the Main Types of Punishments”, explains the 
main kinds of punishments in Sharia law. It illustrates punishments of crimes which 
are divinely sourced which called Al-Qisas, Al-Hudud, their definition and 
conception. However, the chapter then explains the third kind of crimes in Sharia 
law which attract discretionary punishments. This chapter lays out the main kind of 
punishments in Sharia law for such crimes to pave the way for a greater 
understanding of the nature and the extent of discretion in the Saudi legal system 
and the integral role it plays in sentencing and the application of punishments. This 
analysis thus lays the groundwork for the following chapters and parts. 
Part II: “Critique of the use of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing and 
Punishments in Saudi Arabia”  
Chapter 4, “Analysis of Judicial Discretion in the Saudi Arabian Criminal 
Justice System”, explains how the wide breadth of discretionary powers allowed 
to judges in Saudi Arabia is criticized for being illogical and unfair both on a 
national and international level. For instance, Amnesty International stated in its 
report that Saudi Arabia needs to implement reform in the legal system in line with 
international laws if it wants to demonstrate its commitment to a fair legal system.  
The chapter outlines the extent of discretionary power given to judges and the role 
or otherwise of precedent in the exercise of this judicial discretion. The chapter 
considers the viewpoints of different Islamic legal schools as regards the power of 
judges in deciding the maximum and minimum limits of punishments in their 
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discretionary judgments. However, the chapter then presents the case for the need 
for the restriction of judicial discretion in Saudi criminal law. It explains how there 
is a need to set parameters which would guide and limit the degree of discretion 
judges currently enjoy when carrying out sentencing. 
Chapter 5, “Lon Fuller and the Morality of Law”, explores the legal system of 
Saudi Arabia according to the eight principles of “Morality in Law” advanced by 
Professor Lon L. Fuller. He is the most prominent supporter of morality in law and 
his principles are widely recognized as a benchmark for deciding whether or not 
any given legal system or law in fact complies with the international normative 
criteria of law. According to Fuller’s principles, a legal system, in order to be 
legitimate, must follow certain procedural moral standards. If a legal system 
develops laws on an ad-hoc basis or keeps them secret, for example, then this legal 
system, according to Fuller, lacks fundamental legitimacy. So, if a legal system is 
not based on moral values then the government cannot expect its citizens to follow 
this system’s rules. The chapter also explains Fuller’s sub-division of morality into 
the “Morality of Aspiration” and “Morality of Duty” and describes the concepts of 
“Internal Morality” and “External Morality”.  
Chapter 6, “The Application of Fuller’s Principles to the Saudi Legal System”. 
goes into greater detail and explores whether Fuller’s principles of procedural 
morality in law are followed in Saudi Arabia or not. Fuller’s 8 basic principles are 
used to examine the Saudi legal system with the aim of determining to what extent 
this system complies with them and can therefore be considered “moral”.  
Part III: “The Potential for Reform in Saudi Arabia – Learning from 
International Experiences”  
Chapter 7, “How Different Legal Systems Attempt to Comply with Fuller’s 
Principles”, The chapter proceeds to an analysis of three detailed approaches 
which are employed in various jurisdictions outside KSA and which seek to 
implement the principles espoused by Fuller, namely crime categorization, the 
codification of laws and the publication of judicial reasoning. The chapter explains 
the different advantages of an effective categorization of laws and crimes and also 
details the benefits of including precise explanations, instructions, and prohibitions 
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in order to enforce the principles of legality in any given legal system. Codification 
will be presented as a solution for achieving these aims. The chapter also advocates 
the necessity for judges to provide a statement of judicial reasoning for their 
decisions to both offenders and victims in order to conform to the morality of law. 
In the end, this chapter highlights the need to ensure the transparency of the legal 
system in order to gain support and cooperation from the general public and thus 
guarantee the system functions to its maximum efficiency. 
Chapter 8, “Guiding the Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing”, builds 
on the fact that reforms are urgently needed in the legal system of Saudi Arabia. In 
order to solve the issues identified, the thesis argues that the Saudi legal system 
must strive to better adhere to Fuller’s criteria of procedural morality. For example, 
sentencing should be carried out in a more streamlined, transparent and professional 
way. The focus should be on the development of guidelines for deciding 
punishments and this will also allow some degree of flexibility to judges as well. 
The chapter provides an example of sentencing guidelines from the legal system of 
England and Wales for a better understanding of such a framework. The other 
system of fixed penalties described in the chapter is the example of the Sentencing 
Grid in the Minnesota Grids system which provides even more strict sentencing 
policies.  
Finally, Chapter 9, “Nature of the Saudi Constitution and a Proposal for 
Reform”, analyses the Saudi Constitution, customs, traditions, and political 
makeup in order to propose the principles and techniques which would improve the 
process of making consistent and potentially fairer decisions in the Saudi legal 
system, particularly in the context of punishments and sentencing. The Constitution 
provides a framework for enacting and implementing laws and is the fundamental 
starting point when it comes to improving the framework and the functioning of the 
legal system. The chapter then further explains the flexible nature of the Saudi 
Constitution. Although the Saudi government has made the Holy Quran and Sunna 
the Constitution of the country, Sharia laws are not codified in any document. 
Based on what we have learned in previous chapters regarding the specific 
characteristics of the Saudi legal system and the context in which it occurs and 
having identified the areas where reform needs to take place , we can now move on 
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to explore what steps would be necessary for any reform proposal to succeed given 
the factors mentioned previously. This chapter examines the characteristics of a 
successful reform proposal and proposes one which would best fit the context of 
the Saudi legal system and which would have a better chance of success since it has 
been drawn up bearing in mind these specific characteristics and also details the 










Overview of the Sources of Islamic Criminal Law in the wider 
Saudi Legal System 
1.1 Introduction 
Sharia is the religious law of Islam.1 It is the foundation upon which all legislation 
relating to areas of life such as crime, politics, social and economics, as well as 
personal matters such as family and private life are based.2 The main purpose of 
Islam is to guide Muslims out of spiritual darkness into the light, following the way 
prescribed by God through a believer’s faith and actions.3 With regards to the first 
part, the belief system refers to a strict monotheistic belief in the existence of God 
which Muslims believe is the natural disposition of a child from birth. 4 The latter 
part refers to all acts of worship performed for God to establish one’s faith and that 
would need to be performed with a sincere and pure heart. 5  
Sharia or Islamic law is the set of rules and orders ordained and prescribed by God 
to organize the life of Muslims.6 It has several main characteristics: firstly, it is 
divinely sourced; secondly, and more importantly, it is comprehensive in the sense 
that it is applicable regardless of the era, the place, the people or the issues it relates 
to in life. Also, it is realistic and practical which is reflected in the verses of the 
Holy Quran setting out the law. As well as practicality, Sharia laws and teachings 
combine both penalties in this life with penalties in the afterlife. They also combine 
stability with flexibility and seek to achieve a balance between community and 
individual interests.7  
What will proceed in the following discourse is a definition and discussion of 
Sharia which is the primary source of criminal law in the wider Saudi legal system, 
as well as its role in both the Islamic community and in the life of a Muslim 
 
1 Mohammed Bin-Ashour, Aims of Islamic Sharia (1st edn Dar Al-Kitab Al-Masry, Cairo 2011) 224-
231.  
2 Omer Al-Ashquer, Towards Original Islamic Culture (Dar Al-Nafaies, Beirut 2002) 261-268. 
3 Taha Al-Elwani, Aims of Sharia (Dar Al-Hady for Publications, Beirut 2001) 32-39. 
4 Khaliel Kariem, The Historical Roots of Islamic Sharia (Lina Publications, Cairo 1999) 92-98. 
5 Mohammed Kutb, About Islam (Dar Al-Shoruque, Egypt 2005) 192-201. 
6 Saleh Al-Sadlan, Implementation of Sharia in Every Time (Dar Ba-Sania for Publications, Riyadh 
1997) 69-74. 
7 Waeal B.Hallaq, Beginning of Islamic Jurisprudence and its Development (Dar Al-Nawader, Beirut 
2007) 119-126. 
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individual. In this context, the role and purpose of the Holy Quran is presented, 
together with an explanation of the doctrine of Islam and the aims of Sharia. In 
addition to this, the relationship between Sharia, the Saudi government and the 
judicial system in Saudi Arabia will be highlighted and the chapter will go on to 
explain how this relationship determines Saudi life and influences and guides its 
judicial functioning.8 The definitions and analysis of Sharia which follow, together 
with its important role in the government and society, will underline the importance 
of applying Sharia to  any judicial verdicts.9  
Sharia may be best understood by exploring its sources. The role of Holy Quran 
and Sunna (or prophetic acts and sayings) are presented as the primary sources of 
Sharia.10 Ijma (or consensus), Qiyas (or analogy), Ijtihad (or exercising 
independent reasoning) and Urf (or customs) are presented as the secondary sources 
of Sharia.11  
It is stated that the Holy Quran aims to establish the basic understanding of justice 
and equality that each individual should embrace.12 It presents the source and 
foundation of Islamic law. The role of the Sunna, derived from the prophet’s 
sayings and actions including his specific words, habits and practices as well as his 
daily interactions with his surroundings, is essential in the interpretation of the 
Quranic provisions.13 Therefore, as noted, Sunna is also a main source in Sharia14 
and the Holy Quran confirms the validity of the Sunna as a source of Islamic law.15  
Ijma (or consensus) is the consensus of Muslims on a certain religious issues after 
the death of the prophet Muhammed.16 Although it is not a divine source of law like 
 
8 Adel Kaliel, The Saudi Administrative Law (Musbah Library, Jeddah 1991) 81-86. 
9 Abdulmuhseen Ryan, The Comparative Saudi Administration Order (Dar-Havize, Jeddah 2008) 54-
61. 
10 Hunt Janin and Ander Kahlmever, Islamic Law: The Sharia from Muhammed’s Time to the Present 
(McFarland and company, USA 2006) 12-16.  
11 Gavin N. Picken, Islamic law, Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies (Routledge, London 2010) 94-
104. 
12 Ali Hub-Allah, Studies in Philosophy of Jurisprudence, Sharia and the Theory of Aims (Dar Hl-Hady 
for Publications, Beirut 2005) 482-491.   
13 Picken (n11) 82-86. 
14 Bin Zukaiba Ez-Aldien, General Aims of Islamic Sharia (Dar Al-Safwa, Egypt 1996) 184-191.  
15 Mohammed Kutb, Implementation of Sharia (Maktabat Al-Sunna, Cairo 1998) 37-42. 
16 Hub-Allah (n12) 266-274.   
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the Holy Quran and Sunna,17 it emphasizes the importance of the role of 
community by allowing individuals to participate in the law-making processes.18 
Qiyas (or analogy) takes a place when comparing two cases. It finds its credibility 
in the fact that Holy Quran encourages individuals to use their own reasoning in 
attempts to arrive at reasonable opinion.19 Ijtihad (or exercising independent 
reasoning) is about attempting to arrive at a new religious opinion on the basis of 
independent legal reasoning20 and has been considered a source of law since the 
early days of Islam.21 It is a particularly important source of law for keeping up to 
date with developing life. Finally, Urf (or customs), while differing from one place 
to another in the Islamic world,22 is also mentioned as a valid source of law in 
Sunna.  These sources, as well as the definition and characteristics of Sharia will 
be discussed further below. 
1.2 Definition and Characteristics of Sharia 
1.2.1 Definition of Sharia 
As outlined above, Sharia refers to Islamic law.23 It provides the basic principles 
and laws pertaining to aspects of everyday life such as politics, family law, criminal 
law, business law and much more. It is considered to be the ideal set of instructions 
and rules for Muslims regardless of place or time. The fundamentals of Islam are 
based upon the Islamic Holy Scripture called the Quran which is said to be the word 
of God that was revealed to the last Messenger and Prophet Muhammad in the 6th 
century.24 The Quran is known as the greatest miracle of Islam as it not only 
remains intact without a single word being edited over the last 1400 years, but it 
also reveals scientific facts and predicts future events that have already materialised 
and have been understood over the centuries.25  
 
17 Kutb (n5) 122-126. 
18 Al-Elwani (n3) 66-72. 
19 Kutb (n15) 62-68. 
20 Al-Sadlan (n6) 84-90. 
21 Hallaq (n7) 240-244. 
22 Bin-Ashour (n1) 260-266. 
23 Kariem (n4) 32-40. 
24 Malise Ruthven, Islam: A Very Short Introduction (2edn Oxford University Press, USA 2012) 29-
33. 
25 Majid Khadduri, The Islam Law of Nations (Johns Hopkins University Press, USA 2001) 7-10. 
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Islam is based on the Quran and upon the practices and sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him) known in Arabic as the Sunna. The purpose of 
the Holy Quran is to give guidance to man with regards to both their purpose on 
earth and to explain the nature of Islam; the final religion. The life of the Prophet 
Muhammad, on the other hand, serves as an everlasting example on how to 
actualize the Quran in day to day life, both in action and in speech, as Muhammad 
is seen as the epitome of what a complete and ideal Muslim should be.26 
Islam means to surrender to God by obeying Him and carrying out His orders, as 
well as abstaining from committing sins or falling into a trap of satanic whispers.27 
Islam is more than certain acts of worship performed by Muslims: it is a way of 
life. It teaches one rules and guidelines on how to interact with different people, 
starting from the family unit to the Islamic community, and on a larger scale - to 
humanity as a whole.28 The main purpose of Islam is to take its followers out of the 
darkness and into the light, through illuminating the way to God which means not 
only worshipping the Almighty alone with pure intentions but also dedicating all 
of one’s life, even in mundane activities  to Him alone.29 Secondly it also provides 
the ethics to form the foundation of a moral society. All of the Quranic commands 
urge Muslims to follow the good and right path, and to turn away from evil. This is 
achieved by practicing the principles and rules of the divine legislation, which 
makes the life of a Muslim a happy, pure, chaste and tranquil one, as well as being 
beneficial for the general well-being and solidarity of society.30 According to this 
vision, the Quran is received as a casting light on the foundation of Islam which is 
viewed to be made of two basic parts namely the doctrine and Sharia.31 It is said 
that the Quran is the word of God which each Muslim should abide. The foundation 
of Islam is clear when it is considered through its main components. These are 
defined as follows:32  
 
26 Ruthven (n24) 42-50. 
27 John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation (1st edn University Press, 
Edinburgh 1990) 4-7. 
28 Kariem (n4) 31-36. 
29 Kutb (n15) 82-84. 
30 ibid 23-26. 
31 Bin-Ashour (n1) 42-48.  
32 Kariem (n4) 89-94. 
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A- The doctrine is the deep rooted belief of the existence of God.33 The Quranic 
teachings focus exclusively on the monotheism of the religion, reminding its 
readers repeatedly to worship only one God without any partners or deities.34 
Since the early stages of childhood, the Muslim witnesses the testament that 
there is no God but Allah (the Arabic name for God), and that Muhammad is 
His messenger. The Muslim individual is expected to view his life matters 
through His doctrine which is the essence of Islam and the origin of the basic 
tenants of Islam.35 Sharia, which is the Islamic law, is based on the Islamic 
declaration of monotheism stressing the exclusivity and the importance of 
singling out pure faith for one God only.36 In this context, practicing Sharia 
without the Islamic doctrine is considered to be doing good but to be lacking 
essential  guidance.37  
B- Sharia or Islamic jurisdiction is the set of rules and orders made by God to 
organize the life of the Muslim.38 In this context, a Muslim should not just 
practice Sharia throughout his life without controversy,39 but also  comply with 
His orders as stated in the Quran and Sunna.40 The main aims of Sharia are to 
protect the five main areas of life: religion, the intellect, wealth, the soul and 
the offspring throughout generations.41 It is confirmed by Islamic scholars that 
the divine religion agrees on two important points. The first deals with the 
matter of belief, in terms of acknowledging the existence of God the creator, 
the super principles of Islam and the ritual worship.42 The second is clarifying 
the way of applying these principles in everyday human dealings and how to 
 
33 Thomas W.Lippman, Understanding Islam: An Introduction to the Muslim World (3rd edn A 
Meridian Books, USA 1995) 6-10. 
34 Kutb (n15) 23-26. 
35 Janin and Kahlmever (n10) 32-35. 
36 Kutb (n15) 62-68.  
37 Bin-Ashour (n1) 42-46. 
38 Mohammad Ibrahim Hafiz Ismail Surty, Studies on the Islamic Judicial System (Qur'anic Arabic 
Foundation 2012) 10-25. 
39 Sources of Sharia are discussed in detail below. 
40 Mawil Izzi-Dien, Islamic Law: From Historical Foundation to Contemporary Practice (The New 
Edinburg Islamic Survey 2004) 35-38. 
41 Bin-Ashour (n1) 33-40. 
42 Janin and Kahlmever (n10) 10-14. 
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sustain morals in everyday life matters which the core of Sharia.  For example, 
when fulfilling commitments and contracts.43  
 
1.2.2 Characteristics of Sharia 
The majority of the Islamic scholars to date have identified seven characteristics as 
distinguishing the Islamic Sharia. These are:44 
A- It is divinely sourced from the Quran, which according to the Arab and 
other Islamic scholars is the unadulterated word of God, it cannot be 
changed and should be followed under all circumstances.45 The act of 
disobeying or denying the text of the Quran is heresy. Sharia explains that 
man in this life has been created with a pre-ordained destiny; planned and 
designed by the Creator, the omnipotent in His unfaltering and all-
encompassing knowledge which is incumbent for all Muslims to accept at 
all costs.46 This creates a link between Muslims to their Creator through its 
clearly defined rules. Therefore, Muslims have to live with an 
understanding of the basic tenants of Sharia. As a result of its divine source, 
it is argued that Sharia is complete, perfect and has no flaws and that it is 
not limited to one specific period of time but rather for eternity until the end 
of the world.47 In addition, it is also believed that Sharia has no elements of 
oppression or injustice as it is grounded on the absolute justice of God. The 
Islamic belief points out that the most just is the Creator Himself, “Al-
Adl”,48 
B- Another characteristic of Sharia is its totality. In terms of time, Sharia is 
suitable and practical for all times, until the day of judgement. This is due 
 
43 Lippman (n33) 10-14. 
44 Ali Juma, Jurisprudence and Cultural Perspective for Sharia Aims (Nahdet Misr, Cairo 2011) 14-
20. 
45 Izzi-Dien (n40) 58-62. 
46 Lippman (n33) 57-59. 
47 Juma (n44) 54-58. 
48 Mohammed Al-Fuzan, The New Judiciary System in K.S.A-Comparative Study with Islamic 
Jurisprudence (Maktabat Al-Kanun for Publications, Riyadh 2010) 284-291. 
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to the divine nature of Sharia.49 Furthermore, in many places the Islamic 
teachings point out that Islam is the religion for all mankind and also until 
the end of the world.50 This is seen in the Quranic verse: “And We have 
sent you (O Muhammad) not but as a mercy for the ‘Alamin 51”. [The Holy 
Quran 21:107].The day of judgment is said to be the final culmination of 
the world, according to Islamic teachings, where all of mankind will stand 
in front of their God and their destiny in the Hereafter will be decided by 
the Creator Himself.52 With regards to place, Sharia is suitable and practical 
for all places on earth. In reference to mankind, Sharia is both appropriate 
and again practical for all people, and in the sense of provisions, Sharia has 
dealt with all living matters, covering all ages of mankind, as well as any 
aspect relating to daily life, either with God or with other people.53 It is 
mentioned in the Holy Quran that: “And I (Allah) created not the jinns54 
and humans except they should worship Me (Alone)” [The Holy Quran 
51:56]. This verse indicates that mankind has been created to worship God 
for the duration of his existence in this world. Furthermore, the Holy Quran 
states: “We created not the heavens and the earth and all that is between 
them except with truth, and for an appointed term. But those who disbelieve 
turn away from that whereof they are warned”. [46:3].  
This verse again indicates that creation has been made for an appointed time and 
that Sharia is appointed for this period until the end of the world.55  
C- Sharia is also characterised by realism which is reflected in the wording of 
the provisions. There may be a variation between different situations in 
respect to a provision, so there is always a sense of balance between real 
variables in each provision.56 This characteristic is thought by scholars to 
have given Sharia its particular longevity and universality.57 Hence, the 
 
49 Wael B.Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge University Press, UK 1999) 10-19. 
50 Kutb (n15) 43-48. 
51 All creatures of the universe. 
52 Kariem (n4) 76-82. 
53 Al-Fuzan (n48) 62-70. 
54 Means spirits. 
55 Hallaq (n49) 11-16. 
56 Juma (n44) 38-45. 
57 Hallaq (n7) 48-52. 
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provisions of Sharia are straight forward and it is written in such a manner 
that it can easily be related to throughout time and in various situations 
across the globe. Despite the passage of 1,400 years it is still relevant in 
today’s modern times.58 
D- Sharia is characterised by its clarity, which is reflected throughout its 
teachings and provisions. This characteristic is thought to have taken Sharia 
away from argument, into a sphere of practicality and functionality, towards 
a life of justice and welfare.59 Sharia is considered to explain each law (and 
other legal aspects) relating to the way of life in thorough detail, thereby 
leaving little room for conjecture, arguments or any confusion.60 
E- Islamic teachings state that this life is temporary and that the hereafter is the 
eternal life for which one should strive.61 The deeds that are earned in this 
life are ultimately what will either land one into paradise or hell. Therefore, 
any action carried out by the Muslim will have repercussions in this life as 
well as the next.62 Sharia has defined criminal penalties to be applied in the 
existing life,63 and has also defined the penalties for the same crimes which 
will be inflicted in the afterlife. This vision has tied the two lives together 
and considers the afterlife to be an extension of the existing life.64  
F- Sharia amalgamates stability and flexibility in legal aspects.65  Guidelines 
and rules included in Sharia are always distinguished by stability with rules 
and regulations set in their rigidity which has been followed throughout 
time.66 On the other hand, there is always a sense of flexibility to allow an 
accommodation for changes and development through time, customs and 
the situation of each case.67 For example, haj is the annual pilgrimage of 
 
58 Hub-Allah (n12) 266-274.   
59 William E. Shepard, Introducing Islam (2nd edn Routledge 2014) 24-30. 
60 Hallaq (n7) 240-244. 
61 Janin and Kahlmever (n10) 15-20. 
62 Al-Fatlawi (n1) p. 12-19. 
63 Discussed further below. 
64 Juma (n44) 68-72. 
65 Bin-Ashour (n1) 87-89. 
66 Hallaq (n49) 207-210. 
67 Hub-Allah (n12) 87-91. 
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Muslims performed in the 12th month of the Islamic calendar where 
Muslims travel to Makkah for a five day ritual. Haj is one of the five Islamic 
pillars, and it is a type of Islamic worship which is obligatory for every 
Muslim at least once in a lifetime if he/she is able.68 It is the act in Islam 
which requires the greatest physical effort of spending three continuous 
nights in Makkah.69 However, it is only compulsory for the Muslim who is 
able both physically and financially to perform it once in his lifetime. Those 
who cannot perform it due to health or financial problems would have this 
obligation waived.70  
G- Finally, Sharia is characterised by the balance between community and 
individual interests. While Sharia recognizes individual interests such as 
private ownership, it encourages community solidarity throughout its 
teachings, starting from the family unit, to the extended family and to the 
community at large. Islam is not a religion to be practiced in private but 
rather the teachings of Islam encourage family and community bonding to 
strengthen Islamic beliefs within society as a whole.71 At the same time, it 
is also encourages believers to continue to practice and remember God in 
private at all times especially during the early hours of the night before dawn 
(known as Tahajjud), praying and prostrating to God in the silence of the 
night, which according to the statement of the Prophet Muhammad, is when 
God is the most closest to the believer.72  
It was narrated by Abu Hurayrah,73 that the Prophet said:  
“Allah descends every night to the lowest heaven when one-third of the 
night remains and says: “Who will call upon Me, that I may answer Him? 
Who will ask of Me, that I may give him? Who will seek My forgiveness, 




68 Islam has five pillars. These are: the declaration of Islam, performance of prayer, giving zakat or 
fixed charity, fasting Ramadan and performing haj if possible. 
69 Ruthven (n24) 160-164. 
70 Bin-Ashour (n1) 42-48. 
71 Lippman (n33) 170-174. 
72 Malise Ruthven, Islam in the World (Oxford University Press, USA 2006) 260-271. 
73 Close friend and servant of the prophet.  
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1.3 Sources of Sharia 
In theory, the primary and secondary sources of Islamic law are organised in a way 
that seeks to ensure that they make rules to respond to core principles of human 
justice such as the right for life, freedom, equality, justice, economy, private 
property, work, family life, education, privacy and a fair trial. The Holy Quran and 
Sunna teach and guide Muslims to think and act for themselves and others with the 
precepts of dignity, equality and autonomy.74 New living conditions and 
circumstances are responded to within the secondary sources, but with firm 
consideration of the primary sources.75 The holy sentences which define the core 
principles of human justice are believed to have been uttered by God and his 
messengers. Therefore, they are believed to be the best principles to suit mankind 
at any time. Life, through the passage of time, brings new variables to deal with in 
terms of maintaining human justice.76 Those are believed to have responses in the 
Islamic sources of law. That is, if life matters are not dealt with directly by Sharia, 
they could be dealt with indirectly, by applying the techniques of secondary sources 
of consensus, analogy, independent reasoning, and customs. Through this method, 
almost all new matters can be subjected to Sharia principles and guidelines.77 
 
As outlined in the introduction, there are two types of sources in Sharia. They can 
be categorized as revealed or primary sources and non-revealed or secondary 
sources. The Quran as well as the exemplary conduct and other teachings of 
Prophet Muhammad, constitute the revealed sources. The non-revealed sources 
include Ijma (or consensus), Qiyas (or analogy), Ijtihad (or independent reasoning), 







74 Ez-Aldien (n14) 42-50. 
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76 Abdulmajid Al-Najar, Aims of Sharia with New Prospects (2nd edn Dar Al-Kharb Al-Islami, Beirut 
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1.3.1 Primary Sources  
 
• The Holy Quran  
The Holy Quran is the word of God, which was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad 
over the course of approximately 23 years.78 The revelations were sent down 
gradually for two reasons. Firstly, it allowed for people to assimilate information 
slowly and thoroughly, and secondly it provided the chance for people to 
disseminate and apply the provisions with a better understanding of them.79 The 
Holy Quran contains 114 Suras (or chapters) and a total of 6236 Ayahs (or verses). 
Moreover, while the Holy Quran was revealed during two different periods in 
Makkah and Medina, Makkah was the place where the Islamic message started.80  
This transitional period of time is characterised by instability for the prophet, 
caused by the disbelievers of Qurish who were the dominant tribe living in Makkah 
at that time. This lasted for 13 years until 622, when the prophet could not continue 
to live in Makkah and migrated to Medina in order to continue his message. He was 
supported by the two main tribes living there, “Al-Aws” and “Al-Kazraj”. He 
continued to live in Medina until he died in 632.81 This period of time of the 
prophet’s life is characterised by security and stability. The Makkah chapters are 
characterised by a concern for social and legal rules while the Medinan chapters 
focus on theology and the acknowledgment of the existence and capability of 
God.82 
Ayat-al-ahkam (or verses of rules) forms the 350 legal Quranic verses out of which 
140 verses relate to devotional matters and matters of dogma. These matters include 
practical religious duties such as ritual prayers, fasting, legal alms, pilgrimage and 
charity. Verses devoted to questions of paternity, inheritance, child custody, 
marriage and divorce, usury, mortgage, loans, and bequests account for another 140 
verses, approximately.83 In the Quran, 30 verses can be found on the subject of 
 
78 Ez-Aldien (n14) 11-19. 
79 Al-Sadlan (n6) 16-20. 
80 Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur`an (University of Chicago Press, USA 2009) 80-83. 
81 Kariem (n4) 36-40. 
82 Hub-Allah (n12) 89-92. 
83 Al-Sadlan (n6) 66-72. 
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crime and consequent penalties as well as a further 30 verses on justice, rights and 
duties of citizens, equality and justice, economic matters and consultation in 
government affairs.84  
It is stated that the Holy Quran aims to establish the basic understanding of justice 
and equality that each individual should embrace.85 Although questions have been 
raised as to whether the Quran itself represents a legal text, it is argued by most 
scholars that it does not.86 While the laws and judgments are taken from the Holy 
Quran, the Quranic provisions themselves are not designed to represent a legal text 
since most of them are generic, relating to certain historical events.87 These are then 
in need of further interpretation.88 As Zweigert and Kotz argue: 
“Only a few of the statements in the Quran constitute rules of law capable 
of direct application. It consists mainly of precepts of proper ethical 
behaviour too generally phrased to have the precision and point of legal 
rule…” 89 
There are many ways to explain how rules can be extracted from the Holy Quran, 
and these are studied in the area of Quranic science. On one hand, Nass (or text) is 
the clear and directly stated rule for a specific matter.90 This asserts that the Quranic 
text explains laws clearly and contains no ambiguity. An example of this can be 
found in chapter five, verse 38 in the Quran which clearly indicates the punishment 
for stealing. Also, most Islamic jurists are in favour of the principle that the Quranic 
provision should apply to everyone, unless there is another provision that excludes 
the provision or limits it to certain cases.91 Jurists prefer to generalize the meaning 
rather than limiting the meanings to reason implied in the provision.92 
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It is important to note that understanding the rationale of the Quranic provisions is 
useful in understanding the extracted rule of law.93 This provides an explanation 
for the reasons behind the development and legislation of a certain rule of law and 
its purposes which are reached by utilizing diligence (or Ijtihad).94 However, it is 
not mandatory for Islamic scholars to reach such conclusions since it might be 
impossible to determine the objective of the law, because it is believed that the 
human mind is limited in comparison to God’s all-encompassing knowledge. For 
example, while the practice of capital punishment in Sharia law cannot be 
understood by some modernists, it is believed by most Muslims that its practice is 
for the greater good of the community.95 
• Sunna or Prophetic Acts and Sayings 
Although the Holy Quran was considered the main source of Islamic law during 
the Prophet’s life and during the reign of the rightly-guided Caliphs after the 
Prophet, alternative sources of Islamic law started to emerge during the reign of the 
three main Islamic empires.96 It is known that during the Umayyad Empire, 
individuals paid close attention to the legal reasoning and opinions of the Caliph, 
and later, in the Abbasid Empire, there was an emphasis on Sunna since they 
considered Fiqh (or legal teachings) to be of great importance. Consequently, the 
role of Sunna became paramount in the interpretation of the Quranic provisions 
and it is a main source in sharia, or Islamic Law.97 For Muslims, this provides a 
way of assessing situations based on the teachings and practices of Prophet 
Muhammad and for interpretations of the Quran.98 The Holy Quran instructs 
Muslims to obey the messenger, and in order to do this they have to refer to the Sira 
(or personal history of the prophet) and Hadith (or the prophets sayings), which are 
collectively derived from Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and actions. “Sunna” also 
includes Muhammed’s specific words, habits, practices, and even his silent 
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approvals. It is significant because it addresses many details such as the principles 
underpinning the decisions taken.99 
Prior to the emergence of Islam, the word “Sunna” was used to refer to the customs 
of the Arabs. After the emergence of Islam, Sunna started developing to include the 
customs and rules that govern and influence the lives of individuals.100 The last 
development which occurred was the inclusion of the acts and sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad. This explains the mechanism that enables Muslims to put the 
Quran into practice. As Professor Kamali explains:  
“The Ulama (or religious scholars) are unanimous on the point that Sunna 
is a source of Sharia and that in its rulings with regard to Halal (or 
permitted) and Haram (or forbidden), it stands on the same footing as the 
Qur’an. The words of the Prophet, the Quran tells us, are divinely inspired 
[The Holy Quran 53:3] “His acts and teachings that were meant to establish 
a rule of Sharia constitute a binding proof”.101 
 
Sunna may refer to:102  
A) The acts of the Prophet (or F’al,) which determines the daily living matters of 
the Prophet. 
B) Proverbs (or Qawl). These include the sayings of the Prophet and the matters 
the Prophet either approved or disapproved of verbally. 
C) The approval of others, (or Iqrar). This refers to the approval of the Prophet 
regarding acts carried out by his companions. 
It is notable that the Holy Quran confirms the validity of the Sunna as a source of 
Islamic law by saying “And whatever the Messenger has given you – take; and what 
he has forbidden you – refrain from. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is severe in 
penalty” [The Holy Quran 59:7].103 Moreover, there is a famous Hadith in which 
Aisha (the wife of the Prophet) says of the Prophet, “his behavior was the Quran”. 
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This confirms Professor Baderin’s opinion on Sunna as a fundamental source of 
Islamic law.104 
In context of the rulings of Sharia, first and foremost the sense of Sunna is usually 
synonymous with an act of recommendation.105 It means that one who carries out 
such an action will be rewarded in the next life for observing the Sunna. An example 
is using a miswak (or a plant root) to clean his/her teeth, which was a practice of 
the Prophet, and if an individual does not perform this, there will be no punishment 
for not doing so.106 This is contrasted with Wajib deeds (or obligatory deeds) which 
will have their rewards in the afterlife and there will be a punishment for not doing 
so.107  
Sources from Sunna are identified in the form of texts (or Ahadith, plural of 
Hadith). They are then compared with sources of the Quran to check for any 
similarities or differences. When scholars use this sense of identification, Sunna 
becomes Hadith and evidences of cases can be obtained from the Holy Quran. 
What becomes clear as a result, is that the Quran and Hadith can both be used for 
rulings related to obligatory actions as well as recommended actions in Sunna. So 
therefore, the Quran is not exclusively used to formulate necessary actions nor is 
Hadith exclusively used to formulate recommended actions - they are applicable 
for both obligatory and recommended actions, respectively.108 
The Sunna is a practical expression of what is in the Quran. Sunna is also a great 
source for the explanation and clarification of Quranic verses in many ways, and it 
is a guide for acts of worship and laws. One who follows Sunna can easily perform 
those acts of worships and fulfil Quranic laws and regulations. For example, Allah, 
in the Quran, commanded followers to pray, but there is no mention of the timings 
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of the prayers or the manner in which one should pray.109 The Prophet Muhammad 
clarified those commandments through his own teachings and practical examples. 
He taught Muslims how to pray and said, “Pray as you have seen me praying”.110 
It is important to explain how the Sunna was formed. The companions and 
followers of the Prophet used to either memorize or write down all his acts and 
sayings, including each single detail of what the Prophet used to do and how he 
lived his daily life and it is in this manner that Hadith was formed.111 The Sunna 
(the sayings and acts of the prophet) thus consists of two parts. The first is Isnad, 
which means the transmitter or transmitters of the Hadith (the sayings of the 
prophet).112 The second is the Matn, which means the text of the Hadith. At this 
point, although the two terms may share similar meanings, it is important to 
distinguish between Sunna and Hadith.113 Sunna refers to the conduct of the 
Prophet himself while Hadith refers to the act of transmitting and writing down the 
Prophet’s conduct. So it could be said that Sunna was passed on through different 
generations by means of Hadith. There are many basic collections of Hadiths, such 
as Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim. It should be noted that Hadith indicates only 
the sayings of the Prophet while Sunna indicates both his sayings and acts.114  
It is argued that it is possible to form laws from Sunna by the same law-making 
methods that are used to make laws out of the Holy Quran.115 However, Sunna or 
Hadith has a different level of authority that influences the legal enforcement of the 
laws extracted from Sunna. There are three levels of authority:116 
• Mutawatir (or repeated). This means that Hadith was transmitted through 
trustworthy narrators and the chain consists of people famous for their strong 
faith. This kind of Hadith enjoys a strong legal enforcement power. 
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• Mashhoor (or famous). This means that the Hadith was passed on by a great 
number of trusted narrators but by fewer narrators than in the Mutwatir 
approach, and consequently it has a lesser degree of legal enforcement. 
• Ahad (or the one). This means that the Hadith was transmitted by individuals. 
This approach has the most limited legal power of the three approaches. 
Finally, the question arises as to whether it is possible to make laws out of Sunna. 
In this regard, it is noted that Sunna contains the following two categorisations:117  
• Legal Sunna: elements of the Prophet’s conduct that might qualify as law, such 
as family law and inheritance law.  
• Non-legal Sunna: this includes the daily living habits of the Prophet – how he 
slept, dressed or ate food. These types of actions are not mandatory while the 
legal enforcement of the legal Sunna depends on the level of authority of Hadith 
(as explained earlier).   
 
1.3.2 Secondary Sources 
• Ijma or Consensus 
Ijma is the consensus of Muslims on a certain religious issue after the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad. The credibility of Ijma as a source of Islamic law comes from 
famous Hadiths, which is when the Prophet said “My community will not agree on 
an error”.118 
Three conditions have to be met in order to consider Ijma as a source of law. First, 
it has to be agreed on by Islamic scholars (or Mujtahids), so individuals who are 
not Muslims should be excluded. Secondly, all jurists should reach an agreement 
without having any single disagreement. Thirdly, the consensus has to be based on 
the Holy Quran or Sunna, and should not contradict them in any way.119 
Nonetheless, many scholars argue that it would be enough to reach the consensus 
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of the majority of scholars in order to constitute Ijma.120 The result is that there are 
different scholars of Ijma in the Islamic world.  
Usul-al-fiqh (or foundations of jurisprudence) are divided into four sources and 
Ijma is one of them.121 Scholars have given considerable importance to the concept 
of Ijma as Islamic laws which can be easily understood are formulated with the help 
of Ijma. The way in which a Muslim community practices certain things thereby 
forming the laws and orders for that community are explained by the concept of 
Ijma. There are examples of Ijma from Muslims in history when scholars agreed on 
something on the basis of consensus. Over time, Ijma became a traditional authority 
and now it represents the authority of a Muslim community. It helps in 
understanding how people from Medina followed certain practices and beliefs and 
how they reached an agreement based on consensus.122 
 
In Islam, Muslims are taught to practice tolerance when they face different 
problems in certain operations. Ijma provides that principle of tolerance since it is 
a mutual agreement between parties. Ijma provides equal authority to all four 
Madhhabs (or four legal schools of thought) based on this principle of tolerance.123 
Another role of Ijma, which makes it distinct from other sources, is the way in 
which it provides authentication to the practices of non-Muslims who convert to 
Islam.124 People who convert to Islam in later stages of their lives follow certain 
practices and Ijma helps to check authenticity of those practices. In this day and age 
when there are vast differences in customs and behaviours all over the world, Ijma 
helps in providing reformed solutions regarding Sharia and it does not necessarily 
base its ruling on old, traditional customs.125  
  
It is put forward that Ijma (or consensus) can take two forms - explicit and implicit. 
The former occurs when every scholar expresses his or her opinion in an outright 
way, while the latter occurs when some scholars express their opinions but the 
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others abstain or remain silent (being silent indicates satisfaction with the proposed 
idea and that there is no disagreement).126 
As a source of law, Ijma is not regarded as divine like the Holy Quran and some 
Sunna; it emphasizes the importance of the role of community (or Umah) by 
allowing individuals to participate in the law-making process. However, there are 
two main reservations regarding Ijma.127 The first of these is that it is not clear what 
Umah refers to. It may refer to either all the Muslims worldwide or Muslims within 
a certain community. The second issue is that there is no clear criteria that is to be 
applied in order to qualify as a scholar. That is to say that the classification of 
someone as a jurist, or even Mujtahid, is considered to be too vague.128 
Ijma (or consensus) thus has its limitation. Moreover, although it has been used as 
a secondary source to seek answers from Sharia, applying its classical definition to 
modern times is somewhat difficult.129 The most logical explanation is the fact that 
spread of scholars is colossal and covers numerous continents. This difficulty 
hinders Ijma to fully function at a more regional scale. It is bound to operate locally 
and can only be useful in cases such as law-making through parliament. These laws, 
however, cannot be binding forever.130 It requires extensive effort to revive the old-
style Ijma since traditions are no longer in practice and to meet the requirements of 
modern Islamic era, the classical definition cannot be applied.131  
Ijma as a source of law has to consider the practical issues that enable it to be 
applied effectively and reliably in the Muslim community, otherwise it will remain 
(for some scholars) a relative source, which cannot provide certainty regarding 
Islamic issues.132 
• Qiyas or Analogy 
The literal meaning of Qiyas is ascertaining or measuring something. This could be 
applied to quality, weight or length. To determine and establish the similarity or 
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quality among things, Qiyas is used.133 When a ruling has to be made from an 
original case to a new case, Qiyas can be employed as an extension of Sharia since 
the cause of the original case would be same as the new one. This depiction has 
been derived from the language of Usul (or assets).134 In effect, texts of the Quran 
and Sunna provide a ruling foundation through which original cases were regulated 
and therefore extended to new cases. Hence, Qiyas places emphasis on exploring 
common causes among original and other new cases. It must be noted that any law 
derived through the Qiyas method cannot be considered as a new law. Qiyas only 
provides ruling for different cases and matters for practical purposes.135  
Qiyas occurs when comparing two cases. The first arises when there is a clear 
judgment from the Quran, Sunna or Ijma and the second when there is no clear 
judgment since it considered as a new issue. Hypothetically, where there are 
common threads between the two cases, then they are both considered to be under 
the same Sharia view.136 
Qiyas is considered as a rationalist doctrine by the jurists. This is because intellect 
is mainly used to explore causes. But greater significance is given to divine 
revelation rather than to personal opinion and causes can only be derived from the 
text of the Quran and/or Sunna.  This is why Qiyas cannot change or modify any 
law of the Quran or Sunna’s text for expediency. If jurists are to use Qiyas as a 
methodology, they have to accept that there are certain Maqasids (objectives) and 
that jurists are in accordance with reason.137  
Qiyas finds its credibility in the fact that the Holy Quran encourages individuals to 
use their own reasoning in attempts to arrive at reasonable opinions. Furthermore, 
it is known that the Prophet resorted to Qiyas in dealing with new matters.138 
There are four conditions that have to be satisfied if Qiyas is to be applied. First, 
the studied case has to have no existing guidance in the primary sources of law. 
Secondly, the original case has to have a form of guidance which is proven by a 
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primary source. Thirdly, the Qiyas result should not contradict the primary sources 
and the principles of Islam. Finally, there must be indisputable commonalities 
between the two concerned cases.139  
Since new rulings are purely based on causes found in the Quran and Sunna texts, 
Qiyas is considered a methodology by jurists to explore new areas and keep their 
rulings for those areas within Quran and Sunna jurisdiction. If scholars do not apply 
Qiyas correctly in cases, the ruling on those cases will change from laws defined 
by the Quran and Sunna. Following the Quran and Sunna can only authenticate the 
concept of Qiyas.140  
 
• Ijtihad or Exercising Independent Reasoning 
Ijtihad is attempting to arrive at a new religious opinion on the basis of independent 
legal reasoning.141 In other words, the individual is supposed to deduce a religious 
idea from the provisions mentioned in the primary sources. The person who 
practices Ijtihad is called a Mujtahid.142 
The concept of Ijtihad derives from a famous Islamic principle in Sharia that says 
a “legal ruling may change over time”.143  Ijtihad has been considered as a source 
of law since the early days of Islam. The validity of Ijtihad is mentioned in both the 
Holy Quran and Sunna. The Holy Quran says “Indeed, in that are signs for a people 
who give thought” [30:21]. 
Ijtihad is concerned with effort. According to Islamic law, for those problems 
which are not covered by Quran, Sunna or Ijma (or consensus), an original or 
independent interpretation can be employed as Ijtihad. There were adequately 
qualified jurists in early Muslim community known as Mujtahids who practiced a 
right of original thinking.144 This original thinking consisted mainly of analogical 
reasoning and personal judgment. Crystallization of Madhhabs (or four legal 
schools) in the time of the Abbasid empire (reign750-1258) closed the gates of 
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Ijtihad. Those legal schools ended the qualification of scholars as Mujtahids. Taqlid 
(or imitation) was the criteria for succeeding generations of jurists which dictated 
an unquestioned and unchallenged acceptance of their predecessors’ authority.145  
Ijtihad is often considered as an intellectual endeavor to obtain solutions by 
Muslims of their day to day problems. Islam has placed a great deal of emphasis on 
Ijtihad.146 It is considered as one of the most analytical and rational approaches to 
interpret the religious matters based on teachings of the Quran and Sunna. Quranic 
verses are helpful for thinkers and they stress the practice of a rational mind. To 
keep a society progressive and on track on the right path of wisdom, Quran and 
Sunna are considered as prerequisites.147 This is evident in the following Quranic 
verse. “Do not treat Allah’s signs as a jest, but solemnly rehearse Allah’s favors to 
you, and the fact that He sent down to you the Book and wisdom, for your 
instruction.” [2:231].   
Ijtihad as a source of law is essential for keeping up to date with changes in life and 
in different places and eras.  However, there are two main conditions for the practice 
of Ijtihad. Firstly, it is important that there are no primary sources which offer 
guidance and judgment for the particular offence in question. Secondly, Ijtihad has 
to be practiced by a jurist or scholar with enough knowledge of Islamic 
jurisprudence and its legal teachings or Fiqh.148  
Some scholars oppose Ijtihad claiming that it might be used excessively even to the 
point of questioning the basics tenets of Sharia. However, this could be avoided by 
applying the conditions of Ijtihad and respecting the basics tenets of Sharia 
including the primary sources of law.149 
• Urf or Customs 
Urf occurs when individuals gradually begin to follow a certain behavior regarding 
a particular issue until they establish an unwritten rule of law. This source is 
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essential in cases where there are no official legislations.150 Urf is mentioned as a 
valid source of law in Sunna, which says that “What is considered good by Muslims 
is considered good by God and what is considered bad by Muslims is considered 
bad by God”.151 
Urf can take two forms. The first of these is the general form which means that all 
Muslims follow a certain practice. The second is the private form, which means 
that Muslims in one country follow certain practices which may not be practiced in 
others.152  
There are two conditions for applying Urf. Firstly, there has to be a recurrent act 
that all people agree with. Secondly, Urf should not violate the primary sources of 
law.153 There are two further important issues to consider with regards to Urf. First, 
Urf may take place without requiring jurists or scholars to follow. In other words, 
any Muslim who does not have enough knowledge of Islam is considered in Urf. 
Second, Urf may differ from place to place.154 
Different things happen in different eras and they are very important in case of Urf. 
One significant condition in the case of Urf is that rulings made in past cases cannot 
be applied to cases in the present time. Any such ruling will be baseless and it will 
have no authenticity. Certain behaviors of individuals should be in line with Sharia 
laws and they should not disobey the divine laws. 155 
There is common misconception that Urf (or customs) and Ijma (or consensus) are 
the same. The difference between Urf and Ijma is built on a geographic basis. Ijma 
covers countries and places and is based upon agreement of Ulama (or community) 
whereas Urf is an essential practice limited to local regions.156 Furthermore there 
are two sub-divisions of Urf: Fili (or actual) and Qawli (or verbal).  The former is 
related with practices of the people while the latter concerns itself with the 
agreement of individuals on the meanings of words. Agreement of an individual 
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influences meanings in such a way that literal meaning becomes an exception and 
customary meaning is improved to the status of a dominant meaning.157  
Urf Fili (or actual) and Urf Qawli (or verbal) are also subject to sub-division and 
they too are divided into two types: Al-Urf-al Khass (or private customs) and Al-
Urf-al Amm (or general customs). The former is concerned with practices and 
customs of a particular locality or country. Usul (or assets) is majorly concerned 
with this type of Urf. The latter type of Urf is literally non-existent and is related to 
practices and customs of all individuals everywhere.158  
If Urf is valid and is in accordance with the teachings of the Quran and Sunna, it is 
classified as Urf al Sahih (or valid Urf).  If it does not accord with the teachings of 
the Quran and Sunna, it is classified as Urf al Fasid or (disapproved Urf).159  
Urf has many different characteristics and scholars have divided Urf based on these 
characteristics. Three main types of Urf include positive Urf, neutral Urf and 
negative Urf. If customs or behaviours of individuals show hospitality and kindness 
towards a particular aspect, then Urf will be considered as positive. If Urf only 
describes culture of some particular place and its usual practices, then it will be a 
neutral Urf. Furthermore, if practices or behaviours of individuals in some areas are 
against the teachings of the Quran and Sunna, then their Urf will be considered as 
a negative Urf. They should stop following such traditions and customs which are 
primarily against the Quran and Sunna.160  
There is a debate on the authenticity of Urf as an independent proof. Through 
discussions and views of senior scholars, Urf can be denounced as an independent 
proof though it can help in the interpretation and implementation of the Islamic law. 
It should be noted that rules of Urf are subject to change albeit that there is the need 
for caution when doing this since Urf is one of the major sources of understanding 
and applying Islamic law.161 
 
 
157 Ez-Aldien (n14) 63-68. 
158 Hallaq (n7) 132-136. 
159 Al-Najar (n76) 94-99. 
160 Bin-Ashour (n1) 143-147. 
161 Al-Sadlan (n6) 102-110. 
40 
1.4 Conclusion 
It is clear from this chapter that the definition and aims of the Sharia are 
transparent.162 The deeply rooted belief and faith among Muslims means that the 
acceptance of such a divine source of law is usually readily and unquestionably 
accepted, thereby strengthening the rules and orders of Sharia. Such firm belief also 
results in an extraordinary level of faith in the law.163  
The Holy Quran and Sunna teach and guide Muslims to think and act for 
themselves and others with the precepts of dignity, equality and autonomy.164 New 
living conditions and circumstances are responded to within the secondary sources, 
but with firm consideration of the primary sources.  
The Quranic provisions themselves are not designed to represent a legal text since 
most of them are generic, relating to certain historical events, and are in need of 
further interpretation. Therefore laws and judgements are taken from the holy 
Quran after going through the task of study and interpretation.165 This interpretation 
is helped by looking into the Sunna for information and guidelines on the context 
of such legislations and it further helps in the interpretation of the Quran.166 The 
Sunna reveals certain points which may not have been addressed in the Quran, such 
as the surrounding context of certain principles, making it therefore possible to form 
laws from Sunna using the same law-making principles that are used to make laws 
out of the Holy Quran.167    
The primary sources are established and unchanging, while the secondary sources 
are flexible.168 This combination of stability and flexibility built in the sources of 
Islamic law enables it to cope with changes of life matters throughout time.169 The 
realism and clarity of Sharia strengthen its position as a source of law.170 The other 
important characteristic of Sharia is its balancing of community and individual 
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interests which also supports Sharia’s ability to cope with changing human nature 






































Saudi Court Structure and Procedures 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one examined Sharia and its main sources in the light of Islam’s teachings 
which are incorporated into the legal systems of Muslim countries today. When we 
talk about Sharia, we are referring to a divine set of laws and orders predisposed 
by God in the form of Quranic and Sunna teachings primarily. There are other 
secondary sources of the Sharia as well including Ijma, Qiyas, Ijtihad, and Urf, 
which are explained at length in the previous chapter. All forms and sources of 
Sharia are significant and law-makers follow certain rulings within Islamic 
jurisprudence in relation to one source or more.  
This chapter specifically talks about the practical role of the Sharia in the context 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. While the chapter will analyse how the country 
integrates Sharia laws into its own judicial system, it will also describe the court 
structure and legal procedures of Saudi Arabia in order to form an understanding 
regarding the main characteristics of a legal system based on Sharia regulations.   
The chapter, by focusing on legal structures allowed by Sharia statues, will also 
enable readers to comprehend the intensive development of a legal system refining 
itself to achieve modernism. Examining the process which occurred in the legal 
system of KSA -where there was the gradual delegation of significant roles from 
community leaders to the official judges, and from traditional norms to decreed 
procedures- can help us better understand how Sharia works, especially as regards 
the role of “ultimate authorities” in enacting laws. 
 
 2.2 Role of Sharia in the Saudi Arabian Legal System 
In Saudi Arabia, all laws and orders of the country are supposed to be implemented 
based on Sharia principles.1  This approach has been adopted since the foundation 
of the state by King Abdul-Aziz who made the following declaration to his citizens: 
“The Islamic Sharia is the main law that will be in place throughout the Kingdom 
 
1 Mohammed Al-Kahtaney, The Constitutional Orders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1st edn King 
Fahad Library 2011) 124-129. 
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of Saudi Arabia”.2 From that point onwards, Sharia has been considered as the 
National Constitution.3  
Provisions which ascertain the role of Sharia in Saudi life are contained in the 
document “Governing Order”, Royal Decree No. A/90 of 2nd March 1992.4 This is 
the first official attempt to record all Saudi government organizational policies into 
one document.5  These are as follows: 
1. Article one: "Saudi Arabia is an Arabic and Islamic state with full sovereignty, 
its religion is Islam, and its Constitution - the Book of Allah and the Sunna of 
His Messenger". 
2. Article seven: "The verdict, which means the official rules and orders, derive 
its power in Saudi Arabia and its authority from the Book of Allah and the 
Sunna of His Messenger, respectively, and both are ruling parties on the system 
and all state systems." 
3. Article eight: "The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rises on the 
basis of justice, consultation and equality, in accordance with Islamic law." 
4. Article 23: "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia protects the faith of Islam and the 
application of its Sharia Law, and its orders with the enjoining of good, 
promotion of virtue, forbidding of evil and the duty of calling to God." 
5. Article 46: "[T]he judiciary is an independent authority; there is no power over 





2 Osama H. Al-Masdy, Comparative Proof of Islamic Jurisprudence and Saudi and Emirates Law (1st 
edn Dar Al-Kutub Al-Qanunia, Cairo 2013) 221-226. 
3 Haikel Kaliel, The Administrative Saudi Law (King Saud University publications, Riyadh 1994) 86-
91. See Chapter 9 for more. 
4 As will be discussed further in Chapter 9. 
5 Abdulrahmen Al-Shalhub, The Constitutional Order in K.S.A between Islamic Sharia and 
Comparative Law (2nd edn Al-Shakrey Publications, Riyadh 2012) 33-34. 
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2.3 Saudi Court Structure and Procedures 
Before 2007, the Saudi court structure and procedures reflected traditional Islamic 
judicial practice.6 Some scholars compare them with practices that existed even 
before the time of the Ottoman Empire.7 The royal decrees of 2007 which aim to 
reform the Saudi legal system, are the first national attempt to regulate this vital 
field.8 Unfortunately, these decrees are considered to be too flexible, do not 
consider measures for implementation, or even lay out a schedule for reforms to be 
carried out. The decrees provided court structure with no tangible procedures.9 In 
addition, important descriptions of courts, such as the number of judges, are left to 
the Ministry of Justice to determine without specifying a time limit.10  
Implementation of the reforms are also the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. 
However, only major cities have started implementing the new structures.11 Until 
they are implemented, the existing courts and judicial committees will continue to 
exercise first instance jurisdiction over concerned cases. 
 Notwithstanding these delays, however, the Saudi Arabian court structure is now 
regulated by the Judiciary Law, promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/78 on 1 
October 2007. The Judiciary Law is administered by the Ministry of Justice in 
accordance with the directives of the government relating to the development of the 
judiciary.12 In 2007, King Abdullah issued royal decrees with the aim of reforming 
the legal system. Some of the changes foreshadowed by the reforms have already 
been implemented.13 Akin to the old structure, the new court structure also contains 
three main courts, namely the Supreme Court, Appellate Court and Courts of First 
 
6 Al-Shahat I. Mansour, Defined and Discretionary Rules in the Islamic Criminal Law (Dar Al-Fiker 
Al-Jamee, Alexandria 2011) 33-36. 
7 Al-Masdy (n2) 169-173. 
8 Jusief A. Keshishian, Amendments in Law and Politics in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1st edn Al-
Reyes Publications, Riyadh 2015) 331-338. 
9 Al-Kahtaney (n1) 92-94. 
10 Omer Al-Kuley, The Justice is Pleading (1st edn Saudi Center for Legal Research and Studies, 
Jeddah 2010) 76-78. 
11 Mohammed Al-Fuzan, The New Judiciary System in K.S.A-Comparative Study with Islamic 
Jurisprudence (Maktabat Al-Kanun for Publications, Riyadh 2010) 284-291. 
12 Ali R. Barakat, Explanation of the New Saudi Judiciary System (1st edn Maktabat Al-Kanun for 
Publications, Riyadh 2012) 194-199. 
13  Al-Kuley (n10) 22-24. 
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Instance. Courts of the First Instance are made of five main courts: the general, 
criminal, family,14  commercial15 and labour16 courts.17  
It should be noted that the courts have not yet been implemented.  
2.3.1 Court Structure 
Before turning to consider the latest reforms, it is helpful to briefly mention the old 
court structure which was made up of two hierarchical levels. The first level 
contained the appellate courts; the second level contained the general and summary 
courts. The general courts dealt with textual and family cases, while the summary 
courts dealt with discretionary and financial cases.18 As stated, however, now the 
courts are at a transitional stage. Provinces which include the two major cites – 
Riyadh and Jeddah, have started to implement the new court structure while other 
provinces are still functioning with the old structure. Stages of implementation vary 
from one province to another and from each town or a city to another.19 Once the 
reforms have been fully implemented, the court system will be organized 
hierarchically as follows:  
 
14 Article 33 of the Law of Procedures before the Sharia Courts states that Family Courts shall have 
the jurisdiction over specific family matters. All family statues cases including: 
1- Recording marriage, divorce, ‘khul’ divorce at the insistence of the wife, marriage 
dissolution, Raj`a “Return” custody, support, and visit. 
2- Registration of endowment, probate, paternity, absence, death, and determination of 
erth or heritage. 
3- Legacy and division of succession including disputed property, shares in endowments or 
wills, minor, or absent parties. 
15 According to Article 35 of the Law of Procedures before the Sharia Courts, the Commercial courts 
shall have jurisdiction over specific commercial law matters: 
1. All commercial disputes-whether principal or consequential-occurring among traders. 
2. Lawsuits filed against the trader because of the principal or consequential acts thereof. 
3. Disputes occurring among partners in partnerships. 
16 Article 34 of the Law of Procedures before the Sharia Courts states: 
Labour courts shall have jurisdiction over specific labour law matters:  
1. Disputes relating to employment contracts, wages, rights, labour injuries, and granting 
compensation thereto. 
2. Disputes relating to the imposition of the disciplinary penalties by the employer on the 
employee, or exemption thereof. 
3. Lawsuits filed to execute the penalties set forth in the Labour Law. 
17 The reform did not include measures to develop judicial procedures. Barakat (n12) 186-194.    
18 The Judiciary Law, Royal Decree No. (M/64), [23 July 1975]. Umm Al-Qura Newspaper (Makkah, 
5 September 1975). 
19 Barakat (n12) 80-82. 
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Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court in Riyadh is the highest appellate court in Saudi Arabia.20 
Administrative details of each case (for example the number of judges or those 
allowed in the courtroom) are defined by the Ministry of Justice and the court’s 
highest administration.21 The jurisdiction of the court is spelt out by Article 11 of 
the Judiciary Law.  Reviewing judgments and decisions issued, or supported by the 
appellate courts such as death, amputation, stoning or punishment. Its 
responsibilities include reviewing judgments and decisions issued or supported by 
the appellate courts and related to cases not mentioned in the previous provision, or 
providing a final judgment without dealing with the merits of a case, if the reason 
of the objection to the judgment is one of the following:     
• That laws that the King shall issue are inconsistent with Sharia laws. So, when 
the court decides that a law or order issued by the king is not consistent with 
Sharia, it would be considered invalid. 
• That a judgment issues from a court that does not have a valid composition 
according to what is stated in this law and others. 
• That a judgment is issued by a non-competent panel or court. 
• That there is a fault in the case facts or description of the case. 
 
Appellate Courts 
Each of the Kingdom’s 13 provinces has at least one appellate court. There are five 
categories of appellate courts.22 With jurisdiction as follows: 
1. Legal “rights”. 
2. Criminal. 
3. Family status. 
 
20 Sied Abu-Eita, Comparative Study of Saudi Criminal Law (1st edn Dar Al-Fiker, Jeddah 2011) 64-
48. 
21 Kalied K. Al-Zahier, The Administrative Judiciary in K.S.A (Maktabat Al-Kanun for Publications, 
Riyadh, 2010) 36-41. 





Article 17 of the Judiciary Law states “the appellate courts shall look at judgments 
issued by the courts of first instances. They shall issue judgements after viewing 
the respondents' petitions according to Sharia procedure law courts and law of 
criminal procedure”. 
Courts of First Instance 
There are Courts of First Instance in the various provinces and governorates.  The 
Law of Procedures before the Sharia Courts, as issued by Royal Decree No. M/1 
on 25 November 2013 regulates the jurisdictions of the Courts of First Instance. 
This is supplemented by the Law of Criminal Procedures, which was issued by 
Royal Decree No. M/2 on 25 November 2013 in relation to the jurisdiction of the 
Criminal Courts of First Instance. They include general courts, criminal courts, 
family courts, commercial courts and labour courts. 
General Courts 
Article 31 of the Law of Procedures before the Sharia Courts states that “General 
Courts” shall have jurisdiction over all claims and cases or the like not under the 
jurisdiction of other courts, notary public, and the Board of Grievances (or 
administrative courts).23 In particular, such courts shall have jurisdiction over the 
following:  
1. Lawsuits involving property, disputing the ownership thereof, a right relative 
thereto, faulty cases against the property or the beneficiaries thereof, lawsuits 
for restraining interference with possession or for recovery of possession, 
evacuation, paying the rent, or contributing therein, or the lawsuits for 
restraining interference with possession, or for recovery of possession or the 
like, unless otherwise stated therein or for heritage. 
2. Issuing title deeds or registration of endowment. 
3. Lawsuits arising from traffic accidents or the violations set forth in the traffic 
code and the executive regulations thereof. 
 
23 Al-Kahtaney (n1) 32-40. 
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Criminal Courts 
Article 128 of the Law of Criminal Procedures states: “Without prejudice to the 
jurisdiction of other courts, the criminal court shall have jurisdiction over all 
criminal cases.” 
Article 20 of the Judiciary Law states: 
“The criminal court shall compose the following specialized panels to provide 
expert advice to the court: 
(a)   Panels for punishments (Qisas) and Sharia laws (Al-Hudud). 
(b)   Panels for discretionary punishments (Tazir). 
(c)    Panels for juveniles/minors.”24 
It should be noted again, however, that not all provinces have implemented the new 
court structure.        
2.3.2 The Role of the King and Ultimate Authority 
An important dimension of the Saudi court structure is the assignment of roles of 
ultimate authority over discretionary rules, judicial statues and the implementation 
of different judicial rules. Article 48 and 50 of the “Governing Order” of the 
Kingdom, issued by the royal decree No .A/90 of 2nd March 1992, provide the 
following: 
Article 48: The courts will apply the rules of the Islamic Sharia in the cases that are 
brought before them, in accordance with what is indicated in the Holy Quran and 
the Sunna, and statutes decreed by the ruler, which do not contradict the Holy 
Quran or the Sunna. 
Article 50: The King, or whoever deputizes for him, is responsible for the 
implementation of judicial rulings. 
 
24 In some provinces criminal matters are still being dealt with by the old judicial system. 
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The King’s distinctive role is an Islamic tradition which existed in the early days 
of Islam. It proves the leader of the community had direct relation with judicial 
practice.25 In many regions this role was gradually delegated to judges as the 
community grew in population and geographical area.26 In Saudi Arabia, however, 
this tradition is still being reviewed at the present time. The Saudi Arabian royal 
system includes the royal decreed procedures and therefore means the King can 
declare what he sees as good for his citizens’ situation thereby enforcing a royal 
decree which would then be regarded as law. However, this is still secondary to 
Sharia, as announced throughout the ruling of King Fahad bin Abdul-Aziz.27     
With regards to the King’s role over discretionary rules, the actual practice indicates 
that he has the authority to interfere with discretionary rules when he believes such 
interference to be of public interest. The famous 2006 example of the Al-Katief 
case serves to exemplify this power.28 Accused of meeting a young male in a public 
place, Al-Katief was sentenced with 90 lashes on November 1, 2006. She and her 
lawyer appealed to the King. The royal office transferred her appeal to the higher 
judicial council to study her case. The council, after studying the case, transferred 
the case papers to the court's judges to increase the punishment, by the council’s 
decision No.4-979, dated in early 2007. A committee of judges was formed to 
respond to the higher council recommendation. They increased the discretionary 
rule to six months imprisonment and 200 lashes. The King, however intervened and 
made his order to pardon the young woman. The order was explained through 
various means of media which reiterated that the King has the authority to interfere 
with the discretionary rules when he believes such interference to be of public 
interest.  
It should be noted that appealing to the King is usually made through his royal 
office, through a letter stating the subject of appeal. The alternative way of 
appealing is by meeting him and handing the appeal letter to him directly. Such 
meetings do not have specific times and take place according to the King’s 
 
25 Al-Kahtaney (n1) 33-38. 
26 Ryan (n22) 108-114. 
27 Al-Zahier (n21) 21-26. 
28 Al-Riyadh Newspaper (Riyadh, 18 March 2007). 
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availability. It is noteworthy that although these meetings are decreasing as time 
goes on, appeals to the King are answered through his royal office.29  
2.4 Main Characteristics of Courts Procedures in Saudi Arabia 
With increasing criticism and demand for more critical and faster courts 
procedures.30 Saudi courts have undergone an intensive development. Court 
procedures, until recently, lacked effectiveness and modernism as some claimed 
they were excessively traditional.31 The responsibility for their development lies 
with the Ministry of Justice.32  
A) Initiating a Lawsuit: It is not required by the claimants to issue formal demand 
letters in order to initiate a private lawsuit.33 If a claimant wants to initiate a lawsuit 
against public authorities, it requires him/her to file a complaint with the concerned 
authorities first. If that complaint gets rejected or the concerned authorities do not 
take any action or provide a response within 60 days, the claimant can then initiate 
the lawsuit against the public authorities.34 Litigation can only be preceded with 
mediation in the case of family disputes. Parties cannot submit for mediation in any 
other case. In family disputes, official mediation is offered to both parties before 
the official process of any legal action.35  
The Saudi courts have jurisdiction over residents in Saudi Arabia who are not 
national citizens as well.36 The pleading system is not formally accepted by the 
Saudi law. Claimants are required to file their cases with the court in the form of 
written submissions.37 Depending on the situation and trial proceeding, any party 
 
29 Al-Kahtaney (n1) 52-60. 
30 Al-Zahier (n21) 40-50. 
31 Al-Riyadh Newspaper (n28). 
32 Mohammed A. Al-Jarba, Saudi Legal Affairs (Maktabat Al-Kanun for Publications, Riyadh 2009) 
88-94.  
33 Mohammed Al-Fuzan, Orders of K.S.A (Maktabat Al-Kanun for Publications, Riyadh 2010) 44-49. 
34 Abdulfadiel Mohammed, The Law in Line with Saudi Orders (1st edn Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabia 
1994) 186-191. 
35 Al-Zahier (n21) 45-48. 
36 Mohammed (n34) 195-198. 
37 Al-Fuzan (n11) 87-89. 
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can modify or change their arguments in Saudi courts.38 It must be noted that Saudi 
courts do not charge claimants.  
Claimants have the liberty to affect the service in Saudi Arabia through normal 
procedure or outside of the Kingdom through diplomatic channels.39 Nevertheless, 
courts usually carry out the service of process. A claimant can demand that a 
defendant is forced to attend a court hearing by applying through the courts for 
police assistance.40 However, this is only possible when a defendant was duly 
summoned but failed to appear before the court. The court will enter a default 
judgment if it is somehow not possible or convenient to bring defendants before the 
court.41 It must be noted that Saudi courts do not allow class actions.  
B) Pretrial Proceedings: To dismiss a lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds, it is 
required by the parties to file applications before they lodge a substantive defence. 
Court jurisdiction will be accepted once a defendant has lodged the substantive 
defence. Nevertheless, the court can use jurisdictional ground to dismiss any case 
on its own motion.42 Since the Saudi courts cannot have geographic jurisdiction, it 
forms the common basis to contest proceedings by the defendants over given 
disputes. Disputes can come before a judicial tribunal or any different Saudi court.43 
A petition can be filed by parties with an interest to the court including oral requests 
to join either as a defendant or a claimant in matter of disputes.44 Judges are also 
given discretion under which they can request interested parties to join the 
proceedings whether or not that party made any application to join the proceeding. 
Saudi legal proceedings prohibit discovery of documents.45 Cases can only be 
substantiated on the basis of possession of documents by the claimants. Similarly, 
to defend the case, defendants must have documents in their possession. Discovery 
 
38 Mohamed Al-Samary, The Administrative Decision in K.S.A (The Administrative College, Riyadh 
1994) 120-125. 
39 Waleed Hashiem, The Governing Orders and the State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1st edn 
Dar Jeddah Library, Jeddah 2005) 76-82. 
40 Ryan (n22) 49-55. 
41 Al-Jarba (n32) 54-60. 
42 Al-Samary (n38) 41-64. 
43 Mansour (n6) 77-80. 
44 Al-Kahtaney (n1) 33-38. 
45 Mansour (n6) 62-66. 
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of documents will not be made by the court if claimants or defendants are not in 
possession of the documents.46  
C) Trials: There is a broad similarity between the proceedings before all judicial 
tribunals and Saudi courts and the proceedings before the civil law jurisdiction 
courts.47 Short hearings range between 15 minutes to 90 minutes and usually take 
place during the litigation process and there is no pre-trial procedure as such. The 
court summons the parties to a hearing once it formally institutes the action. This 
occurs usually after a couple of weeks of a complaint being filed.48 Parties can file 
their written submissions at this point and/or in any subsequent hearing. They can 
have oral arguments and can provide the evidence. Arguments of parties are 
unfolded step-by-step. The respective arguments can be modified or changed at any 
moment during proceedings by any party.49 Limitless submissions can be filed by 
applicants during the course of proceedings. Intervals between hearings can be of 
several weeks depending upon the involvement of caseload of the proceeding court. 
Since there are no jury trials, it is common to meticulously exhaust the respective 
arguments by both parties before the closing of their submissions.50  
The taking of an oath is of significant value in the Saudi law of evidence. When a 
claimant conclusively fails to prove his/her case, either through documentary 
evidence or witness, the liability of the defendant can still be challenged through 
taking an oath.51 The case will be closed and no further appeals will be allowed if 
the defendant accepts the claimants challenge and refutes his/her claim on oath. 
Nevertheless, claimants do not usually challenge the defendants on basis of an oath 
since it is demanding and is of immense religious value. Hence it is not frequently 
invoked on but remains an available option.52  
Expert evidence can be introduced lawfully into Saudi legal proceedings by the 
parties.53 When complex, technical and financial issues are raised in the court, 
 
46 Kaliel (n3) 34-42. 
47 Al-Jarba (n32) 32-36. 
48 Ryan (n22) 108-114. 
49 Kaliel (n3) 101-106. 
50 Al-Kahtaney (n1) 17-21. 
51 Al-Samary (n38) 16-21. 
52 Mohammed (n34) 221-226. 
53 Abu-Eita (n20) 64-68. 
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judges usually appoint an expert or team of experts to serve as advisors to the 
tribunal.54 The appointment of an expert is, however, within full discretion of the 
tribunal. It is also within their discretion to either partially or fully accept or 
disregard the findings of the expert(s). Experts are, however, responsible for the 
determination of complex or technical issues.55  
D) Settlement: Parties are open to settle any dispute on their own at any time and it 
does not require them to obtain the court’s approval. However, this will only 
discontinue the court proceedings formally if the complaint was withdrawn by the 
claimant or settlement has been recorded before the court.56 Settlements of such 
lawsuits are kept confidential since each and every court proceeding in Saudi 
Arabia is treated as strictly confidential.57  
E) Damages and Judgment: Saudi court proceedings have a limited scope and 
nature of remedies to offer as compared to various other jurisdictions.58 Islamic 
laws give the right to withdraw any contract, compensations, or damages to be paid 
for actual and/or tangible losses. Damage of business reputation and/or damage of 
anticipated prospects are not considered when deciding compensation.59 Blood 
money is offered by the responsible party in lawsuits of accidental personal injuries 
or deaths to the victim or their erth (or heritage) as compensation.60 The history of 
Islam proposes a blood money equivalent to a 100 camels payable to the victims’ 
erth (or heritage) in case of accidental death. Liability for personal injuries is pro-
rated with this ceiling reference.61 A monetary equivalent of 100 camels has been 
expressed from location to location and from time to time. Royal Order # 43108 set 
on the first of September, 2011 determines that value as SAR 300,000 as to the 
current applicable standard conversion in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This 
amount is approximately equivalent to USD $80,000.62 Saudi courts prohibit the 
 
54 Ryan (n22) 90-97. 
55 Ahmed Hassan, Purpose of Law: A Study in Law Philosophy (Dar Al-Mathowa Al-Jamiea, 
Alexandria 2000) 23-30. 
56 Al-Zahier (n21) 87-88. 
57 Ryan (n22) 79-84. 
58 ibid. 
59 Kaliel (n3) 40-42. 
60 Mansour (n6) 82-85. 
61 Mohammed Bin-Ashour, Aims of Islamic Sharia (1st edn Dar Al-Kitab Al-Masry, Cairo 2011) 76-
78. 
62 Mohammed Kutb, About Islam (Dar Al-Shoruque, Egypt 2005) 33-36. 
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award of interest to any party in any form or manner but injunctive relief can be 
obtained by the parties through such courts.63 Although not impossible to obtain, it 
is generally quite difficult. The injunctive relief is not granted in the form of a 
specific performance but rather it is granted in the form of an injunction; but that 
too in rare cases.64 
F) Appeal: Judges ask for the consent of both parties as to whether or not they are 
both satisfied with the ruling once each judgment has been issued. If the losing 
party disagrees, as is the situation in most cases, a written appeal can be lodged 
after a set number of days within receipt of a written judgment with the related 
appellate tribunal. This appellate tribunal usually requires the lower tribunal’s 
records and forms its review on that basis. It does not require both parties to be 
present and once the appellate tribunal comes in agreement with the decision, it 
stamps the judgment as final and enforceable. The appellate tribunal is not bound 
to provide reasons and returns to the first instance of the tribunal.65 In case of 
disagreement by the appellate tribunal with a decision based upon procedure or 
point of law, both parties are summoned to provide further agreements and then it 
issues judgment based upon that argument. However, it is not common at this stage. 
The appellate tribunal can also remit the cases to the tribunal for reconsideration at 
first instance as a normal procedure.66  
When an appellate tribunal remits a case for consideration, it issues specific 
directions. It orders the first instance tribunal to determine the additional facts first 
in alignment to the rulings on evidence or procedure presented by the appellate 
tribunal.  Additional hearings can also take place and parties can be required to 
provide further submissions.67  
The first instance tribunal issues a new judgment once it is satisfied by the ruling 
of the appellate tribunal and after following their directions.68 The appellate 
 
63 Kaliel (n3) 96-102. 
64 Suhaiel Al-Fatlawi, Introduction to Saudi Law (1st edn Dar Wael for Publications, Amman 2012) 
410-416. 
65 Al-Samary (n38) 73-81. 
66 Ayoub Al-Jarbou, Judicial Review of Administrative Action Under the Saudi law (Ayoub M. A. Al-
Jarbou, 2013) 286-291. 
67 Al-Zahier (n21) 72-75. 
68 Al-Kahtaney (n1) 87-91. 
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tribunals can also issue their own judgments on cases if an opinion is formed 
regarding the inability or unwillingness of first instance tribunals to carry out the 
appellate tribunal’s directions. This point can be reached without any specific 
rule.69 However, it is normally done after the issuance of second judgment and/or 
when the appellate tribunal deems it necessary to take over the case. Before issuing 
its judgment, the appellate tribunal is bound to invite arguments by all parties 
involved since decisions of appellate tribunal are mostly final and enforceable.70 
To lodge an appeal against judgment of first instance, parties are required to do so 
within 30 or 60 days, once the receipt of judgment has been issued.71 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the Saudi court structure and those legal procedures that are 
applied to seek to ensure the provision of justice in the Kingdom. In the light of the 
chapter’s examination of the structure and functioning of the Saudi legal system 
along with the philosophy underpinning it, it is evident that Sharia principles are 
fundamental and form the bedrock on which it is based.  
As soon as Saudi Arabia was formed, it was confirmed by the founder of the 
Kingdom himself that the Holy Quran which is the Holy Quran and Sunna will be 
its Constitution and nothing else. Hence, most of the subsequent laws and 
procedures were actually derived from these primary sources of Sharia while 
official verdicts of judges follow wide-ranging essence of Sharia law in order to 
make the sure highest likelihood of justice being delivered.  
As per our initial understanding of the Saudi court structure, it was formed on 
traditional practices of centuries-old customs and regulations. For long time, while 
the country was still being formed, the old structure was being followed until a 
relatively recent attempt in the form of Royal decree sought to change that structure. 
The purpose behind this change of court structure was to reform the judicial system 
altogether and to streamline certain elements within the legal system which often 
 
69 Eisam Bin-Saied, The Saudi Constitutional Law (1st edn Maktabat Al-Kanun for Publications, 
Riyadh 2011) 104-108. 
70 Mansour (n6) 88-90. 
71 Ahmed Sorrore, Constitutional Legitimacy and Human Rights in the Criminal Procedures (Dar Al-
Nahda Al-Arabia, Cairo 1995) 76-80. 
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prove a hindrance to the provision of justice itself. The old structure having 
Appellate, General and Summary Courts was announced to be replaced with 
Supreme, Appellate, and Courts of First Instance throughout the country.  
The divisions of jurisdictions among Courts of First Instance is a particularly 
significant development in the court structure of Saudi Arabia. As Saudi 
government aims to establish different courts that will work in their own specific 
domains in a way that does not prejudice other court systems. For example, under 
the new court structure, there will be general courts and criminal courts and they 
will function in their own very domains. A criminal court will take up criminal 
cases and will decide upon cases of Hudud, Qisas, Tazir and judges of the criminal 
court will not interfere in the lawsuits related to property disputes. The biggest 
beneficiary of a systemized court structure will be the general public while those 
judicial committees and existing courts that are required to exercise first instance 
jurisdiction over all related cases will be better able to do so and could work more 
















































Law in Relation to the Main Types of Punishments 
3.1 Introduction 
As is clear from the foregoing chapters, the Saudi legal system is heavily influenced 
by Sharia principles. In this chapter, we will consider how it imposes a variety of 
punishments for crimes as prescribed by Sharia principles. In order to discuss these 
punishments in the context of the Saudi legal system, it is first necessary to define 
the three main important categories of crimes and their subsequent punishments.  
The first two categories are considered traditional crimes because they were defined 
before modern times. The first category of crimes, Al-Qisas, may be punishable by 
death where the offence or wound inflicted cause death.  This category also includes 
body injuries and may result in retaliation for physical injuries caused with the law 
built on the concept of “eye for eye”.72  
The second category is Al-Hudud, or fixed crimes, which are defined by the Holy 
Quran and include major offences such as adultery, apostasy, road aggravation, 
alcohol consumption, theft and slander.73 Punishments prescribed in the Holy 
Quran for these offences include stoning, capital punishment, amputation, cross 
amputation and flogging.74 These punishments are designed to assure justice and 
seek repentance in a society. Anyone who disrupts the social order must suffer the 
consequences. Nevertheless, the Holy Quran urges that a criminal should only 
receive a just or fair sentence. As a result, certain conditions must be fulfilled before 
classifying a criminal activity under Al-Qisas or Al-Hudud categories.75  
The third category is composed of all other crimes which are subject to 
discretionary punishments not included in the first two categories. In the early days 
of Islam discretionary crimes were defined as offences which do not result in death 
and which do not fall into the other categories but can merit punishment ranging 
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from capital punishment, imprisonment, flogging, and public admonition to fines 
and penalties.76 Researchers estimate that 80-85% of legal cases in Saudi Arabia 
today fall under the category of discretionary cases, and 30-35% of these cases are 
forwarded to the Ministry of Justice for consultation.77 Most of these cases involve 
modern crimes such as those pertaining to communications and trading.78 
The chapter investigates all three categories. The first section describes the law in 
relation to Al-Qisas punishments. The second section describes the law in relation 
to Al-Hudud punishments. The third section discusses the law in relation to all other 
crimes which are subject to discretionary punishments.  
3.2 The Law in Relation to Al-Qisas Punishments 
3.2.1 The History of Al-Qisas Punishments 
The pre-Islamic punishment for homicide was compensation paid by the perpetrator 
to the victim or revenge. Pre-Islamic Arabia was filled with tribal hostility and 
aggression. Friendly cooperation was rare and only existed among members of the 
same tribe, thus hostility was a compelling motive for revenge.79 As a result, not 
only the offender but the offender’s tribe was subject to revenge, especially in cases 
of homicide. In ancient Arabia, it didn’t matter if the crime was committed solely 
by one offender, his whole tribe would undergo a chain reaction of revenge. Petty 
matters would result in the bloodshed as a consequence and it would take years to 
end such tribal disputes.80 Tribal men associated such matters with their social 
prestige and honour and would go to any extent of violence to regain their social 
status.81 Such practices resulted in a state of continual violence. In this situation, 
revenge was dominant between tribes and there was little consideration given to 
humanitarian measures such as peace and forgiveness.82 Where peaceful 
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alternatives were considered (albeit relatively rare) these included the use of Diya 
(blood money), with the status of the perpetrator and his tribe defining the amount 
to be paid. 
With the inception of Islam, there was a quick process of social development and 
significant improvement was seen regarding the legal position of individuals in the 
society.83 The Arab region was re-organised by Islam in an effort to establish strong 
and stable roots for human interaction and relationships.84 An Islamic society under 
absolute authority of God replaced and transformed the whole ancient tribal social 
order by means of a newly established Islamic law system.85 After Islam triumphed 
in Arabia, the area witnessed a drastic transition from the custom of revenge to 
Qisas law, under which the infliction of injury is imposed on the perpetrator without 
reference to the tribal status of the murder or victim.86 Legal scholars including 
Mohammed Fahmi argue that Sharia’s punishment for homicide - Qisas or capital 
punishment - has a dual nature: as well as acting as a deterrent it also benefits the 
victim in that punishment is imposed and compensation is provided.87 This notion 
was also supported by ancient Arabs who believed that Qisas was an Islamic 
innovation which required the state to inflict punishment for homicide cases.88 
Islam gave decisive rights to all individuals and those crimes which nullify such 
rights would result in retaliation.89 Islam gives options to those individuals either 
to demand the punishment or pardon the culprit and claim the blood money. Islam 
defined the Qisas punishments which chiefly concern the issues of bodily harm and 
killing, whether accidental or unlawful.90 According to these Qisas punishments 
defined by the Holy Quran and Sunna, if someone killed another person, the 
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victim’s family can demand that the culprit be killed. Alternatively, they can 
forgive the culprit at any time and settle for the blood money.91 This blood money 
is decided solely on the bases of nature of crimes.92  
3.2.2. Aims of Al-Qisas Punishments 
Al-Qisas punishments are characterised by two common elements. The first 
element is imposing the same harm to on the defendant that he or she inflicted on 
the victim. The severity of this punishment is intended to discourage crimes like 
homicide and limit their occurrence in societies.93 The other element of Al-Qisas 
punishments is the struggle to establish guilt, which protects the accused party and 
reduces the chance of executing punishments.94 Islam has established the practice 
of waiving punishment in case of doubt, and the accused party always enjoys the 
benefit of the doubt.95 Strict procedure regarding reporting of the crime is 
stipulated. The punishment cannot be awarded on mere suspicion until reliable 
witnesses prove the crime in court.96 Al-Qisas punishments are also designed to 
permit pardon in some cases of retribution, which is alien to western legal systems. 
Islam encourages and prefers pardon because pardon may result in repentance.97  
Laws such as those regarding homicide drastically changed the concept of revenge 
which, as stated, was common in the pre-Islamic era.98 Islam not only restricted the 
punishment to the accused person and spared his or her family and tribe, but 
introduced the concept of Diya (blood money) and the victim’s right to pardon. 
These revisions were enacted to uphold the supremacy of God, justice, and a sense 
of peace.99 
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Since Islam delivers the system of equality for all members of the society, it tends 
to diminish the discrimination between rich and poor by awarding equal 
punishments.100 Islamic law system is not based on pecuniary punishments.101 
Although the provision of fines is observant in the form of Diya blood money in 
Islam is fixed and can only be imposed if injured party wishes to accept it.102 
Moreover, Islam discourages exaggeration in defining Diya and encourages the 
demand of moderate Diya or blood money, which is reasonable for the perpetrator’s 
status. The aim is to give culprits a chance of redemption, rather than skip the 
punishment and punishment for Qisas cannot be converted into blood money until 
the victim or the victim’s family decides this.103   
Any punishment in Islamic criminal law, including the Qisas punishments, is an 
outcome of divine revelation by Allah granted to the Muslims through His last 
prophet Muhammad. Thus, these punishments are sacred serve the most sacred 
purpose of restoring the social justice, society’s and its members’ religious 
interests, and protection of individuals’ materials and morals.104 The Islamic 
criminal law determines the relationship orders among the members of Islamic 
society and defines the relationship of Muslims with their God at the same time. 
Last but not least, it defines the rule of the law.105  
Since Qisas punishments are prescribed in both the Holy Quran and Sunna, they 
could be perceived as cornerstones of Islamic criminal law106 and provide constant, 
stable and steady provisions for the Islamic law system.107 The most significant aim 
for the Al-Qisas punishment is to administer the moral and mundane correction of 
a culprit and to prevent future crimes. This aim dictates the main values which 
reside in any Islamic society.108 Therefore, punishment could only by seen as a 
mundane measure which imposes the liability on culprits by depriving them of their 
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freedoms and rights as a correctional method. Lastly, punishment could only be 
administered after the commission of crime or when it is predicted since it is of a 
retaliatory nature.109  
3.2.3. Definition of Al-Qisas Punishments 
Qisas could be defined as a ideal principle. The principle of a life for a life and the 
principle of a limb for a limb.110 This principle gives the injured parties or their 
heirs the absolute right to impose the same injury on the offender as that suffered. 
It applies to all cases of killings and certain kinds of grave wounding or damages.111 
Islam gave this right of retaliation to the victim of murder and bodily injuries or 
his/her next of kin to execute the convict after his/her trial.112 For bodily injuries, 
the same injury would be inflicted to the perpetrator of the crime. For example, if a 
victim of a crime lost his/her eye during an attack, he/she could retaliate by inserting 
a red-hot sharp needle into attacker’s eye who had already been found guilty.113  
Both the Holy Quran and the Sunna dictate terms regarding Qisas specified for 
body parts and wounds on which there is a learned consensus shared by notable 
Muslim Scholars. There are two conditions according to this consensus to validate 
the Qisas for the body parts. They include; an assurance that it will not result in 
injustice as well as transgression. The punishment for retaliation will be done by 
cutting off the same body part and from same specific joint and to same certain 
point. In a case where specific limit is not clear for the court, the retaliation could 
not be granted.114 For example, if a perpetrator breaks someone’s tooth, his tooth 
will be taken off with similar severity to fulfil the condition of Qisas. Secondly, 
Qisas requires the body parts’ equivalence, specifically, name as well as location 
should be equal for both offender and victim of the crime. Amputating a right organ 
of offender’s body will not fulfil the condition of Qisas if victim’s left organ was 
amputated. A ring finger cannot be amputated in retaliation of amputation of little 
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finger and vice versa. This condition of name and place applies to all organs 
including hands, eyes, legs and ears.115  
It must be noted that the rule of exactitude also strictly applies here. The retaliator 
in any kind or type of crime is required to inflict the same amount of wound or pain 
he/she received. In a case where the victim accidently inflicts more damage to the 
perpetrator of crime, he/she would also break the law, thus will be subject to the 
punishment in return.116 The Ministry of Interior is responsible for the execution of 
Al-Qisas punishment. This rule of exactitude discourages the victim’s retaliation. 
For this purpose, Islam introduced the concept of compensation to avoid unjust 
retaliation. Offenders and victims could agree upon blood money to settle their 
disputes.117 Therefore, Qisas punishments in cases of murder and bodily harm range 
from inflicting the same injury to the payment of reparation.118 
In both cases of killing and bodily harm where the families of the victim do not 
demand the offenders be killed or be subject to retaliation, they could simply 
forgive and demand reparation.119 The significant aspect of the blood money is that 
it varies according to the crime’s nature. For example, if somebody murders 
someone intentionally, the blood money would be different (higher) than the cases 
where a person is killed unintentionally.120 The same applies to the every body part. 
According to Prophet Muhammad,  
“Whosoever kills a believer unjustly will suffer retaliation for what his hand 
has done unless the relatives of the murdered man consent otherwise. And 
therein it was: A man shall be killed for the murder of a woman. And therein 
it was: For the murder of a life, there is blood wit of 100 camels…”121 
Categories of Qisas 
Qisas could be further divided into two broad categories: one deals with the 
homicide, while other is related to bodily harm.  
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Islam gives equal rights to all Muslims, and this egalitarianism extends to the right 
of Qisas. In respect to physical harm, the Holy Quran maintains, “Remember that 
the recompense of an injury is an injury the like thereof; but whoso forgives and 
thereby brings about an improvement, his reward is with ALLAH. Surely, HE loves 
not the wrongdoers” [042:040]. Therefore, according to the Islamic penal code, an 
equal requital is given to the injured person.122 However, Al-Mashehadany 
criticises this requital as uncivilised and primitive,123 while others as Kutb argue 
that because divine guidance, human inclination, and nature always remain the 
same, primitive rules do not necessarily require updating.124 According to the Holy 
Quran, individuals have the ultimate right of retribution, over and above the state 
or societies, but individuals can never take the law into their own hands. Islam also 
suggests that individuals opt for settlement first to avoid the irreversible procedure 
of trials and punishments involving extensive time, effort, finances, and the 
interference of government.125 That is by assuming that Muslims morals would 
make it possible to reach a settlement away from official dealings.   
3.2.4. Conditions Necessary for Al-Qisas Punishments 
The first and most important condition regarding Qisas punishments is that they 
only apply in cases regarding deliberate murders or wounds, and are not valid 
punishments for accidental killings or injuries.126 Retribution only applies in 
intentional murder or injury because God says in the Holy Quran, “O you who 
believe, retribution is prescribed for you in the case of murder” [2:175]. Another 
condition for Qisas punishment relates to retaliation for injuries. If the retaliation 
for homicide is clear and there is enough evidence from the Holy Quran and Sunna, 
jurists might face difficulties in issuing appropriate retaliations for injuries, due to 
the lack of evidence regarding them in the Holy Quran and Sunna.127 Qisas is also 
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not applicable in cases of accidental killing or negligent killing, but offenders in 
these cases are responsible for paying Diya or blood money.128   
The second condition for Qisas punishments is fulfilling the right of the victim, to 
whom God has given the privilege to forgive the offender. The victim or his or her 
family has the freedom to decide whether or not a defendant should be punished. 
The judge hearing a case must therefore inquire of the victim or his or her family 
about their desire to pardon the offender.129 The Holy Quran says, “If anyone 
waives the right to retaliation out of charity, it shall be an expiation for him” [5:45]. 
In this way, Islam encourages the victim to pardon the criminal by promising 
rewards in the afterlife, but this does not take place frequently in modern times. 
Pardon can be granted with or without financial compensation.130  
The third condition of Qisas punishments, as noted previously, is that the state or 
government must carry out the pronounced punishment. The victim or his or her 
family cannot take the law into their own hands and cannot carry out the 
punishment themselves.131 The punishment is implemented by the Ministry of 
Interior in public. 
3.3 The Law in Relation to Al-Hudud Punishments 
3.3.1 Al- Hudud Punishments: An overview 
The second category of punishments is known as Al-Hudud punishments. The word 
Hudud means the boundary or limit.132 In this respect, Hudud punishments in 
Islamic criminal law could be seen as specific punishments for specific crimes. 
Islam introduced the idea of prescribing and defining the penalties for specific 
offences.133 The Islamic legal system has employed the concepts of Hudud 
punishments to make criminal proceedings as objective and consistent as 
possible.134 These particular offences were regarded by society as anti-religious or 
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anti-social.135 Hudud offences are not merely offences against any human being, 
they are perceived as offences against the God or against public justice.136 There 
are some doctrinal provisions which Quran and Sunna established. The Hudud 
crimes violate such provisions and affect rights of Allah.137  
Hudud prescribed punishments are constant and cannot be decreased or increased. 
Hudud is the plural form of the Arabic word Hadd, which can be translated as 
restraint, boundaries, prohibition, or prevention. The Islamic legal system defines 
Hudud punishments as prescribed by God. Hudud punishments are those prescribed 
by the Holy Quran and Muhammad, and can neither be exceeded nor reduced. If a 
case is reported to a judge and there is sufficient evidence against the accused 
person, no one (including the King) can grant pardon to the defendant in any 
circumstances.138  
Hudud crimes have been classified by Ulemas and jurists.139 The following six 
punishments are prescribed for Hudud crimes: 
1-  Amputation of the right hand for the first occurrence of theft, or cross 
amputation if the crime has been committed for the second time; 
2-  Stoning to death for adultery committed by married people, and one 
hundred lashes for fornication committed by unmarried people. If a 
relationship did not involve coitus between a man and a woman, this 
punishment is not valid under Hudud offences;140 
3- Death penalty for apostasy, that is. converting to any religion other than 
Islam;141 
4- Eighty lashes for drinking alcohol or inebriation;142 
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5- Eighty lashes for false accusation or slander: any claim of adultery or coitus 
between unmarried couple which cannot be proven by sufficient evidence 
will be regarded as false accusation;143 and  
6- Death penalty, exile, or cross-amputation for highway robbery in 
accordance with the seriousness of the crime.144 
 Once the offence has been carried out by a culprit, no one has the power (including 
the judge) to use their jurisdiction to stop the punishment. The history of Al-Hudud 
punishment is rooted in the fact that penalties in Islam are designed to deter 
individuals from criminal activities. God has determined certain obligations, 
limitations and rights for all Muslims that comprise the system of justice within 
Islamic societies.145 Islam introduces Hudud rules as “signposts” erected along the 
peaceful and safe highway of life. If an individual does not act in accordance with 
these rules, he or she not only puts his or her life in danger but also potentially 
endangers the lives of others. The Islamic justice system punishes these individuals.  
The Holy Quran refers to Hudud as “exemplary punishment from God”, 146 which 
implies that these punishments bear an important function to serve as preventative, 
educational and deterrent tools in order to support justice. God designed these 
punishments to encourage the public to refrain from violating His boundaries. A 
sense of justice cannot prevail in a religious community if individuals transgress 
against God or other individuals because transgression is viewed as the root cause 
of corruption and other forms of disorder.147 
Hudud punishments were defined to take preventive actions against certain severe 
offences such as adultery, theft and apostasy. The punishments are equally severe 
and include death by stoning for adultery and amputation of limbs for theft among 
others.148 The objective of such severe punishment is to deter the criminals from 
committing those heinous offences. Hudud punishments deal with those offences 
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which purport to cause injury to creatures of God or society.149 For this purpose, 
the prescribed penalty could not be remitted by the injured party in cases of Hudud 
offences unlike Al-Qisas punishments.150 One other important aspect related to 
Hudud punishments is the very strict burden of proof and often full evidence is 
required to convict the offender of Hudud crimes. Witness evidence of Hudud 
crimes is also required.151  
For example, in cases of adultery, to convict the adulterer, four male eye witnesses 
are essential. If someone committed the offence and no one witnessed the act or the 
offender of crime manages to successfully defend himself, the court is liable to set 
the culprit free.152 In a case where someone accused confesses his/her crimes before 
the judge, he/she will have to do it four times and the confession could be taken 
back at any time. The imposition of Hudud punishments could be prevented if there 
is any doubt regarding the authenticity of the evidence.153  
3.3.2 Aims of Al-Hudud Punishments 
Al-Hudud punishments can neither be accurately understood nor justifiably 
implemented without understanding the entire integrated framework of Islam. Law 
is not the main characteristic of this framework. Designed to strengthen individual 
morality, this framework is a set of rules and regulations which encourage 
individuals to refrain from activities that displease God.154 Therefore, the primary 
aim of Al-Hudud punishments is to evoke God-consciousness within individuals 
and to strengthen their Taqwa, or doing good.155 The second most significant aim 
of punishment is to support justice within Islamic societies. Justice is not merely a 
systematic means to inflict punishment. It aims to improve society with positive 
ways of life. Consequently, an environment is established in which everyone is 
encouraged to do right and to avoid doing wrong.156 
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Islamic legal scholars such as Shai’i believe that punishments aim to seek 
repentance from God because any act of injustice is a sin against God.157 Therefore, 
unless a person asks God for His forgiveness, the aim of a punishment is not 
achieved.  Although repentance protects and strengthen Islamic societies, all crimes 
disrupt the social order. Therefore, Sharia has fixed punishments in the form of 
Qisas and Hudud.158  
Punishments must also be proportional to the crimes committed.159 A strictly 
proportional justice is not possible because judges are required to evaluate a variety 
of complex factors associated with a given crime, and it is impossible to assess all 
intentions, motives and factors. Therefore, the rationale for having Al-Hudud 
punishments is to make proportional justice for specific crimes like murder, 
fornication, and apostasy more practicable.160 Mawardi recognizes “deterrence” as 
the main justification for and aim of Hudud punishment. He argues that Hudud 
punishments were established by God as deterrent penalties in order to prevent 
individuals from committing sins which God forbade and neglecting or failing to 
complete tasks commanded by God.161 
Another aim of Hudud punishments is to protect public interests, and God designed 
Hadd punishments in a manner that restores public justice. Therefore, it is 
prohibited for a judge to issue heavier or lighter sentences than those prescribed in 
Hudud penalties, or to issue pardons.162 Judges, rulers, political authorities, and 
even victims cannot grant pardons in al-Hudud cases.  
3.3.3 Conditions Necessary for Al-hudud Punishments 
The most important condition for a crime to be categorised under Hudud 
punishment is its determination in the Holy Quran and Sunna as a fixed crime. As 
previously discussed, there are six categories of Hudud crimes, including theft, 
adultery, armed robbery, drinking alcohol, apostasy, and slander, for which fixed 
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punishments can be found in the Holy Quran and Sunna.163 According to El-Awa, 
apostasy and drinking alcohol should not be categorised under Hudud offences 
because they are insufficiently defined in the Holy Quran and Sunna.164 He 
maintains that only the other four offences can be accurately classified as Hudud 
offences.165  
In addition to sufficient definition in the Holy Quran and Sunna, certain other 
conditions set Hudud punishments apart from other types of punishments. As 
previously discussed, Hudud punishments can neither be more or less severe than 
their fixed penalties as established in the Holy Quran. For example, as stated, the 
punishment for fornication between unmarried people is one hundred lashes. A 
judge cannot issue a punishment of more than one hundred lashes or reduce the 
number if all of the required evidence and witnesses are available.166 Judges, rulers, 
political authorities and victims are unable to waive or withdraw the punishment 
fixed for Al-Hudud offence. This condition instantly applies when a crime has been 
reported to the governing body. If the state is not aware of the crime or the victim 
has not yet brought the crime before the State, the pardon can be granted to the 
criminal by the victim where the State is aware of Al-Hudud crime, the punishment 
must be applied.167 
Another important condition that must be fulfilled for Hudud punishment is that it 
is the “right of God” rather than the “right of the State”. Hudud punishments are 
imposed in order to fulfil God’s commands and to achieve greater welfare within 
an Islamic society.168  
3.4 The Law in Relation to Discretionary Punishments 
3.4.1. History of Discretionary Punishments 
The third and final category are those crimes which are open to receive 
discretionary punishment. It can be described as a “miscellaneous” category, which 
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means that any crime which does not satisfy Hudud conditions and is not regarded 
as Al-Qisas will fall under this category.  
The history of discretionary punishments begins in the era of the Caliphs, or the 
Prophet’s successors. Prior to the development and implementation of traditional 
Islamic laws, the Caliphs were responsible for judicial processes and discretionary 
punishments.169 From the 9th century, however, Ulemas or religious scholars, 
interpreted Sharia teachings, reformed laws and halted independent legal 
interpretations by Caliphs who could previously have expected unlimited 
community support of their interpretations. This limited the power of later Caliphs 
and a range of actions under Sharia discretionary laws were divided between 
Caliphs and Ulemas. Gradually the Ulemas took on the decision-making role in the 
judicial field. 170 Although this balance shifted between the two parties through 
subsequent empires and centuries, the balance of power did not change 
dramatically.171 Eventually, the balance of power between Ulemas and rulers did 
change, however, with legislative reform during the industrial revolution of the 
early 19th century.172 Two separate legal authorities were formed in most Islamic 
states, including Saudi Arabia: the Islamic court authority, which determines all 
penalties, and the Ministry of Interior, which executes them.173  
Today, unlike most Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia and states in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC)  are still mostly practicing justice as existed prior to 
the industrial revolution – Kings and Princes have unlimited authority in dealing 
with discretionary crimes.174 This authority is maintained by inter-related 
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administrative bodies.175 Current Saudi Arabian legislative authorities, including 
the Consultative Council, the Ministry of Justice, and the National Religious 
Scholars Association, whose members are appointed by the King, can determine 
discretionary punishments.176 In theory, the Ministry of Justice takes guidance from 
the Consultative Council and the National Religious Scholars Association in 
making decisions about discretionary punishments. However, this may not always 
happen or if it does happen it may arise in an informal way.177 Moreover, although 
these authorities’ directions are valid in theoretical discussions, they cannot be 
validated in practice because there is no formal mechanism for implementing their 
proposals, and punishments are left completely to judges’ discretion.178 
Finally, it is important to note that in addition to the use of discretion in relation to 
those crimes which are neither Al-hudud nor Al-Qisas, in some situations discretion 
may be used in relation to crimes which ostensibly appear to fall into these latter 
categories. This is because, for example, although the Holy Quran and Sunna 
provide fixed punishments for adultery, murder, and theft, and require that certain 
conditions must be fulfilled before fixed punishments can be allotted, if any of these 
conditions are not fulfilled, the judge hearing the case must rely on his Sharia 
discretionary powers.179 These and other circumstances will be considered in 
greater detail below. 
• Types of discretionary punishments 
As evident in the above there are various offences for which discretionary 
punishments are liable to be issued and the range of punishments is broad.180 If a 
person has committed a minor transgression, i.e. any act which is against the law 
and which is not considered to be Hudud or Qisas crime, then a judge can issue an 
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Al Waz or warning to him or her. This is only available where certain conditions 
are met including that the offence was committed for the first time, and the judge’s 
warning is aimed at reform.181 For some situations, however, the judge can issue an 
Al-Tawbikh or formal verbal warning, which may vary according to the crime 
committed and the criminal’s circumstances. The judge can use specific words or 
perform actions which he believes serve the purpose of discretionary 
punishment.182 Al-Tahdid or threat is the next most severe punishment, and applies 
in situations where a judge issues a threat of punishment to the culprit. The judge 
can either maintain the execution of the threatened punishment if the offender 
repeats the offence, or suspend the punishment. The purpose of Al-Tahdid is to 
reform the behaviour of the offender using fear of punishment.183 Under Sharia 
law, judges are also accorded the authority to suspend all kinds of punishments.184  
There are situations in which a judge might order Al-Hajr or boycott of the culprit 
in an Islamic society albeit that this form of discretionary punishment is not 
considered practical in modern times.185 Examples of Al-Hajr can be traced back to 
the early days of Islam when certain offences led to the boycott of individuals. The 
second Caliph Omar Bin Khattab, for example, imposed a boycott punishment on 
a man who created mischief within people by confusing them with difficult words 
in the Holy Quran.186 Public disclosure, or Al-Tashhir, applies in situations where 
public identification of a criminal offender is essential. This practice is still 
considered valid and the disclosure is accomplished through media publications.187  
In situations where an offender’s repentance is required, a judge might issue Al-
Gharamah and Musadarah or fines and seizures. An example of a crime for which 
fixed fines are commonly levied are traffic violations. Any illegal activity or 
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misconduct can lead to fines, seizures and imprisonment depending on whether a 
criminal has repented from criminal activities.188 
Dangerous crimes which do not have fixed punishments require the legal system to 
impose Al-Habs or imprisonment. This punishment can range from a finite term to 
an infinite term depending on the severity of crime, the profile of the criminal, and 
the need for reform.189 Judges can, for instance, issue lifetime imprisonment of a 
criminal if he or she constitutes a constant danger to the society and has committed 
dangerous crimes.190  
Alternatively, some situations might provoke judges to issue Al-Nafy or exile. An 
offender is exiled on the basis of the severity of his or her crimes and whether they 
encourage others in the society to indulge in the same deviant activities.191 
Sometimes banishment is given as an additional discretionary punishment along 
with fixed punishments, such as for fornication.192 This is the only crime stated in 
the Holy sources that has a discretionary measure.  
Al-Jald or flogging is also based on the same principle where a judge considers 
additional flogging necessary. Although one hundred lashes is the fixed Hadd or 
punishment for fornication committed by unmarried individuals, the minimum and 
maximum number of lashes is entirely up to the judge’s discretion according to the 
circumstances, nature of the crime and the character of the offender.193 
The issuance of Al-Taazier bil Qatl or death penalty is specified for Qisas and 
Hudud crimes rather than for discretionary crimes. Exceptionally serious 
discretionary crimes such as habitual homosexuality, spying, propagating heretical 
doctrines, and homicide that do not come under Qisas might, however, result in a 
judge using their discretion and issuing a death penalty.194  
Circumstances in which Crimes may Result Discretionary Punishment 
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Saudi Arabian courts are empowered to order a discretionary punishment when the 
offence committed or the injuries or losses resulting from it do not satisfy either the 
definitions of fixed crimes, which mostly cause death, or the conditions for 
implementing the defined punishments for these traditional crimes.195  
Moreover, as noted, in three circumstances, Qisas and Hudud crimes may 
themselves result in a discretionary punishment. First, if both parties agree to a 
“blood money” arrangement in an Al-Qisas case, then a court will not follow the 
defined punishment for the Qisas crime because pardon has been granted by the 
victim or wronged party. In this scenario, a court will provide a discretionary 
punishment instead of capital punishment.196 Fixed, Al-Hudud crimes only fall into 
the category of discretionary crimes in the event of insufficient availability of 
evidence. However, Qisas crimes only fall into the category of discretionary if 
pardoned.197   
Second, some Hudud crimes also fall into the category of discretionary crimes in 
the event of a breach of trust or fraud. For example, property crimes are considered 
Hudud crimes, but a breach of trust is not exactly a property crime.  
Third, but there is an increasing number of modern criminal law cases that require 
discretionary punishments.198 Crimes which breach the social order, excluding 
adultery, bribery, assault, forgery and extortion, and would otherwise appear 
similar to fixed crimes are considered to be “modern crimes” which were not 
common at the time the fixed laws were implemented, and so are considered to be 
discretionary.199 Administrative, political, economic, financial and media-related 
crimes, which are modern crimes recognised by the Saudi society, are all 
considered by the government to be discretionary.200  
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Finally, there are other minor offences for which Sharia discretionary punishments 
are applied. Islam refers to some practices as Makruh, or discouraged practices. 
Makruh practices might involve smoking or spitting in public areas. Some other 
practices are Mahbub, or recommended practices, such as fasting on Mondays and 
Thursdays as recommended by Prophet Muhammad. If a person is charged with 
committing Makruh or with omitting Mahbub, the judge must decide on a Sharia 
discretionary punishment that fits the offence. However, someone cannot be 
punished for not completing Mahbub practices.201 
3.4.2. Characteristics of Discretionary Punishments 
There are conditions set by Islam which judges must follow in order to decide upon 
an appropriate punishment, since the choice of punishment has several direct and 
indirect effects.202 For example, there are individual, social and religious 
characteristics attached to a discretionary punishment. Penalties should be aimed at 
preventing crimes and discouraging people from imitating criminal behaviours. The 
purpose of punishment should be to uphold justice, preserve the virtue and spirit of 
Islam and achieve peace and stability within a society.203 Sharia judges are 
supposed to limit the suffering of a victim through discretionary punishments 
designed to discourage crime and ensure reform and rehabilitation in a society.204 
Discretionary punishments thus have the following characteristics. 
The first characteristic is their personal nature which ensures that consequences 
must be limited to the guilty person: the punishment cannot be extended to any 
relatives or friends of the guilty party. A punishment must be cancelled if the guilty 
person has died and any fines are only payable by that person or from his or her 
inheritance. If payment is not possible in the case of death of the guilty party, then 
all punishments and fines are cancelled. There is one exception in the case of blood 
money which must be paid by any sponsors of the guilty party even after his or her 
death. Sharia has given four reasons for this exception, which are:205 
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1- Being required to pay blood money is both a criminal and civil 
punishment. It is criminal because a crime was committed and civil because 
it involves monetary compensation. 
2- In most cases, the amount of blood money agreed upon by both 
parties exceeds the personal wealth of the guilty party. 
3- Usually the payment of blood money is connected to crimes of 
omission. This indicates that the social environment created by the family 
of the guilty person could be responsible for his careless attitude, and 
therefore, the family of the offended individual may be indirectly punished. 
4- The system of exacting blood money helps to spread the concept of 
Islamic moral support through the cooperative attitude of people, especially 
in hard times.  
The second characteristic of discretionary punishment is that it conforms to the 
context of Islamic legal ideology: the punishment must be related to the Holy Quran 
and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, and directed by the Islamic legal 
authority.206 Thus, discretionary punishments should be proportionate to rules of a 
fixed nature and their punishments. The Holy Quran and the Prophet’s sayings 
provide clear sentences from which discretionary rules are derived but punishments 
are not necessarily always related to discretionary crimes.207 For example, the fixed 
punishment for theft is cutting off the perpetrator’s hand, but the majority of such 
crimes should not be punished so severely. The punishment for slander is 80 lashes, 
but not every incidence of actual or alleged slander merits this level of 
punishment.208 
The Sharia discretionary approach also has significant religious purposes in 
addition to contributing to social well-being. Islamic laws were originally designed 
to protect individuals’ religion, minds, families and wealth which are the most 
important pillars of a peaceful society.209 To reform criminals into productive parts 
of an Islamic society, Sharia discretionary punishments should be aimed at 
disciplining the criminals rather than taking revenge or inflicting harm. The 
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punishment should involve reform steps for the criminal designed to teach him or 
her to not repeat wrongdoings that disrupt the whole society. The process of reform 
cannot be achieved if a criminal is subject to any humiliation or abuse.210 As 
Prophet Muhammad said to His associates when they insulted a drunk man, “Do 
not support the Satan over your Brother”. This shows how correcting someone by 
humiliating him or her about his or her wrongdoings could negate the original 
purpose of reform.211  
 
• Purposes of discretionary punishments 
 
Ulemas or religious scholars have explained that Sharia discretionary punishments 
are based on deterrence, i.e. discouraging the criminal behaviour rather than 
discouraging the criminal, because deterrent punishments may help judges to 
prevent future crimes in that the criminal will not repeat it and other people will not 
imitate it.212 One significant aim of Sharia discretionary punishment is to uphold 
justice within an Islamic society. If a punishment is just but harmful, it also serves 
this purpose, as chaos would prevail in a society without justice.213 Another 
important characteristic of discretionary punishment is mercy. Mercy in criminal 
cases upholds the justice system as it supports peace and security within a society 
and aids in reform by deterrence. When a lenient punishment is applied for harmful 
acts which did not mention in Sharia sources, that demonstrates a sense of 
responsibility among individuals.214  
Moreover, discretionary punishment should ensure the provision of justice: it 
should satisfy all parties connected to the crime. An important dimension of 
ensuring the provision of justice is the equality of punishment in similar cases.215 
In comparison with murder and fixed punishments, which provide clear and 
unequivocal justice for all relevant cases, discretionary punishments have relative 
justice. In theory, similar outcomes are expected in similar cases.216 However, 
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judicial parameters in discretionary punishments are subject to various moderating 
factors and circumstances.217 
The underlying justification for punishment following a crime is to prevent the 
crime from happening again so that individual rights are maintained. Sharia 
discretionary punishments are not intended to exact revenge in the form of electric 
shocks or burning; violent punishments are strongly discouraged by Islam in 
discretionary cases. Islam rather encourages preventative means prior to enforcing 
punishment, and advocates that punishments should be minimal. Sharia law 
demands that jurists prevent doubts, record crimes, and do not apply the punishment 
if evidence is insufficient. Moreover, these Sharia guidelines should be followed 
completely when issuing penalties because they are only part of the greater Islamic 
legal system.218  
 
3.4.3 Factors that Influence Judges in the Use of their Discretion 
There are certain features of crimes that guide a judge in deciding which sentence 
fits a given crime as discussed above. The Holy Quran and Sunna provide fixed 
punishments for adultery, murder, and theft, and require that certain conditions be 
fulfilled before fixed punishments can be allotted. If any of these conditions are not 
fulfilled, the judge hearing the case must rely on his Sharia discretionary powers.219 
He is required to form an understanding through Sharia guidelines and issue a 
sentence based on the available evidence. As noted, a judge can issue sentences in 
cases according to the circumstances and nature of the crimes committed, and 
punishments can range from warning to imprisonment to death.    
For judges to issue a discretionary sentence, it is essential that the sentence fits the 
crime.220 For example, in a case of discretionary theft where there circumstances 
surrounding the theft such as hunger which resulted in stealing food, the guilty 
person might be sentenced to imprisonment rather than amputation. A rapist will 
not be charged for adultery because rape is not a typical case of adultery, for which 
stoning to death is the fixed punishment. The rapist, however, usually is given a 
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sentence for adultery rape according to Sharia discretionary rules.221 As previously 
mentioned, settlement by blood money allows a murderer to escape death, but he 
or she may still spend time in jail, and the victim’s family’s forgiveness is not 
grounds for releasing the murderer.222  
• Importance of Witness Testimonials 
One significant factor that encourages judges to use their Sharia discretionary 
power is the increased flexibility in gathering evidence and sentencing, as Sharia 
discretion allows for circumstantial evidence, that is the opposite of fixed 
punishments in which evidence must be defined and clear without considering 
circumstances.223 This category does not require a strict kind of evidence and 
condition because they do not represent serious crimes. 
Witness testimonials also significantly influence judges’ employment of Sharia 
discretion. The rule of evidence in a Sharia court demands an oral testimony of 
witnesses in most cases. The practice of taking an oath or confession is prioritized, 
and the oral testimony of witnesses is admissible, especially in Hudud cases. 
However, a judge may allow written evidence, i.e. notaries.224 Two Muslim male 
or four female individuals are required to be the witnesses in a case, cannot be 
related to the defendant or prosecutor, and must have reliable characters and sound 
minds. The exception to this requirement is adultery cases, in which four direct 
male witnesses are required to admit testimony evidence. All forms of forensic 
evidence including DNA samples, fingerprints, blood samples, and ballistics are 
considered, but eyewitness testimony is preferred in Hudud.225  
There are several factors which judges should consider when issuing judgements, 
as they can influence discretionary punishments.226 In Saudi Arabia and other 
Islamic countries where strict Sharia laws are followed, harsher sentences for 
Hudud crimes in accordance with teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunna are 
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common. For example, the Hudud punishment for theft is hand amputation, but a 
judge must confirm certain circumstances first before offering this punishment. For 
hand amputation, these circumstances include the presence of a criminal intent to 
steal private property, the availability of reliable eyewitnesses, and that the goods 
must not have been taken from a public place, must not be haram or forbidden, and 
must worth more than a given minimum value. If these circumstances are not met, 
the judge may opt for a discretionary punishment.227  
Sentencing for adultery is also subject to certain requirements which judges must 
consider before allotting the traditional punishment of stoning to death. The most 
difficult of these requirements is the availability of four male eye-witnesses who 
were present and each observed the crime as it happened.228 According to a Hadith 
or prophet saying, the Prophet Muhammad’s response to an adultery accusation 
was “Why did they not produce four witnesses? Since they produce not witnesses, 
they verily are liars in the sight of Allah”.229 Therefore, the judge cannot grant the 
Hudud punishment of stoning to death unless this requirement is met, or there is a 
confession from the accused. If these two requirements are not fulfilled, the judge 
must decide on a discretionary punishment. Similarly, 100 lashes have been 
prescribed by the Holy Quran and Sunna as a punishment for fornication between 
unmarried men and women, and the same requirement of four male eyewitnesses 
applies here.230  
3.5 Conclusion 
The Islamic legal system is comprised of a divinely derived set of rules and 
regulations that should be abided by Muslims and embraced by state bodies in order 
to assure justice for everyone.231  
This chapter also probed into the history of Qisas, Hudud and discretionary crimes 
and their punishments, and provided a firm understanding regarding their 
background. In particular, this chapter clarified the differences between 
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discretionary and fixed crimes according to evidence retrieved from the Holy 
Quran and Sunna. All crimes which are not covered by Qisas and Hudud are 
considered to be discretionary crimes, and a discretionary punishment can also be 
issued as a supplementary punishment to augment a fixed punishment.232 As was 
also considered, courts in Saudi Arabia are empowered to impose discretionary 
punishments for range of offences, from trivial offences to serious offences. A 
judge is vested with the power to evaluate the nature of a crime in respect to whether 
or not it falls into the categories of Al-Hudud or Al-Qisas. If the case is 
discretionary, judges then choose warnings, fines, imprisonment, banishment, or 
the death penalty according to the seriousness of the discretionary crime.233 Judges 
may also consider how likely a given discretionary punishment is to deter future 
offences, as discretionary punishments are intended to alter the behaviour of the 
culprit and discourage others from imitating him or her. This is one of the many 
characteristics of discretionary punishments that fulfil Islamic legal ideology, 
which commands the maintenance of justice, protects the rights of all human beings 
as well as their religion, wealth, and families, and encourages reforms within 
Islamic societies.234 These characteristics require that judges consider contextual 
factors such as the time and place of criminal activity, as well as the character of 
the defendant, prior to issuing punishment for discretionary crimes. If the sentence 
does not suit the crime, it cannot be supported by Islamic legal ideology.235 A judge 
must determine whether or not an offence is explicitly stated in the Holy Quran and 
Sunna before choosing the correct punishment for it.236  
It is also clear from the foregoing that Islam gives priority to reforming rather than 
punishing criminals violently. Although Islam is a religion of peace, peace can only 
be achieved in societies by disciplining criminals.237 Therefore, the primary aim of 
punishment in Islam is to deter criminals from criminal activities, protect people 
and promote justice.238 The characteristics of Qisas, Hudud and discretionary 
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punishments adequately explain their common aims and objectives which cannot 
be achieved unless judges consider all relevant guidelines. In short, although judges 
cannot consider all of the complex factors associated with a case, they should 
attempt to allot proportional sentences.239 
Because Sharia laws redefine civil as well as criminal cases in the form of Qisas, 
Hudud and discretionary crimes, it also requires jurists to follow certain conditions 
for each category of crime before pronouncing a sentence. The nature of the crime, 
appropriate punishment, the right to pardon and other relevant conditions are 
applicable in all Sharia cases.240 If a crime falls into the Hudud category, a judge is 
unable to exercise his discretionary powers or increase or decrease the fixed 
punishment indicated for the crime. These conditions demonstrate that selecting a 
punishment is not a fully autonomous privilege enjoyed by judges (except for the 
crime of fornication as stated above).241  
Victims’ right to pardon is another important consideration in Qisas cases. The 
rationale behind this right is that forgiving defendants encourages repentance and 
promises rewards in the afterlife for those families who prefer pardon over 
punishment.242. The right to pardon also includes the concept of monetary 
compensation, which is alien to modern Western jurisdictions.  
Given this backdrop, let us now consider how this system actually operates in 
practice in Saudi Arabia placing a particular focus on the extent of discretion 
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Analysis of Judicial Discretion in the Saudi Arabian Criminal 
Justice System 
4.1 Introduction 
As explained in Part I, the Saudi Arabian criminal justice system places 
considerable discretion in the hands of its judiciary.1 This chapter seeks to analyse 
the extent of this discretion, how it is exercised in practice and what impact this has 
explained.  
The first section considers the Saudi judges’ discretionary powers. The discussion 
includes the extent of judicial discretion, and the role of precedent in the exercise 
of this discretion. The section also includes a discussion on the death penalty as an 
example of where the problems arising from the application of wide judicial 
discretion are at their most serious.  
The second section focuses on how modern-day circumstances require legislative 
and judicial authorities to enact discretionary laws since there is an inadequate 
information available for discretionary punishments from Sharia texts.2 This is 
particularly important since the lack of clarity in relation to the definition of some 
crimes or their punishments could in fact result in a higher incidence of such crimes 
being committed.3  
 
4.2 Discretionary Powers Afforded to Saudi Judges 
4.2.1 Extent of Judicial Discretion and Islamic Schools of Thought 
Considerable discretion is afforded to judges in Saudi Arabia. One important area 
in which this judicial discretion may be exercised is in the determination of 
punishments for criminal offences.4 Some jurists believe that judges have exclusive 
 
1 Saied Al-Seraihy, ‘Codification of Sharia Rules’ Okaz Newspaper (Jeddah, 21 July 2015).  
2 Suhaiel Al-Fatlawi, Introduction to Saudi Law (1st edn Dar Wael for Publications, Amman 2012) 
32-38. 
3 Taha Al-Elwani, Aims of Sharia (Dar Al-Hady for Publications, Beirut 2001) 26-30. 
4 Ibrahiem Al-Metairy, “Inflicted Punishments for Al-Hudud and Al-Qisas, and their Implementation 
in KSA” (Master Thesis, Naief University of Security Sciences, Riyadh 2003) 56-63. 
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authority to determine the punishments on their own.5 As influential religious 
scientist Saleh Al-Fawzan6 argues,  
“The judge must be given exclusive authority in discretion, because he 
might face a situation which he thinks that a codified article dose not 
actualize justice, then the judge is entitled to make his discretion.”7 
Thus, a judge on this interpretation, after analysing and taking into account all 
conditions of the crime and the offender, could decide upon a suitable punishment 
depending on Islamic Sharia.8 The judge will have the absolute authority in doing 
so and the punishment awarded would be determined by him alone.  
Nevertheless, there are Saudi concerns regarding the extent of judicial discretion, 
and there are doubts as to whether the judiciary really do enjoy absolute power to 
determine punishments.9 The main Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence are divided on 
this issue, particularly regarding determination of upper and lower limits of 
punishments.10 This section will therefore consider some of those schools’ 
perspectives on this issue. 
 
5 Quasem Al-Tuhery, Importance of Codifying Discretionary Punishments- Applied Study in KSA (1st 
edn Law and Economy Library for Publication, Riyadh 2015) 54-58.  
6 In 2013 he was a member of the Council of Senior Scholars, Saudi Arabia’s highest religious body 
which counsel’s the King on compliance with Sharia law. He is also a member of the Permanent 
Committee for Islamic Research and Issuing Fatwas which issues rulings in Islamic jurisprudence 
and produce research reports for the Council of Senior Scholars.  
7 Nawal Al-Rashied, ‘The Discretionary Flogging Punishments, is it the Suitable Time for Codify 
them instead of Depending on Judges Diligence?’ Al-Riyadh Newspaper (Riyadh, 14 January 2008).   
8 Hamed Al-Jehany, Judges Rectification Authority in Determining Discretionary Punishments, 
“Analytical Study of Riyadh Courts in KSA” (The Arabic Center for Security Studies 1995) 9-11.      
9 Semi Awad, Theory of Judicial Judgment in Islamic Jurisprudence and Modern Law, with a Study 
of the Saudi Judicial System and Judicial Judgments (1st edn Dar Al-Nawader Al-Lebnania, Lebanon 
2014) 43-50. 
10 Ahmed Ibrahiem, Judiciary Methods in Islamic Sharia (1st edn Al-Maktaba Al-Azharia, Egypt 
2010) 18-25. 
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Restrictive boundaries for the exercise of judicial discretion are set by three 
different schools of thought: Hanafi,11 Shafi’i12 and Hanbali.13   
On one hand, Hanafi, which is historically the most popular school of thought in 
some Islamic societies (including Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Egypt) believes that since 
Islam does not give absolute discretion to the judges in the determination of 
punishments, therefore judges have only been given the right to decide upon a 
punishment with minimum discretion.14 If the conditions of an offence demand a 
judge to consider flogging, in theory he has the absolute liberty to choose this 
punishment.15 However, the Hanafi school of thought asserts that the maximum 
number of lashes should be pre-determined by notable jurists and scholars and 
should not be exceeded.16 In this regard, a maximum limit of 39 lashes was fixed 
by Abu-Hanifah for all discretionary cases.17 Alternatively, Abu Yusuf al-Qadi 
fixed the number at 75 – almost double Abu-Hanifah’s recommendation.18 Pursuant 
to this school of thought, therefore, even if a judge believes that exceeding 
maximum lashes in some particular case is necessary and would prove a deterrent, 
he simply cannot issue the judgment since he would then exceed his own 
discretionary power.19 
 
11 The Hanafi School was presided by Imam Al-Nu΄man Ibn Thabit (Abu Hanifa) who lived from 700 
to 767 AD. He was raised in Kufa, and died in Baghdad. This school of thought dominated during 
the time of the Abbasid Empire when a student of Imam Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf al-Qadi, became 
the leader of the judicial department and the highest judge. 
12 The Shafi΄i School was led by Imam Muhammad ibn Idris Al-Shafi΄i who lived from 767 to 814 
AD. Imam Shafi΄i was born in Hijaz, the west of the Arabian Peninsula, and his view was dominant 
in Egypt. He was killed in Egypt in 814AD. 
13 This is an Islamic school of legal thought whose roots are connected to Ahmad Ibn Hanbal in the 
9th century in Baghdad. Ibn Hanbal lived from 781 to 856 AD. He obtained his familiarity in Najd 
(a region of the Arabian Peninsula) by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This is the dominant view 
in Saudi Arabia, with many followers also in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. The Hanbali view is the most 
conservative of the Sunni law schools, but it is the most liberal in most commercial matters. 
14 Ahmed Kalifa, Judges Prestige Ensures the Judiciary Independence “Comparative Study between 
the Islamic Jurisprudence and Modern Law” (1st edn Dar Al-Fiker Al-Jameai, Egypt 2010) 45-51. 
15 Mohammed Al-Dehiem, Independence of Judiciary in Islamic Jurisprudence (Dar Ibn Al-Juzy, 
Riyadh 2016) 34-39. 
16 Mohammad Al-Zehaily, Judiciary Order in Islamic Jurisprudence “Comparative Study” (2nd edn 
Dar Al-Fiker Al-Muasier, Beirut 2002) 45-49. 
17 Kalifa (n14) 35-40. 
18 Mohammad Al-Nehaily, Judiciary in Islam (Dar Al-Maktaby, Syria 1998) 48-54. 
19 ibid 42-48. 
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On the other hand, the Hanbali school of thought - which is dominant at the present 
time in other Islamic societies such as Saudi Arabia - differs from the Hanafi 
school.20 Both schools present different discretionary limits in terms of upper and 
lower limits of punishment but do concur that judges cannot exceed their 
discretionary limits. Similarly, the Shafi’i school adopts the same approach but 
again applies different discretionary limits.21 Hanbali School says the upper limit 
must be less than 80 lashes, while Shafi’i school says that the upper limit should 
not exceed 39 lashes. These figures are based on the application of punishments in 
the Prophet’s days and his Caliphs, which are considered part of Sunna.22 The 
thought behind fixed maximum limits is that it could achieve the objective of 
discretionary punishment from each school’s jurist’s perspective according to their 
interpretation of Sharia.23 Therefore, when a judge is required to inflict the 
punishment of flogging, although he retains judicial discretion in the amount of 
lashes he orders, he is precluded from exceeding the maximum number of lashes 
established by the school he is following.24 
Moreover, in the three schools, whether Hanafi, Hanbali and Shafi’i, where a judge 
orders the maximum number of lashes to the offender and still believes that it does 
not serve the purpose of deterrence, he has the authority to issue an additional 
punishment along with the flogging.25 The additional punishment could either be a 
fine or imprisonment but an additional flogging punishment could not be given in 
this situation as the overall punishment in that particular case would exceed the 
maximum number of lashes.26 It must be noted that the additional punishment 
should also be reflecting the adopted school’s teachings and must satisfy the 
conditions of the offence and the offender otherwise the penalty will not be 
regarded as proportionate.27  
 
20 Al-Tuhery (n5) 52-55. Note, the Hanafi school of thought is not widely followed in Saudi Arabia. 
21 Al-Zehaily (n16) 37-44.        
22 Ali R. Barakat, Explanation of the New Saudi Judiciary System (1st edn Maktabat Al-Kanun for 
Publications, Riyadh 2012) 61-67. 
23 Al-Zehaily (n16) 48-53. 
24 Al-Dehiem (n15) 63-69. 
25 Awad (n9) 78-83. 
26 Al-Jehany (n8) 26-33. 
27 Ibrahiem (n10) 64-70. 
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Maliki28 is the only distinguished school of Islamic jurisprudence which differs 
from the aforementioned schools on this matter.29 According to the Maliki school, 
the determination of discretionary punishment should be unobstructed.30 It gives 
total and absolute discretion to the judges in the matters concerning discretionary 
punishments. Not only does a judge have the full authority to determine the 
punishment for the offender which he believes is suitable in a particular case, he 
can also exceed the maximum limits fixed for that type of punishment.31 
Discretionary punishments such as flogging or banishment can be issued by a judge 
without strictly following upper limits for those punishments. This is because the 
Maliki school believes in the value of ultimate deterrence in society which can only 
be achieved through absolute discretion of judges and their selection of 
punishments for the culprits.32 It is important to note, however, that the Maliki 
school is not commonly adopted in Saudi practice. 
Given this context, the question may be raised as to whether judges ought 
legitimately to go beyond the necessary penalties - irrespective of the school’s 
respective limits - to uphold justice or not? According to some legal commentators 
as Mohammed Imam, the answer to the question is no because it is evident that 
lighter punishments such as a warning, for example, is sometimes sufficient to deter 
the criminal from repeating the impugned acts. Where appropriate, if a judge 
chooses a stronger punishment than a reprimand to deter the offender then it would 
simply not be a just decision.33 As noted earlier, the rationale behind a punishment 
in the Islamic law system is to discourage criminal behaviour and not over-punish 
 
28 The Maliki School was first introduced by Imam Malik ibn Anas al-Asbahi who lived from 712 to 
796AD. He was born in the holy city of Medina and his reputation spread throughout the Islamic 
world. On the account of his contravention with Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik became the head 
of the view of tradition, while Imam Abu Hanifa was the head of the view of opinion. Most Muslim 
governments were supportive of Imam Abu Hanifa, however. 
29 Al-Jehany (n8) 59-66. 
30 Kalifa (n14) 56-62. 
31 Awad (n9) 36-41.  
32 Mohammed A. Mohammed, Comparative Study of Egyptian Law and Saudi Orders (Dar Al-Nahda 
Al-Arabia 2012) 84-92. 
33 Mohammed Imam, In Method of Sharia Codification (1st edn Dar Al-Matbuat Al-Jamiea, Egypt 
2012) 48-52. 
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the culprits. Therefore, a judge should not go beyond the essential punishment in 
any given case.34 As Abdulqadier Ouda writes:  
“Discretionary punishment in Muslim scholars’ perspective aims for 
achieving fair discipline of the offender as a result of his/her behaviour in a 
way that he/she would not re-commit that offence again. In other words, 
any act or punishment that is possible to achieve deterrence on offenders, 
would be enough to be a fair penalty”.35 
Currently, Islamic jurists face difficulty in reaching a shared consensus regarding 
the power of judges in deciding the upper and lower limits of punishments in their 
discretionary judgments.36 A shared consensus is not achieved however because of 
the divergent views of the different schools of thought on this matter. Thus, a 
disparity is created between those who believe that exceeding the Hudud or fixed 
punishments is allowed as within the scope of judicial discretion and those who 
oppose it.37  
If it is accepted that discretionary punishments are allowed to go beyond fixed 
punishments, it means that judges may enjoy absolute discretionary power and 
authority to decide the suitable punishment and its extent.38 Alternatively, it may 
be considered that judges are restricted in the use of their discretionary powers and 
may not  exceed the fixed punishment limits laid down.39  
 
4.2.2 The Role of Precedent in the Exercise of Judicial Discretion 
Pursuant to Saudi law, judges, when faced with determining a punishment for a 
criminal case, are required to look through all historical facts which might concern 
the matter, especially in cases where subject of precedent has been involved.40 
Today, because they have been the primary sources for the evolution of the Islamic 
law, discretionary powers given to the judges still require them to consult the Holy 
 
34 Ibrahiem (n10) 67-73. 
35 Abdulqadier Ouda, The Islamic Criminal Law in Comparison with the Descriptive Law (14th edn 
Al-Resal Establishment, Lebanon 1998) 110. 
36 Al-Jehany (n8) 53-57. 
37 Imam (n33) 78-84. 
38 Al-Dehiem (n15) 23-29. 
39 Ibrahiem (n10) 55-60. 
40 Al-Jehany (n8) 24-29. 
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Quran and Sunna before reaching a final decision.41 Indeed, the very first Islamic 
state originated in Medina where the first judgments were made by Prophet 
Muhammad Himself. The principle source behind those judgments was revelations 
made by God to the Prophet Muhammad in the Holy Quran.42 Thus, as noted, we 
can refer to the Holy Quran as the main source of the Islamic legal system. Other 
significant contributions to this law system were Prophet Muhammad’s own 
wisdom to make just decisions (i.e. Ijtehad) or existing independent reasoning and 
Him seeking out opinions of His companions (i.e. Mushawara) or consultation. 
These two significant contributions helped to solve certain issues which were not 
guided by the God through His revelations to the Prophet Muhammad.43 This shows 
that Sunna attached extreme credibility in itself to issue judgments in those cases 
which could not be referred to the Holy Quran, thus making it the second most 
significant source in the Islamic legal system.44 As a result, according to Abu 
Hanifah, Ibn Malik, Ibn Hanbal and Shafi’i, the discretionary punishment becomes 
binding in those cases where they have previously been mentioned in sacred texts.45 
It is evident that previous judgments affect some cases only and the judge’s decision 
may or may not be directly influenced by them - if indeed such precedents are 
accessible at all.46 Based on the above, some discretionary punishments are 
imposed by the judges which have previously been specified in Sharia texts. For 
some contemporary issues faced by the courts, there may not even be a precedent 
in the Quran or Sunna to guide the issue either. Moreover, serious difficulties have 
emerged which challenge the ability of modern courts to rely on more recent 
precedents. By official regulations, it is difficult to access reports of past judicial 
cases in Saudi Arabia. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that more recent 
 
41 Abdul-Aziz Amer, Discretionary Rules in Sharia (Dar Al-Fiker Al-Araby, Cairo 2007) 35-41. 
42 Ibrahiem (n10) 48-52. 
43 Al-Nehaily (n18) 75-81. 
44 Ibrahiem (n10) 34-38. 
45 Amer (n41) 26-30. 
46 Osama H. Al-Masdy, Comparative Proof of Islamic Jurisprudence and Saudi and Emirates Law 
(1st edn Dar Al-Kutub Al-Qanunia, Cairo 2013) 33-39. 
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judgments have not been made public.47 This has presented distinct challenges with 
limited recent precedents that can be relied on. 48   
Yet, whatever the difficulties in accessing relevant precedents, it is clear that 
precedents ought to be considered by the courts. 
In fact, it could be argued that the Islamic legal system is based on hierarchical 
judgments made from cases of a similar nature.49 This could be explained by the 
practices adopted by Caliphs after the demise of Prophet Muhammad. For example, 
Abu Bakr,50 would settle an incident by referring to the Holy Quran and seeking 
answers to base his judgments. If he could not base his judgments on the Holy 
Quran, he would then try to base them on the Prophet’s Sunna.51 It must be noted 
that Abu Bakr was one of the few companions which were very close to the Prophet 
Muhammad and he practically knew everything regarding a matter of Sunna 
himself in most instances.52 However, if he did not recognize any Sunna which 
concerned the particular case at hand, he would not hesitate to ask fellow Muslims 
if they were aware of any tradition of Prophet Muhammad regarding the matter. If 
there was one, he could base his judgment on that.53 If no single Sunna was there 
to support the matter, he would finally gather distinguished people and leaders 
among Muslim community and would try to resolve the matter through their 
opinions as Ijma or consensus. A consensus of opinion would eventually lead him 
in making his judgments.54 A similar approach was employed by his successors. 
Umar ibn al-Khattab 55 followed Abu Bakr by first consulting The Holy Quran and 
 
47 See below for more. 
48 Mohammed Al-Kahtaney, The Constitutional Orders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1st edn King 
Fahad Library 2011) 56-63. 
49 Kalifa (n14) 42-47. 
50 Abu Bakr was always a very near associate of the Prophet, which made him the former man to 
go to after the Message of Prophet Muhammad. He was the first man confess Islam. 
51 Mohammad Arnous, Judiciary History in Islam (1st edn Al-Maktaba Al-Azharia, Cairo 2008) 35-
39. 
52 Saleh Al-Sadlan, Implementation of Sharia in Every Time (Dar Ba-Sania for Publications, Riyadh 
1997) 62-66. 
53 Arnous (n51) 42-48. 
54 Ibrahiem (n10) 33-36. 
55 He is the second of the four "rightly guided" Caliphs after Abu-Bakr. Umar was born in Mecca 
from Quraish tribe, the most famous tribe of Mecca. Umar was born into a middle class family, but 
he was able to become intellectual, and was recognized for his physical strength. 
When Muhammed first announced his message of Islam, Umar considered that Islam was false 
eloquence. He intended to kill Muhammad, but after he meditated on some of the Holy Quran 
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Sunna to reach a judgment. If he did not find his answers in these two primary 
sources, he would make his decision by referring to the Abu Bakr’s judgments.56 
Ultimately, he would base his judgments in unresolved cases on a consensus of 
opinions.57  
Thus, it is evident that historically precedent played an important role in the 
development of Sharia law. Punishments were determined with help from previous 
historical judgments and, crucially, represented a notable practice among early 
rulers and judges in the Islamic societies.58 Especially in cases of discretionary 
matters, judges were supposed to refer to any distinguished previous judgments 
prior to making their own decisions.59  
Notwithstanding this historical approach, however, changes which have taken place 
in the intervening centuries have had a significant impact on the relevance of some 
precedents.60 Punishments in some cases become void and not binding due to the 
fact that previous judgments were made in an entirely different era and setting.61 
Given the change in contexts, previous historical judgments may or may not now 
provide a valid basis to form a decision.62 For example after the Prophet’s time and 
the first four Caliphs, the death penalty was applied for apostasy.63 By contrast, in 
modern times, most Islamic countries including Saudi Arabia have changed the 
death penalty to a milder discretionary punishment, which differs from one Islamic 
society to another.64 Some Islamic countries such as Tunisia do not consider 
 
verses he immediately changed his opinion. Instead of killing Muhammad, he decided to declare 
Islam. 
56 Arnous (n51) 43-48. 
57 Al-Nehaily (n18) 31-37. 
58 Awad (n9) 62-68. 
59 Ibrahiem (n10) 33-39. 
60 Mezaqbish Atlawi, Judiciary in Early Islam (1st edn Dar Al-Yazouri Al-Elmia, Jourdan 2016) 73-78.   
61 Arnous (n51) 29-36. 
62 Awad (n9) 43-49. 
63 Majied Abu-Rakiea, Summary in Textual and Wounds and Discretionary Rules (1st edn Dar Al-
Nafaies for Publications, Jordan 2010) 56-61. 
64 Abdul-Aziz Al-Sakeir, Capital Punishment in Sharia with Accordance with Saudi Law (1st edn 
National Center for Law, Cairo 2015) 42-46. According to Al-Tuhery, courts of Saudi Arabia has not 
witnessed an apostasy case in it is modern history. Al-Tuhery (n5) 54-59.  
96 
apostasy as a fixed crime or even a discretionary crime, but view it as a free personal 
matter.65   
4.2.3 The Death Penalty as a Discretionary Remedy  
Undoubtedly the most severe punishment available under Saudi law is the death 
penalty. On one hand, there are various arguments which support the death penalty 
for different reasons. First of all it may be claimed that it implements the retribution 
concept which consists of two aspects which are “just deserts” and “revenge”. The 
concept of “just deserts” relies on the idea that punishment should fit the crime’s 
severity. This follows the idea of “proportionality” which is a significant principle 
in the practice of fair sentencing. So this view supports that death penalty is 
appropriate for those who are convicted of murder under the concept of “just 
deserts” as this crime involved the deliberate ending of the life of another. However, 
supporters of the death penalty also follow the principle of “revenge”. This 
principle evokes the right of the victim’s family to revenge on the perpetrator of the 
murder.66  
However, on the other hand, the use of this penalty as a discretionary punishment 
raises serious concerns. The UN carried out a comprehensive survey to determine 
the association between homicide rates and the death penalty. The survey was 
designed to find evidence regarding whether the death penalty has more of a 
deterrent effect on individuals than life imprisonment. The findings of the survey 
failed to deliver any evidence that there is a difference between the deterrence 
effects of life imprisonment and executions. According to the research, such 
evidence is highly unlikely to be forthcoming. Therefore, there is little support for 
the death penalty in the deterrent hypothesis.67 This appears to be boarne our when 
one considers he application of the death penalty in Saudi Arabia in the context of 
drug related crimes. 
 
65 Ahmed Jaradat, Theory of Implementing Judiciary Criminal Rules in Islamic Jurisprudence, Textual 
and Wounds (1st edn Dar Al-Thakafa for Publications, Jordan 2012) 58-65. 
66 Al-Sakeir (n65) 230-234 
67 Roger Hood, ‘The Question of the Death Penalty and the New Contributions of the Criminal 
Sciences to the Matter: A Report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control’, UN Doc. E/AC.57/1988/CRP.7, 1988. The survey was last reviewed and published 
commercially as Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (5th 
edn Clarendon Press, Oxford 2014). 
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The Royal decree (M/39) issued in 2005 sets out the guidelines for the punishment 
of drug-related offences in Saudi Arabia. According to these guidelines, such 
offences are punishable by death under the discretion law. Each trial judge decides 
upon the appropriate punishment for a given crime by considering all relevant 
factors. Article 37 explains the categories of different drug-related offences which 
are punishable by death, including manufacturing, producing, extracting, 
transferring, growing, smuggling, selling, exporting, receiving, or importing any 
psychotropic substance in Saudi Arabia with the intention of sponsoring and 
promoting its use. Any individual’s consensual participation in any of these crimes 
may lead to his or her conviction and execution under the strict drug laws. 
According to Article 37, judges may choose to impose the death penalty, life 
imprisonment, or milder punishments such as whipping or a fine. Life 
imprisonment for drug-related crimes can be extended to at least 15 years, while a 
minimum fine of 100,000 Saudi Arabian Riyals can be imposed on those convicted 
of drug-related crimes.68  
Therefore, the question arises: how common is the use of the death penalty in 
punishing this category of offence? The answer is that these crimes are believed to 
be the largest non-lethal crimes category for which death penalties have been issued 
in Saudi Arabia in the last few decades. According to Amnesty International, drug-
related crimes constituted 28% of total death penalties in 2012, rising from 4% in 
2010 and 2011. 69 Executions for drug-related crimes escalated in 2013 to 32% and 
in 2014 and 2015 to 47% of all executions.70  
There are many different reasons for this sharp increase in drug-related crimes in 
Saudi Arabia, and it is difficult to single out a specific factor which is primarily 
responsible. Saudi Arabia is waging a war against drugs and, despite evidence to 
 
68 Note also, that the possession of drugs in the KSA for personal use without the intention of 
promoting or trading them is also punishable by law. Article 39 of the same law prescribes the 
conviction and sentencing of individuals who possess drugs for private use. The prison time can 
range from two to five years, fines in the range of 3,000 to 30,000 Riyals can be imposed, and 
flogging can be ordered. 
69 The Death Penalty in Saudi Arabia: Facts and Figures (Amnesty International 2015), 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/the-death-penalty-in-saudi-arabia-facts-
and-figures/>, accessed 14 December 2016. 
70 ibid, accessed 14 December 2016. It should be noted that there is no available official statistics 
released on this matter by the Saudi government. 
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the contrary, authorities continue to argue that the death penalty is the most 
effective solution to the illegal drugs problem.71 Yet the significant increase in the 
number of executions indicates that the problem is more widespread than ever and 
the death penalty does not appear to be proving effective in eliminating or even 
deterring these crimes.72 Indeed, more broadly, the argument that capital 
punishment prevents crimes more effectively than other forms of punishment 
arguably lacks convincing evidence.73  
Traditionalist and Moderate Views on the Death Penalty  
Beyond the specific example of drug related crimes, it appears that capital 
punishment is on the rise in Saudi Arabia as more and more court rulings include 
capital punishments in cases where judges use their discretionary powers to issue 
sentences.74 There are various reasons why the use of capital punishment is on the 
increase. For one, the practice of including capital punishments in Sharia 
discretionary rulings is particularly increasing as crimes become more complex. 
Another reason for the increase in capital punishment is the overall increase in the 
number of crimes, which encourages judges to allot harsher sentences in order to 
discourage others from committing similar offences.75 
Although traditionalists believe that capital punishment should remain a viable 
discretionary punishment, there is an increasing number of moderate legal scholars 
who are concerned by the increasing prevalence of capital punishment in Saudi 
Arabia and have started to raise public awareness of this trend.76 These moderate 
scholars believe that not all discretionary cases should be dealt with using the death 
penalty, and that the death penalty should be limited to those cases which can be 
 
71 Ata El-Rowaly, Drug Addiction in Saudi Society: A Field Study of Addicts at Al-Damam Al-Amal 
Complex, (Ain Shams University, Egypt 2012) 22-27. 
72 Mohamed Mehmoud Mentawi, Criminal Islamic Jurisprudence in the Light of Islamic Sharia: 
According to Saudi Law (The National Center for Legal Publications, Cairo 2015) 18-24. 
73 Alarming Number of Countries Flout International Law by Executing for Drug-Related Crimes 
(Amnesty International 2015) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/alarming-
number-of-countries-flout-international-law-by-executing-for-drug-related-crimes/>, accessed 14 
December 2016. 
74 ibid. 
75 Abdulmajid Al-Najar, Aims of Sharia with New Prospects (2nd edn Dar Al-Kharb Al-Islami, Beirut 
2008) 33-37. 
76 Omer Al-Kuley, The Justice is Pleading (1st edn Saudi Center for Legal Research and Studies, 
Jeddah 2010) 25-29. 
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traced back to the Quran and Sunna.77 According to such scholars, all discretionary 
rules are prepared and introduced into the legal system by court officials and are 
therefore not Holy or in accordance with sacred texts, namely the Quran and Sunna. 
Discretionary rules follow guidance from the Quran and Sunna, but if there are set 
punishments for set crimes, harsher punishments cannot be imposed on milder 
crimes.78 These moderate scholars agree that major crimes like murder should 
warrant capital punishments - as is suggested and fixed by the Quran and Sunna - 
but that capital punishment should not be imposed for crimes which warrant a 
discretionary punishment.  
The following five points further explain the position of moderate scholars as to 
why capital punishments should be omitted from discretionary rulings:  
1. The Holy Quran and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad clearly state 
that “no death penalty is to be given except for in three cases: apostasy, 
adultery and wounds causing death”. The Holy Quran and Sunna set forth 
fixed or Hudud crimes in order to deter individuals who pose a threat to a 
peaceful Islamic society from committing such crimes. The punishments for 
Hudud crimes are harsh and fixed and no judge has the power of discretion 
to change these punishments if a person is found guilty of any of the stated 
crimes because of the dangers these crimes pose to the well-being of a 
society.79 
2. Discretionary punishments are introduced in Islam for offences that are 
milder than fixed or Hudud and Qisas crimes. A judge can issue a 
punishment according to his or her discretion if he or she believes that the 
offence is not covered by the Hudud or Qisas categories of crime. 
Moreover, the original aim of introducing discretionary punishment was not 
execution but reform and rehabilitation. Therefore, judges should focus on 
punishments that prevent the recurrence of offences and deter the accused 
 
77 Shakier Al-Essamy, ‘Codification of Discretionary Rules from Textual Crimes, and its Role in 
Actualizing Justice’ (PhD Dissertation, Naief University for Security Science, Riyadh 2014) 59-67. 
78 Abu-Rakiea (n63) 100-104. 
79 Amer (n41) 76-83. 
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from further criminal activities. Discretionary punishments must be decided 
by a judge considering all contextual factors.80  
3. Sharia law, particularly Hudud and Qisas, deals with violent crimes such as 
homicide with fixed, including capital punishments. The integrity of the 
justice process relies on this ability to issue harsher sentences for crimes 
that cause harm to people or society. In order for a punishment to be 
considered justified, a judge must believe that the crime in question caused 
harm to the society. However, all crimes cannot be treated with the same 
principle, as this is in opposition to the concept of justified punishment 
defined by Sharia discretionary rules, which are not fixed.81  
4. There are problems with finding evidence in the Holy Quran and Sunna 
regarding capital punishments for discretionary crimes. Judges enjoy 
significant power and freedom in employing their discretionary powers in 
discretionary cases, where rules which regulate evidence are much more 
open to interpretation than in cases regarding Hudud crimes. If a witness 
withdraws his or her statement in a Hudud case, a judge is not able to apply 
the Hudud punishment specified by law. However, the same judge can apply 
punishment for discretionary crimes even if witness testimony is 
unavailable, because discretionary rules for capital punishments are not 
sufficiently covered by Sharia rules and cannot be fully authenticated by 
Sharia.82 
5. Most Islamic jurisprudence scholars hold that capital punishment is only for 
Al-Hudud crimes and wounds which cause death. They argue that other 
major crimes should be penalised by imprisonment because if a crime is not 
of a serious nature and execution is unnecessary, a judge should not impose 
a harsher sentence to redress the crime. The purpose of working in 
accordance with traditional values should be to encourage reform within the 
society and not to practice law in an unjustifiable fashion. If a crime did not 
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inflict a wound, the peace of a society should not be “restored” by issuing 
the death penalty as a punishment for that crime.83 
These moderate scholars comprise a group of individuals who have studied at 
Western institutions and share a preference for the Western system of capital 
punishment in which most justice systems abide by a clear set of rules and 
regulations.84 They usually present their views informally through different types 
of media and lectures. There has been no formal presentation of this view in 
conferences, published books, or official discussions in Saudi Arabia or other 
Islamic countries. Due to the prohibition of any form of criticism, these moderate 
Saudi scholars might not succeed in achieving tangible results; most of their efforts 
remain disorganised and lack a common platform, resulting in individual 
movements. Moreover, these efforts to limit capital punishments appear to only be 
supported by individuals interested in the law85 and not by official legal authorities. 
 
4.3 Limiting the Exercise of Judicial Discretion 
4.3.1 Need for greater clarity vis-à-vis discretionary punishments  
Unlike Hudud and Qisas punishments, the enactment of discretionary punishments 
in Saudi Arabia is not carried out solely on the basis of Sharia texts. The chief 
reason for this is their inadequate mention in the Sharia texts themselves.86 Thus, 
apart from discretionary punishments mentioned in the texts’, a greater part was 
left by the Holy Quran and Sunna to be later considered and decided by the rulers. 
Islam placed a sacred duty on the rulers to protect the Islamic societies and keep 
them well-organized.87 To accomplish such order in the legal system and in society, 
rulers were supposed to make certain acts compulsory, while prohibiting other acts 
from being committed. They were able to do so with the help of a specialised bodies 
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which would assist them in discretionary cases.88 However, the discretionary power 
should comply with the texts from Sharia as well as with all the principles laid out 
in them. The discretionary power should also comply with the accepted views and 
opinions of the jurists.89 Above all, it must satisfy the principles laid down in 
Islamic legal policies.90  
In this regard, Sharia provides jurists and rulers with a list of categories of 
discretionary punishments. Sharia divides these punishments into the lightest and 
the severest penalties.91 What Sharia does not prescribe is the most suitable 
punishment for a particular crime, thus leaving it solely to the discretion of rulers 
to select from the range of penalties.92 This is usually done by checking the 
conditions and nature of offence and taking in to account the circumstances of the 
offender.93 This practice could be traced back to the early years of Islam when 
notable rulers including Abu Musa al-Ash'ari,94 followed this general rule.95  
Thus although Sharia from the very beginning has enabled rulers to use their 
discretion to address crimes falling into this category, it does not impose any kind 
of restriction on those rulers to determine discretionary parameters.96  
Yet despite this, there is a clear rationale for why we need to place limits on the 
exercise of judicial discretion. In fact, the need to have greater clarity in relation to 
discretionary punishments seems quite reasonable when compared to other types of 
crimes such as Hudud and Qisas whose subsequent punishments have already been 
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prescribed in the Sharia texts.97 Hudud and Qisas crimes and punishments which 
are known in advance and make people accountable are very small in number as 
compared to discretionary ones, which are plentiful.98 In this context, there is a 
significant reason to clarify the discretionary punishments to warn individuals in 
advance, and to make them accountable for their deeds.99 Individuals can only be 
held accountable if there is no room left for ignorance of the law which could 
otherwise be used as an excuse by the individuals to commit discretionary 
offences.100 Any such ignorance of the law would only make the application of the 
principle of liability a difficult task as will be explained more in the next chapter.101  
Another significant reason why discretionary punishments need to be clarified in 
law is to ensure the more principled use of discretion by judges. If one judge abuses 
the discretionary powers given to him, he could sabotage the law which is originally 
there to protect society.102 If discretionary parameters are determined, they act as a 
guide for judges, ensuring a degree of consistency and also set out the principles to 
be used in applying discretion.103 The regulation of judges and their judgments 
would influence the whole justice system in a positive way. It would provide clarity, 
transparency and ensure greater consistency of application.104 It would also make 
the judges’ work much easier.105  
Early Efforts to Limit the Exercise of Judicial Discretion in relation to 
Punishments 
Rulers made efforts to determine discretionary parameters from the Holy sources 
in the early days of Islam, though with little success.106 While the laws of Hudud 
and Qisas were being enacted in the Holy sources, a good deal of effort was exerted 
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by leaders to determine a comprehensive range of discretionary parameters.107 This 
proved to be a challenge since there were few guidelines shaping the discretionary 
regime in Sharia.108 It was also discovered that securing a broad consensus for these 
parameters would require a substantial amount of time which proved impractical.109 
For example, the very first recoded attempt of determining discretionary parameters 
was made by Umar ibn Abd al-'Aziz;110 and ended with his death. Umar took great 
care in seeking formal legal opinions from people, who lived in Medina and who 
were the successors of the Prophet’s companions. The aim was to introduce 
parameters which judges could follow in the future.111 This effort remained 
incomplete and no regular parameter could be accomplished at that time.112 
Similarly, Ibn Malik compiled a book of Sunna’s containing the Fatawa or formal 
legal opinion of companions and their successors. Imam Ibn Malik did so on the 
instructions of the second Abbasid period caliph, Abu Ja'far al-Mansur113 who 
wished to continue Umar ibn Abd al-'Aziz’s work. Even though the work, 
completed and compiled into a book by Ibn Malik,114 did not become the law of the 
country,115 it has made a valuable contribution to the area by combining Hadith or 
Prophet Sayings with Islamic jurisprudence thus producing a comprehensive 
reference for scholars engaged in the area.116Another Sunna compiled in a different 
region of the Islamic territory forbade Abu Ja'far and his successors from 
implementing their version of law in the country concerned because it was thought 
 
107 Al-Zehaily (n16) 38-44.        
108 Saleh Al-Lehiby, Judiciary in the Islamic Civilization “Historical Study” (1st edn Dar Ibn Al-Juzy, 
Riyadh 2016) 63-67. 
109 Al-Nehaily (n18) 21-26. 
110 The eighth Umayyad Caliph. He is known among Muslims as a fair and religious leader. He 
studied the Holy Quran at a young age and was educated by strong believers and from the 
distinguished generation that were companions of the prophet.  
111 Baioun (n95) 28-33. 
112 Al-Lehiby (n108) 78-83. 
113 Although he was the second Abbasid caliph, he succeeded his brother only five years after the 
downfall of the Umayyad. Thus, he is always deemed the actual establisher of the Abbasid Empire. 
Al Mansur founded his capital at Baghdad, which he called the City of Peace. 
114 Mohammed Fouad explination of Mohammed Ibn Malik, The Muwatta’ (Dar Ehiaa Al-Turath 
Al-Arabi, Beirut Lebanon 1985) 76-73. 
115 Arnous (n51) 63-70. Religious differences proved influential. 
116 Al-Lehiby (n108) 63-66. 
105 
that it was not socially sound. This was possible by the contact available to each 
group of thought with the Islamic leadership.117  
4.3.2 The Legislative and Judicial Authority of the Ruler in Limiting the Exercise 
of Judicial Discretion    
Unfortunately, the silence of Sharia texts regarding judges’ discretionary powers 
make the determination process more complicated.118 Any determination of 
punishment which is not contradicted by the rules of Sharia is acceptable.119 Sharia 
does not say that a judge is the only person responsible for determining the 
discretionary punishment and neither does it say that a judge should have no say in 
determination at all.120 In fact, Sharia does not demand that determination is left to 
the discretion of a judge unless the prescriptions containing the discretionary crimes 
and punishments oppose or challenge the Sharia rules.121 However, the belief of 
present time jurists is in line with the previous historical standpoint. They state that 
the books of Fiqh or jurisprudence suggest that discretionary punishments should 
only be left to the ruler’s and a judge’s discretion.122 Significantly this means that 
the person who possesses both judicial and legislative powers is the one responsible 
for making discretionary judgements. 123 Therefore, a person who holds these 
powers, and who does not contradict Sharia rules, is deemed responsible to 
determine discretionary punishments.124 According to this belief, the judges who 
are directly involved in the judgment-making process do not hold absolute 
discretionary power which make them independent from rulers. Otherwise, the 
jurists would have specifically mentioned the word Qadi or judge throughout the 
discussion on discretionary matters.125  
Therefore, the determination of discretionary parameters is the responsibility of the 
ruler, as long as they conform to the rules of Sharia. If a law does not follow the 
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general guidelines of the Sharia texts, the ruler has the power to nullify this law 
and he is not accountable to anybody.126 Thus, the ruler has absolute authority in 
clarifying (and, if undertaken, legislating for) discretionary crimes and 
punishments. By virtue of this, the same ruler is responsible for the comprehensive 
implementation of Islamic law in the country.127 Sharia texts maintain the 
prerequisite qualifications for a ruler for an Islamic state along with all the 
stipulated requirements128 must be fulfilled.129 Mohammed Al-Ethemine writes: 
“Justice is a duty in everything, but in terms of rulers it is much confirmed, because 
if injustice took place at the governors’ level, chaos would take place as a result of 
injustice”.130 
- Arguments for the clarification of discretionary punishments 
Relieving judges of their absolute discretionary powers does not affect their ability 
to determine judgments in discretionary cases.131 In fact, when specialized bodies 
identify discretionary parameters in advance, judges will still have the power to 
decide the exact punishment to be imposed on criminals.132 Judges’ powers 
therefore will only be limited (if not removed) once parameters are introduced with 
guidelines established merely assisting them in determining suitable 
punishments.133 Mohammed Abu-Zahra writes: “Because discretion is an 
implementation of the religious order, which is aiming to work on community 
reform and prevent tampering and corruption, it must have a clear basis to regulate 
it”.134 
Possible change in the determination of discretionary parameters not only 
simplifies the tasks for the judges, but also safeguards the interest of general 
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public.135 In some cases, judges are accused of not taking aggravating and 
mitigating factors into account and use their absolute powers to impose a particular 
sentence.136 This practice causes dissatisfaction among the public regarding the 
whole justice system which is based on punishments which favor the judges’ 
interests and which are not necessarily suited to the law or the crime itself.137 Their 
argument for codification is that it is necessary at the present time in Saudi Arabia, 
because the inconsistency in the discretionary punishments ordered, and the lack of 
foreseeability associated with the system, is prompting social dissatisfaction with 
the Saudi judicial system. In short, as Dr Mohammed Al-Mushawah publicly stated, 
“codification of discretionary punishments would limit differences in judges 
sentencing in similar cases”.138 When discretionary parameters are defined via 
legislation, this problem can be solved in the most effective manner.139 However, 
it would still be the judge’s responsibility to determine the punishment in all cases. 
Thus, judges would merely be required to take into account all prescribed 
guidelines and aggravating and mitigating factors in exercising their discretion.140  
It must be noted that any effort to determine discretionary parameters does not mean 
that they would become immutable and unchangeable. In fact, a discretionary 
regime could not be established which would remain applicable forever and for all 
times and places.141 The most significant reason behind this temporary nature of the 
discretionary regime is the fact that it is not prescribed in the Sharia texts as Hudud 
and Qisas. The latter types of punishments are not subject to change but the 
discretionary regime is changed when necessary.142 For example, in the era of Umar 
ibn al-Khattab, the punishment for drinking intoxicants was fixed by the law at forty 
lashes. The guilty person would receive forty lashes for his offence so that he would 
not repeat the crime.143 The widespread use of intoxicants and the somewhat 
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relaxed punishment for such wrongdoing did not act as a deterrent which ultimately 
obliged the caliph to change the rule.144 The new discretionary punishment was 
fixed at eighty lashes.145 Therefore, the revision of discretionary punishment was 
aimed at promoting deterrence which would otherwise not be achieved with the 
previous set value of lashes. This demonstrates the need to change the discretionary 
regime from time to time and place to place.146 That is why many Islamic countries 
around the world continue to amend the laws so that they remain relevant and 
applicable for the specific time and place.147   
 
4.4 Conclusion 
When the offender is punished in criminal law cases the normal reasons given for 
doing so include retribution, denunciation, incapacitation, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and reparation.148 The principle that “the punishment must fit the 
crime” allows judges some leeway in deciding upon the correct sentence and 
therefore opens the door to the practice of judicial discretion. These discretionary 
practices are regarded as justified provided that the sentence imposed for an offence 
must be equivalent to the level of offence. This means that punishment decided 
should be neither more nor less than the gravity of the crime.149  
In the current justice system in Saudi Arabia, magistrates have extensive choice 
when issuing verdicts according to their own understanding of Sharia including the 
use of capital punishment as discussed.150 Some jurists believe that judges have the 
exclusive authority to determine the punishments on their own. Thus, a judge on 
this interpretation, after analysing and considering all conditions of the crime and 
the offender, could decide upon a suitable punishment depending on Islamic 
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Sharia.151 However, in certain circumstances there are restrictive boundaries set by 
three different schools of thought namely Hanafi, Shafi’i, and Hanbali which may 
prove influential.152  Moreover, although judges refer to the Holy Quran and Sunna 
for making decisions and to previous decisions made in Islamic law in Saudi 
Arabia, referring to previous cases can be problematic because the decisions 
reached and the punishments which were imposed often occurred in a different 
place and time and are therefore not always applicable to the current era.153 These 
issues combine to heighten the ambiguity surrounding discretionary punishments.  
The modern world is moving towards significant processes and adding new 
parameters, values and principles. This gives rise to a variety of different conflicts, 
especially in the legal field.154 The Western world has spent sufficient time and 
resources attempting to resolve these anticipated conflicts and to avoid 
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Lon Fuller and the Morality of Law 
5.1 Introduction 
It is clear from the foregoing chapters that serious concerns have been raised at a 
domestic level as to the appropriateness of the highly discretionary regime adopted 
in Saudi Arabia. This chapter now seeks to benchmark the system in KSA against 
international norms and this end will place the focus on Professor Lon L. Fuller 
morality of law thesis. For Fuller, a legal system is orientated towards a clear 
purpose: it subjects human conduct to the governance of rules. Therefore, 
procedural moral standards must be followed in order to develop a legitimate legal 
system.1 According to Fuller, a legal system that generates laws which, for 
example, are ad hoc, kept secret, unclear, inconsistent, impossible to obey, 
frequently changing or lacking congruence cannot be regarded as legitimate.2  
Relying on the hypothetical example of King Rex, Fuller tried to convey to 
lawmakers that they must instead observe eight key principles, or “kinds of legal 
excellence” in the process of law-making because these principles together provide 
citizens with the reasons to obey the rule of law.3 According to Fuller, the 
government cannot expect its citizens to follow a legal system which ignores the 
value of moral principles. Therefore, it is essential for lawmakers to follow these 
standards first. When lawmakers respect the procedural moral principles of the rule 
of law, their laws can engage citizens positively in the legal process and influence 
their behaviour. On the other hand, failure to observe these standards results in a 
system which is neither legal nor moral according to Fuller, and runs the risk of 
providing the citizens with no reciprocal obligations to obey. As Fuller suggests: 
“The literature of the morality of duty is in fact filled with references to something 
like the principle of reciprocity”.4 
 
According to Fuller, the legal procedures are built out of norms of justice, which 
have a moral aspect. The procedures which are embodied in a legal system are 
 
1 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (2nd revised edn Yale University Press, U.S.A 1969) 9-12. 
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morally significant in determining whether a set of rules count as a legal system. 
He believes that for a law to be called a law in a true sense, it must pass a moral 
functional test. If a rule or a set of rules fails to conform to this function, it does not 
count as law.5  
This chapter therefore sets out to describe the concept of morality and describes 
Fuller’s attempt to split the concept into two distinct component sets. There are a 
number of procedures he explains that help us to give form to the law as far as the 
“internal morality” of law is concerned and these, in particular, will be discussed 
below. Building on these foundations, the chapter will then focus on the positivist 
approach to law championed by critical moral philosopher and renowned legal 
positivist Prof. HLA Hart before turning to consider Fuller’s criticism of it.   
 
5.2 Fuller’s Argument for the Morality of the Law 
Law plays a significant role in guiding and directing the conduct of people in a 
society. Fuller’s description of laws and morality is based on this topic of subjecting 
individuals’ behaviour in a society to the supremacy of a legal system. To live 
together peaceably, human beings appear to need a framework to settle their 
disputes and deal justly with each other. Laws establish these rules to live in a 
society.6  
In this context, Fuller tried to develop the connection between law and morality. 
He placed a lot of emphasis on the need for the implementation of the law to 
maintain interdependence between both concepts. The main argument advanced by 
Fuller is that laws should be widely accepted and publicized to gain the status of a 
legal framework which could subject human conduct to the governance of rules.7  
When lawmakers respect the moral principles of the rule of law, their laws can 
influence the practical reasoning of citizens. The public can consider the legal 
consequences and penalties when deciding how they should behave. Where the law 
is foreseeable, citizens can fully evaluate the consequences of their acts in advance. 
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If citizens are to be expected to comply with the law it is important that law gives 
them reasons for doing so and deters them from acting wrongfully.8 Fuller explains:  
“The laws should also be given adequate publication so that they may be 
subject to public criticism, including the criticism that they are the kind of 
laws that ought not to be enacted unless their content can be effectively 
conveyed to those subject to them. It is also plain that if the laws are not 
made readily available, there is no check against a disregard of them by 
those charged with their application and enforcement”.9   
Fuller, in his theory, regards the law as an activity and the entire legal system as a 
creation of a continuous struggle. Human beings follow law in order to live in a 
society. This activity is carried out under pressure from the external world and 
internal sources to establish what acceptable conduct in a society is.10  
The Two Moralities 
Fuller identified two moralities: “external morality” and “internal morality”. 
“External morality”, he explained, concerns the decision of making a particular 
principle or theory an object of the statute.11 This was not the focus of Fuller’s 
attention, however, Rather, he sought to investigate the issues involving “internal 
morality”. “Internal Morality”, according to Fuller, is compliance with eight 
principles while enacting laws. 12  Fuller called these eight criteria discussed below 
the “Inner Morality” of law because these apply to both legal and moral theory and 
can be used as ethical standards for assessing official conduct.13  
Along with an emphasis on the internal morality of law, Fuller also distinguished 
between “morality of duty” and “morality of aspiration”. According to Fuller, the 
morality of duty establishes the basic principles without which maintaining order 
in a society would not be possible. On the other hand, the morality of aspiration is 
about a complete awareness of human powers, quality and enables citizens to lead 
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a better life.14 The morality of aspiration demands more than the morality of duty. 
The morality of aspiration focuses on the demands and desires of humans that 
would help them to achieve what is best for individuals. A legal system which is 
inspired by the complete recognition of human powers would serve this aspirational 
aspect. The morality of duty, however, simply strives to maintain the order in 
society.15 
Fuller argued that to achieve the laws’ objective, the “morality of duty” should be 
focused on the more basic aspects of the creation of laws.  He advised legislators 
to avoid confusion between the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty. 
Increased focus on the morality of aspiration would hinder the effective functioning 
of society according to Fuller. Basing laws on the morality of aspiration would 
result into a list of too many obligations on the one hand and prohibitions on the 
other which would be difficult to follow. It would also hinder the freedom of action 
which is the basic right of every human being.16 Increasing the number of 
restrictions can suppress experimentation, stop individuals from developing their 
inventive faculties and thwart the autonomy of action which is needed if the best 
interests of humanity are to be served.17 As he noted, law cannot make people good, 
but it can prevent them from being bad.18 
 
5.3 Procedural Morality in Fuller’s Theory 
To support the argument of morality in law, Fuller devised a whole procedure of 
enacting laws in light of moral value and called it the “inner morality of law”. Fuller 
highlighted eight mistakes that lawmakers can commit while enacting laws. To 
understand this procedural morality, it is first useful to analyse the eight failures in 
 
14 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn Oxford University Press, U.S.A 2011) 28-
31. 
15 ibid 81-84. 
16 Fuller (n1) 20-25. 
17 David Dyzenhaus, Law and Morality: Reading in Legal Philosophy (3rd edn University of Toronto 
Press, Canada 2007) 128-132. 
18 Fuller (n1) 157-159. 
115 
encoding and implementing law as illustrated by Fuller through his imaginary 
character, King Rex.19 
 
Mistakes in King Rex’s Legal System 
King Rex was a good-natured king who wanted to develop sufficient laws for his 
people and came to rule. with the aim of reforming the legal system. According to 
his views, the reason for the failure of the previous king was his inability to enact 
proper laws. The legal system of the region was inefficient and ineffective. Trial 
processes were awkward, existing rules were outdated and justice was unavailable. 
Owing to the lack of a proper legal system, judges were deemed slovenly and 
corrupt. King Rex wanted to resolve all these issues and ensure that his reforms 
were remembered by history.  
His reforms got off to a seemingly promising start. In order to enact proper laws, 
he disregarded and cancelled the implementation of any existing law in the region 
and began to establish his own system and initiated the drafting of a new code. 
However, he found himself unable to formulate even the simplest rules. Moreover, 
although he had confidence about his ability to decide on particular disputes, he 
was unable to reach a coherent conclusion on any case and this caused him a great 
deal of stress. 
Realizing his inability to code laws he began to follow another strategy and decided 
to act as a judge of disputes between his citizens. He supposed that he would 
develop his ability and become proficient with the passage of time and his exposure 
to different situations and ultimately he would be able to codify the laws. Despite 
handling hundreds of cases, neither he nor his subjects could trace any pattern and 
logic in his decisions and this attempt failed.20 
After the second failure, he decided to improve his ability to codify laws by 
following a course of lessons in generalization. After taking these lessons, he spent 
many hours of work coming up with a generalized code of law. Although he came 
 
19 ibid 38-39. 
20 ibid 34. 
116 
up with a lengthy document, he was still unsure of his ability to enact effective 
laws.  As a result, he decided to keep his code of laws secret from his subjects. He 
announced that verdicts would be reached in accordance with this document but 
that the document would be seen only by his scrivener and be kept as a state secret. 
To Rex's astonishment, this plan met with his subjects’ disapproval. 
To remedy the situation, King Rex decided to announce a new plan. Following his 
new plan, at the start of the calendar year, he declared he would settle all the 
disputes of the previous year. He further announced that he would publish a 
statement of detailed reasons for all the judgment made by him. But those 
judgments were not to be used in the future to decide on other cases. Initially, his 
subjects accepted the plan but then gradually they began to object that what they 
wanted was a clear code of law to be available in advance so that they knew in 
advance the consequence of any act.21 
At last, he decided to publish a revised version of the document. His subjects 
appreciated the fact that the document was made available for all. However, soon 
everyone realized that the document was merely a masterpiece of vagueness. 
Neither legal experts nor common people were able to understand even the opening 
sentence of the document. Rioting began in front of the royal palace. Now Rex 
realized he was unable to enact laws on his own so he appointed a group of experts 
to clarify the document – although the experts were told not to change the original 
verdict. Now the revised version of the document, with the clearer language, 
showed that the numerous provisions contradicted each other. It was a total failure 
once again.22 
Becoming angry over his subjects’ repetitive negative feedback, Rex once again 
revised the document but this time he came up with totally unrealistic and extremely 
harsh punishments.  For example, earlier people called to the court were given 10 
days to appear and now they were only given 10 seconds to present themselves 
before the court. Similarly sneezing, coughing or falling down in front of King was 
denounced as a crime. Even after drafting such laws, he repeatedly made changes 
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in the document which increased the confusion among his subjects and resulted into 
the failure of his legal reforms.  
Key Principles Identified 
From the example of King Rex, Fuller highlighted eight key failures in law-making 
which may undermine a legal system:23  
1.    Making decision on an ad hoc basis; 
2.    Keeping the rules secret; 
3.    Introducing retroactive rules; 
4.    Enacting vague rules; 
5.    Enacting contradictory rules; 
6.    Making compliance impossible for people by listing absurd crimes; 
7.    Frequently changing the rules; 
8.  Failing to ensure the proclaimed rules corresponded with their actual purpose. 
The reason for the failure of Rex’s legal system, according to Fuller, is attributed 
to the failure of procedural morality. Fuller states that vague terms and language 
can lead to misinterpretation. Therefore, the focus should be on the procedures of 
law making rather than its substantive content.24 Furthermore, when Fuller’s 
principles are examined, it is clear that firstly, there should be established and fixed 
rules for judges to base their decisions on and when these are followed it prevents 
any sense of random decision making, In addition, law documents should be 
published, laws have to be prospective and laws should be clear. As citizens are not 
obligated to obey vague and contradictory laws, laws should be consistent, and  the  
obedience and compliance with laws should be possible for the citizens. Finally, 
laws should reflect their actual purpose for their enactment while they are being 
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implemented and thus create a moral responsibility among lawmakers and produce 
a distinction between a "morality of aspiration" and a "morality of duty”25. 
Laws that are formed by violating any of these principles, lose their moral grounds 
and their right to compel people to follow them morally. Fuller explained:  
“Certainly there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have 
a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret 
from him, or that came into existence only after he had acted, or was 
unintelligible, or was contradicted by another rule of the same system, or 
commanded the impossible, or changed every minute”.26  
The famous sociologist Simmel stated that there exists a type of trade-off between 
the government and the inhabitants of a country as regards the compliance of laws 
enacted for citizens. By enacting laws, the government gives a message to its 
citizens that it expects them to follow these rules and in return government gives a 
guarantee that these rules will be applied to every citizen’s conduct. However, when 
the government fails to comply with its guarantee and breaks the bond, then there 
is no room or ground left for the citizens to perform their duty of compliance, and 
this is what Fuller emphasized in his analysis as the reciprocal nature of law.27 As 
Fuller noted, “if the legislative draftsman is to discharge his responsibilities he, in 
turn, must be able to anticipate rational and relatively stable modes of 
interpretation”.28 
When no moral grounds are observed in developing laws, there can be no precise 
measure available to test the loyalty of citizens as regards complying with laws. 
Here the point should be made that mere respect toward the government and the 
authority of state do not show the citizens’ loyalty to the legal system.  Fuller’s 
argument becomes clear when we observe that the people of King Rex’s state were 
respectful toward him and accepted and admired him as King. However, they never 
accepted any legal system developed by King Rex because he failed to provide a 
moral structure to form the conduct of his citizens.29  
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Thus, it can be concluded that, according to Fuller, to form a legal system it is 
necessary to follow these eight principles which can be characterized as “The 
Morality that Makes Law Possible”.30 Fuller writes:  
“Every departure from the principles of the law’s inner morality is an affront 
to man’s dignity as a responsible agent. To judge his actions by unpublished 
or retroactive laws, or to order him to do an act that is impossible, is to 
convey to him your indifferences to his powers of self-determination. 
Conversely, when the view is accepted that man is incapable of responsible 
action, legal morality loses its reasons for being. To judge his actions by 
unpublished or retrospective laws is no longer an affront, for there is nothing 
left to affront-indeed, even the verb “to judge” becomes itself incongruous 
in this context; we no longer judge a man, we act upon him”.31  
Strengths of Fuller’s Criteria 
The purpose of law, according to Professor Fuller, is “the enterprise of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules."32  He suggests that it is a particular way 
of achieving social order within a society insofar as a set of rules is established 
which guides human behaviour in order to achieve cooperation between those who 
follow these rules. Fuller explicitly termed law as something which could not exist 
without morality and considered it one of the most important elements of achieving 
justice. Since all our legal procedures are based upon norms of justice, morality 
remains the foundation stone on which each legal system is built. He rightly 
believed that procedures should be morally important when we need to determine 
whether a set of those rules and procedures could be considered a valid legal 
system. In this way, a proposed law will have to undertake a moral functional test. 
If it fails to meet the minimum criteria of this test, we cannot consider it as a law.33 
Fuller set out eight desiderata of internal morality, eight principles of legality and 
the question of whether or not these minimum requirements are fulfilled would be 
the necessary criterion for a legal system to come into existence. He stated that “A 
total failure in any one of these eight directions does not result in a bad system of 
law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all”.34 
Achieving these aspirations of internal morality set out by Fuller adds credibility to 
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a system and any failure to achieve them would result in the formulation of a bad 
law, not only in the strictly moral sense, but also in what Fuller would have 
categorized as a “technical” sense. Indeed, he perceived morality to be the 
“indispensable conditions for the existence of law”, and believed that no legal 
system can thrive in its absence.35  
The approach of Fuller also relies heavily on “interaction thesis” which is the 
interaction of humans and laws. Fuller believed that any given legal system can 
only function officially when there is a human judgment at play at every level. 
Fuller did not believe that a legal system should necessarily be imposed blindly 
upon society. Rather, he drew attention to the role played by individual actors in 
those legal systems. The kind of reciprocity which Fuller hoped for between 
governments and their citizens was the key to achieving the ultimate observance of 
rules.36   
Fuller considered the law as an enterprise that channels human conduct toward the 
successful governance of rules by the state as stated above. Nevertheless, these 
rules were not just arbitrarily inflicted upon the citizens by the state:  
“Law is not, like management, a matter of directing other persons how to 
accomplish tasks set by a superior, but is basically a matter of providing the 
citizenry with a sound and stable framework for their interactions with one 
another”.37  
Above all, whatever the substantive purpose is, certain procedural standards and 
their due compliance are imperative in achieving the practical purpose of having a 
legal system in the first place. The failure to comply with above-mentioned 
procedural standards only serves to make the legal system a tool of state coercion 
to be employed against its own citizens.38  
Fuller insisted that all legal systems in existence around the world have a necessary 
purpose, namely to control human conduct in order to achieve the objectives of the 
society. Even among ethnically, culturally, and religiously diverse societies, their 
laws will show high degrees of similarity.39 The strength of Fuller’s inner morality 
of law lies in the strength of the eight desiderata since he did not state which 
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particular postulate out of eight should be preferred over another. An order of 
significance or ranking system was not provided. Therefore, Fuller advised that 
lawmakers must consider each postulate effectively before making a final 
determination. These postulates are a means of internal morality for any legal 
system which is why judges, executives, and legislators should consider their 
employment.40  
 
Fuller’s theory guides the lawmakers and citizens in showing why it is sensible for 
the people of any given society to contribute to the system of collaboration which 
the legal system creates. Fuller’s theory limits the excessive exercise of power by 
setting up the moral principles for the enactment of laws by officials.41 Finnis 
writes:  
“Adherence to the rule of Law (especially the eighth requirement, of 
conformity by officials to pre-announced and stable general rules) is always 
liable to reduce the efficiency for evil of an evil government, since it 
systematically restricts the government’s freedom of manoeuvre”.42 
Fuller also explains:  
“The demands of the inner morality of law, … though they concern a 
relationship with persons generally, demand more than forbearance; they 
are, as we loosely say, affirmative in nature: make the law known, make it 
coherent and clear, see that your decisions as an official are guided by it.”43  
 
Criticisms of Fuller’s Criteria 
Under natural law theory, for a law to be regarded as a genuine law, it must 
correspond to certain idealistic values or principles. Such was the position of Prof. 
Fuller and his famous illustration conforms to this idea as explained earlier.   
However, the law of morality and its dependence on the satisfaction of certain 
moral demands have been criticised, especially by those who follow the legal 
positivism school of thought which holds that a legal system should not necessarily 
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be connected to morals as it is a closed logical system where correct legal decisions 
must be decided without reference to social considerations. For instance, Professor 
Hart, who was a renowned legal positivist and contributed significantly toward a 
critique of moral philosophy, did not believe that the legal system should rely on 
morality.44 He maintained that law should not be dependent on the principles of 
morality and vice versa. According to him, if a law is judged based on its adherence 
or not to a code of morality then it is influenced by our likes and dislikes. It is 
therefore made dependent on individual gratification, and it ceases to be an 
independent, fair and just system since it relies on moral principles which cannot 
be established by rational argument.45 
Moreover, it has been pointed out that Fuller is unclear whether the citizens should 
comply or not with laws when these laws are immoral and constitute a breakdown 
in legality even if the whole legal system is not a total failure. Adolf Hitler’s rules 
in Nazi Germany in the first half of the 20th century (1934) are an example of this 
situation. Hitler published some of his rules, especially the most important ones. 
Although the majority of laws are expected to exist permanently, in reality, only 
those laws which suit the perspective and convenience of the rulers of that time are 
immune to change. In such a situation, the problem of those citizens living under 
such a system is not as simple as those who are assured that their vote will not be 
considered even if they cast it. The problem for these citizens is like a voter who is 
sure that his vote will not be counted at all and in the case that it is considered; the 
chances are high that the purpose of counting is the opposite of what he considered 
while voting. When such a situation arises, a citizen dealing with this dilemma has 
to choose for himself whether he wants to follow with such rules and cast his vote 
“symbolically” in hope that in the future the situation will get better. This was the 
situation of people under Hitler’s rules. They were left to decide whether they 
wanted to comply with this system or realize that they had no moral obligations to 
comply with his rules.46  
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Another significant criticism of Fuller is the way he is said to confuse morality with 
efficiency. As internal morality observed and Prof. Hart noted, “[Fuller’s theory 
was] unfortunately compatible with very great iniquity”.47 Fuller emphasised the 
importance of morally good laws, which are usually perceived as contributing to a 
less-efficient legal system.48 On the other hand, as Summers suggests, the principles 
of internal morality “may be viewed as “maxims of legal efficacy” and maxims of 
this nature are not, as such, conceptually connected with morality. If a person 
assembles a machine inefficiently, the result is inefficiency, not immorality”. 
Hence, according to legal positivists the pre-requisites for a legal system to exist do 
not necessarily include the endorsement of minimum moral values by the law. A 
legal system does not have to exhibit a level of conformity with morality. Laws are 
made to endure and not to be eliminated by moral criticism; you can meet the 
requirements of the internal morality and make morally bad laws.49  A possible 
illustration of this is the “One Child Policy” in the People’s Republic of China 
which has been adopted since 1978, and which states that couples is not allowed to 
have more than one child in urban areas. The government initiated this policy to 
ease China's political, economic, social and environmental problems. Authorities 
have prevented more than 250 births since the introduction of these laws up till the 
year 2000.50 This law has complied with Fuller principles in enacting laws but the 
content of the law is arguably bad because it represents a potentially inappropriate 
intervention in citizens lives and affects their freedom adversely. Nicholson writes 
that the lawmaker can abuse the law, and is “subject to a constant temptation to 
cheat on the system, and to exercise a ruleless power under the guise of upholding 
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5.4 Conclusion  
The chapter has shed light on Fuller’s theory which examines the relationship 
between laws and morality. Despite the flaws of Fuller’s theory regarding the 
morality of law, it has become internationally accepted and is the primary theory 
when it comes to enacting laws due to its rational nature and the role it plays in 
improving the citizens’ satisfaction with the legal system. Nicholson writes 
“following the procedures prescribed by the internal morality is not a means to 
making law; it is, and it alone is, to make law. The requirements of internal morality 
are not preconditions of law making but constitutive of it”.52   
It is submitted, the strengths of Fuller’s procedural morality outweigh its failings. 
Fuller’s principles function as a framework which shapes the legal system and also 
facilitates the implementation of the external morality of law. Fuller observed that 
there is some overlap by internal morality with the external morality of the law in 
a way that "a proper respect for the internal morality of law limits the kinds of 
substantive aims that may be achieved through legal rules."53    
It is also clear that it is irrational to expect people to obey a legal rule which does 
not exist or which is kept secret, or which appears only after an action has carried 
out or is vague or inconsistent with another rule in the same system. Fuller writes: 
“It may not be impossible for a man to obey a rule that is disregarded by those 
charged with its administration, but at some point, obedience becomes futile-as 
futile, in fact, as casting a vote that will never be counted”.54    
The violation of a principle of legal morality could have a negative effect on the 
rest of the system. For example, a lack of clarity, consistency or publicity could 
lead to retroactive laws. Carelessness in ensuring that it is possible for citizens to 
obey a given law may lead to the need to increase judges’ discretion which in turn 
increases the risk that there are discrepancies between the law and the way it is 
implemented by legal practitioners as is the case in the Saudi legal system which 
the next chapter will explain in detail.   
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The next chapter will discuss Fullers eight principles in enacting laws in the light 
of the Saudi legal system, after that it will present the strategies which various 
countries have followed in order to ensure that Fuller’s principles of legality are 













































The Application of Fuller’s Principles to the Saudi Legal System 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter seeks to examine whether or not Fuller’s principles of procedural 
morality as described in detail in the previous chapter are being applied to the Saudi 
legal system. As the previous chapter explained, Fuller highlighted eight principles 
to test the morality of a legal system, and the failure to observe these standards will 
result in systems which will be neither legal nor moral.55 Unfortunately, when 
examining the Saudi legal system as regards each of these principles it can be seen 
that most of the standards are not met as the chapter will prove. 
6.2 The Application of Fuller’s Principles to the Legal System in Saudi Arabia 
This section will now take Fuller’s 8 basic principles of morality in law, which are 
recognized and adhered to internationally, and use them to analyse and evaluate the 
key characteristics of the Saudi legal system with the aim of determining to what 
extent the principles  are being followed and therefore deciding if this system is in 
fact a “moral” one using Fuller’s criteria. 
 
1. Decisions Should not be Made Randomly; There Should be Established and 
Fixed Rules 
The main function of a legal system is to establish the fundamental rules which 
direct human conduct and lay out the answers to all questions related to the judicial 
systems in a given country. It forms the basic rules which serve as the main tool for 
deterring wrongful acts, maintaining order, protecting liberties and rights and 
preventing the abuse of power by the government by guiding the citizens conduct 
and laying out their responsibilities.56 In the case of Saudi Arabia, the fact is that 
the legal system is not governed by clear rules.57 It can, therefore, be argued that 
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there is no official legal system owing to the absence of an identified codes of rules 
and because decisions are made randomly in KSA by judges.58  
As was explained in the previous chapters, Saudi judges are completely dependent 
on interpreting Sharia rules using their personal perspectives and traditions. This is 
because there is no codified set of rules which are identified and ready for 
implementation for all citizens. Rather, there are the general rules of Sharia law 
which judges, depending on the circumstances they encounter, extract and interpret 
according to their own criteria. This leads to different sentences being given in 
similar cases depending on the judge’s view and understanding of Sharia and leaves 
the citizens unsure in advance of the consequences of their acts.59 Such a practice 
of arbitrary decision-making could be considered corrupt and lacking in logical 
justification. Al-Judhlaniu has argued that not all judges have the same level of 
Sharia knowledge and jurisprudence and that this fact gives rise to the urgent need 
for the codification of Sharia guidelines and for judges to be obliged to follow these 
codified rules. In addition, he argued that at the present time, there exists some 
judgments and independent reasoning which were extracted from Sharia which 
need to be reviewed and corrected to agree with Sharia principles especially in 
terms of fairness and reflecting Sharia’s true objectives. He states that some of 
these judgments have caused injustice, oppression and the loss of human rights in 
the name of Sharia even though Sharia is not itself to blame.60    
2. Rules Documents Should be Made Public 
Fullers writes: “The laws should also be given adequate publication”.61 In regard to 
the Saudi legal system, as discussed in Chapter Three, pursuant to Sharia law there 
are certain defined fixed punishments. The first category of crimes punishable by 
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death is Al-Qisas offences or wounds which cause death. People who commit Al-
Qisas offences receive capital punishment. This category also includes body 
injuries and may result in retaliation for physical injuries caused with the law built 
on the concept of “eye for eye”.  The second category is Al-Hudud, or fixed crimes, 
which are defined by the Holy Quran and include major offences such as adultery, 
apostasy, road aggravation, alcohol consumption, theft and slander. The 
punishments prescribed in the Holy Quran for these offences include stoning, 
capital punishment, amputation, cross amputation and flogging.62 Notwithstanding 
this, however, there are no published codes of laws which identify the definition of 
every crime and the punishments imposed in cases where these crimes do not satisfy 
their stated conditions. Moreover, there is no published code of laws which clarify 
for citizens the definitions of other harmful acts which fall outside the six fixed 
crimes and punishments mentioned in the primary Holy sources and which are 
supposed to shape the Saudi legal system. As a result, citizens cannot predict the 
punishments for their crimes and cannot identify the circumstances which 
determine the level of severity of the punishment and whether indeed it should even 
be considered as an offence or not. All of these factors depend on the wide 
discretion afforded to judges to render judgment on cases which they are dealing 
with depending on their understanding and the degree of their religious 
background.63 
3. Laws Should be Prospective 
In order for there to be a fair and just legal system in any given country new laws 
must apply to actions carried out after the laws have been introduced and they 
cannot have a retroactive effect.64 Put simply, how can a citizen assess the 
consequence of his acts if a new law can retroactively punish him for it.  Fuller 
writes: “It is an accepted principle of interpretation that a criminal statue should be 
constructed strictly, so that acts falling outside its normal meaning are not to be 
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considered criminal simply because they present the same kind of danger as those 
described by the language of the statute”.65    
As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, as there are no codified and identified sets of 
laws available, in many cases sentencing is dependent on the exercise of judicial 
discretion and the specific judge’s different interpretation and view of the general 
Sharia rules. As a result, citizens cannot predict the exact punishment for their 
behaviours, in this case, the law may be imposed retroactively leading to a problem 
of validity.66 Unfortunately, as Fuller writes: “the validity of retroactive legislation 
is largely regarded as a problem of due process”.67 
4. Rules Should be Clear 
As Fuller explains: “the desideratum of clarity represents one of the most essential 
ingredients of legality”.68  In the absence of legislation, only the Holy Quran and 
Sunna rules and principles are used to guide the definition of crimes and 
punishments in Saudi Arabia. However, these rules are not interpreted in the form 
of legal system which means that there are no clear and well-known rules that 
citizens can refer to. Judges have almost unlimited discretionary power to interpret 
Sharia rules according to their own understanding without clear guidelines for their 
interpretations. In some cases, crimes even lack specific definitions and the 
circumstances surrounding a crime are similarly not discussed leading to unclear 
guidelines for punishment. As a result, the interpretation of a case and the selection 
of an appropriate punishment depends entirely on the judge’s assessment and 
discretion which gives the citizen the impression of the law being confused and 
leads to a lack of adequately clear guidelines on which to base a decision.69  Fuller’s 
writes: “it is obvious that obscure and incoherent legislation can make legality 
unattainable by anyone, or at least unattainable without an unauthorized revision 
which itself impairs legality”.70  
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5.    Rules Should be Not Contradictory 
There are many factors which could lead to the Saudi legal system being described 
as “contradictory”. First of all, issues of inconsistencies among the interpretation 
of Sharia laws by judges are prevalent in the Saudi legal system. These 
inconsistencies are the result of the vague legal system and the unlimited 
discretionary power of judges in the country. This unlimited discretionary power, 
without any kind of supervision, can sometimes cause misunderstandings of the 
real doctrine and intent of the Sharia rules. Secondly, Sharia lacks information 
which could be applied to modern-day circumstances which increases the tendency 
for judges to issue contradictory discretionary judgements as they attempt to apply 
Sharia law and to modernize Islamic legal practices according to their own 
understandings.71 
All these factors can contribute to creating contradictory rules by judges which 
oppose each other. 
6.    Observance and Obedience Should be Possible 
Given the absence of clear legal provisions, the Saudi legal system has a tendency 
to list laws absurdly without paying enough attention to how they will be 
implemented. The result of the unlimited discretionary power afforded to judges is 
the enactment of vague and inconsistent rules by judges which automatically runs 
the risk of bringing about a system where compliance becomes impossible. When 
citizens are not clear about certain crimes and penalties owing to their ignorance of 
them, there is no way they can comply with those vague and inconsistent rules. 
Similarly, the unlimited discretionary power afforded to judges could easily create 
impossible kinds of procedures with judges for example, requiring an unreasonable 
or insufficient burden of proof.72    
7.    Frequent Amendments Should be Avoided 
In Saudi Arabia, the absence of a codified official legal system is the most obvious 
cause of frequent changes and amendments. In the Saudi legal system, different 
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judges and scholars offer their own interpretation of Sharia rules. Thus, the 
meaning of Sharia rules keeps changing from one judge to another. This is a result 
of the largely unfettered discretionary power afforded to judges in assessing cases 
without any significant control or supervision.73 As Fuller writes:  
“all of the influences that can produce a lack of congruence between judicial 
action and statutory law can, when the court itself makes the law, produce 
equally damaging departures from other principles of legality: a failure to 
articulate reasonably clear general rules and an inconstancy in decision 
manifesting itself in contradictory rulings, frequent changes of direction, 
and retrospective changes in the law.”74      
     
8.    Proclaimed Rules Should Correspond with their Actual Purpose  
As Fuller explains:  
“All of the influences that can produce a lack of congruence between 
judicial action and statutory law can, when the court itself makes the law, 
produce equally damaging departures from other principles of legality: a 
failure to articulate reasonably clear general rules and an inconstancy in 
decision manifesting itself in contradictory rulings, frequent changes of 
direction, and retrospective changes in the law”.75  
Elsewhere he explains:  
“legality requires that judges and other officials apply statutory law, not 
according to their fancy or with crabbed literalness, but in accordance with 
principles of interpretation that are appropriate to their position in the whole 
legal order”.76 
The variety of different judges’ interpretation of Sharia rules in Saudi courts, along 
with the absence of generally agreed upon interpretations of the real meaning of 
Sharia aims and principles, leads to interpretations of Sharia rules being at odds 
with Sharia’s original intentions. This situation generates a high degree of 
inconsistency and leads to arbitrary and widely differing punishments for similar 
cases which causes a lessening of the public’s faith in the trustworthiness of the 
legal system when judges issue their judgments depending on their personal 
 
73 Shakier Al-Essamy, ‘Codification of Discretionary Rules from Textual Crimes, and its Role in 
Actualizing Justice’ (PhD Dissertation, Naief University for Security Science, Riyadh 2014) 64-69. 




knowledge, understanding and background which in some cases differ greatly from 
the main law of the country which is Sharia.77  
 
6.3 Conclusion  
When benchmarked against Fuller’s principles, the shortcomings of the Saudi 
Arabian legal system are thrown into focus and the need for reform appears 
indisputable. In order for the legal system in KSA to meet the minimum standards 
of legitimacy from Fuller’s perspective, it is necessary to carry out a cautious 
implementation of Fuller’s principles of morality of law. Fuller’s theory does not 
explain which principle is more important to be followed. In fact, he calls for 
sensible harmonizing and acknowledges the necessity to focus on each of these 
aims. To strike a balance between each principle, Saudi lawmakers should test these 
eight standards to arrive at the most suitable mix according to the requirements of 
society. Judges, lawmakers, and legal theorists should work towards adopting these 
standards in order to develop a legal system which would be the best one to function 
in the context of this country.78  
The King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has supreme power over the judiciary of 
Saudi Arabia. Through this structure, the King has extended his power to influence 
and form the legal system which could in fact lead to the construction of a strong 
legal system as Chapter Nine will explain. Before that, however, it is worthwhile 
to consider a selection of schemes which may be adopted which could be of 
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How Different Legal Systems Attempt to Comply with Fuller’s 
Principles 
7.1 Introduction 
After examining if this is the case, three specific strategies which may be 
implemented in order to give greater effect to Fuller’s principles will be analysed. 
Without these core elements, a legal system arguably cannot be considered 
legitimate or be expected to guide the behaviour of the members of a society. 
First, as will be discussed, the effective categorization of crimes has many 
advantages. It facilitates the accurate determination of penal liability and 
investigative jurisdiction and adjudication. It better facilitates the exercise of 
judicial discretion deciding on individual punishments and arguably better allows 
reforms to be implemented when needed.  
Second, the “rule of law” requires statutes to include specific definitions, 
instructions and prohibitions in order to enforce the principle of legality in any 
given legal system. One way of achieving this is via the codification of laws which 
place a limit on the power of judges and which encourage logical judgments.  
Third, if laws are to conform to any basic morality, it is essential for decision-
makers and judges to provide reasons for sentences as these sentences significantly 
affect the liberty of any individual. Indeed, as Ashworth points out, “it is 
fundamental tenet of natural justice that decisions-makers should give reasons for 
their decisions”.1 Both victims and offenders have the moral right to know the 
reasons for sentences as they are both affected by them. Also, as will be discussed 
the general public need to accept and trust the legal principles of any given legal 
system if this system is to be effectively implemented and this can only be achieved 
through providing reasons for judgments.2 Moreover, when the reason for a 
sentence is provided, this sentence can be impartially evaluated later as in the case 
of appellate courts dealing with appeal cases. As the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission noted back in 1996: 
 
1 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (6th edn Cambridge University Press, U.K 
2015) 448. 
2 ibid 435-437. 
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“Wide discretion which, properly, allows individualization and broad 
choice of rationales for punishment should be accompanied by 
accountability. In our view this is best achieved by a clear statement from 
the sentencing court as to the sentencing rationale chosen, the relevant 
factors and the reasons for adopting them. This makes the position clear to 
the offender, improves community and media understanding of the process 
(including apparent superficial inconsistencies) and provides an 
unequivocal platform for appellate review”.3 
 
Finally, the chapter will underline the need for transparency to ensure the general 
public supports and is satisfied with their legal system and with the whole apparatus 
of state such as its government and Constitution.    
 
7.2 Categorising Crime  
The categorization of crimes is of the utmost importance in ensuring the 
establishment of an effective legal system. In theory, therefore, an offense ought to 
first be comprehensively defined and this definition ought to cover as completely 
as possible the subspecies of the offence. The definition of the offence should also 
include a statement of fundamental principles and guidelines which serve to 
facilitate the process of establishing proof, aid interpretation of the law and 
establish clear technical grounds for a conviction or acquittal of the defendant.4 In 
reality, however, as will be outlined below, such standards may be difficult to meet. 
Many jurisdictions categorize offences in terms of civil responsibility and lay out 
the corresponding legal penalties. It is a fundamental principle of common law that 
a criminal act or other form of behaviour is basically characterized as a failure to 
fulfil a lawful duty which causes loss or harm and therefore constitutes a tortious 
civil injury.5 This not only applies to acts affecting individuals or legal bodies but 
also to conduct carried out by someone who is legally responsible and of a fit state 
of mind which endangers or causes harm to public interests or to the state and 
certain penalties are established for the punishment of such an offence.6 Thus, 
 
3 New South Wales Law Reform Commission. (1996). Sentencing. Discussion Paper No. 33, The 
Commission. Sydney, Australia.  
4 John Douglas, Crime Classification Manual (3rd edn Wiley, U.S.A 2013) 4-6.   
5 R. A. Duff and David Garland, A Reader on Punishment (1st edn Oxford University Press, U.S.A 
1995) 8-11.       
6 ibid 72-74. 
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legislation includes not only crimes against individuals such as murder, robbery, or 
legal bodies such as fraud, embezzlement. It also includes those such as bribery of 
an official, the forgery of money or official documents, tax evasion, lying under 
oath, crimes which harm the state and the status quo of society as a whole. However, 
if an offence is not typified in the legal system then there is no crime imputable and 
the person who commits a morally questionable act which causes harm may escape 
the consequences of his acts. “Nullum crimen sine lege”- or “No punishment 
without a statute” - is a fundamental and generally accepted legal principle.7   
If different penal codes are examined and subjected to analysis and classification, 
it is clear that although certain divisions of different offences may vary, there is an 
underlying similarity about how specific offences are categorized and dealt with.8 
There is frequently a distinct correspondence between a specific offence and a 
specific degree or category of criminality. Forgery and counterfeiting comprise 
diverse grades of crime as do larceny and embezzlement. Burglary or 
housebreaking is a crime against property which constitutes a specific category of 
crime and distinguishes a class of offenders.  
If these distinctions are unclear and offences are lumped together without being 
adequately defined, for example if “disorderly conduct” or “inappropriate 
behaviour” covers a range of different offences then the law may be deemed unfair.9 
If there is a clear differentiation and categorization of different offences and their 
corresponding penalties then the legal system can function better. If, however, 
different offences are not clearly defined and penalties are not differentiated and 
there is a lack of consistency or attention paid to the differing circumstances of each 
offence (for example, if mitigating circumstances are unfairly applied or a person’s 
state of mind is not considered) then the possibility of having abuses and unfair 
sentences increases.10 
There are many reasons why crimes may be insufficiently defined and why their 
classification may be inconsistent or erroneous. First, the methods employed to 
 
7 This was made part of the French Declaration of Rights of 1789.  
8 J. Angelo Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment (4th edn Springer, U.S.A 2013) 73-75. 
9 Douglas (n4) 12-17.  
10 Duff and Garland (n5) 113-118.        
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draft new statutes may be unsuitable for, or misapplied to, the definition of newly 
created offenses.11 Secondly, antiquated or incorrect models and precedents may 
be followed which leads to obscure or faulty statutes being introduced.12 Thirdly, 
offences such as murder, sexual assault, statutory rape, embezzlement or perjury 
are classified in strict terms which allow no leeway for other more flexible 
interpretations more suitable for specific cases.13 Fourthly, there may be a lack of 
sufficient legal knowledge. For example, the offence may not form part of current 
legal legislation. Finally, any criminal code must be applied to such a vast range of 
different circumstances that achieving justice in every single case is very difficult.14  
If crime categorization is to be reformed to differentiate between more offences for 
bureaucratic and legal purposes, any new definitions and categories emerging must 
be clear, transparent and easily applicable. However, the task of undertaking such 
categorization requires careful consideration, in particular in relation to the 
fundamental issue of how to decide the different degrees of the offence. Some 
crimes could end up being classified under too general categories in a manner that 
could lead to a lack of clarity and confusion in the application of the law.15  
There are many criteria which can be applied when categorizing crimes and many 
specific groupings of crime which can be used. For example, crimes committing 
personal harm, crimes against property, crimes which affect sexual integrity, crimes 
damaging the wellbeing of a state or government. Other criteria and viewpoints 
must also be considered such as government policy, the transparency of justice, 
administrative effectiveness, the maintenance of law and order and of public peace 
and security.16  It is important, therefore, to be conscious of best practice but bearing 
 
11 Michael R. Gottfredson, A General Theory of Crime (1st edn Stanford University Press, U.S.A 
1990) 8-11.   
12 Cesare Beccaria and Richard Bellamy, ‘On Crimes and Punishments’ and other Writings 
(Cambridge University Press, U.K 1995) 17-19.     
13 Douglas (n4) 98-102. 
14 Beccaria and Bellamy (n12) 24-26. 
15 ibid 22-26. 
16 Douglas (n4) 99-106. 
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in mind the specific circumstances of each country, its society and social 
structure.17 
 
7.3 Adopting Codification 
The process of codification gathers all the laws on a certain issue in one official 
document which is then made available to citizens and members of the legal and 
judicial system. These codes facilitate access to the laws of the land which apply in 
any legal case which, in turn, helps improve the efficacy and transparency of the 
legal system.18 The codification of laws minimizes the chances of confusion arising 
regarding verdicts in a particular situation.19 
Codification also facilitates the important process of reforming outdated, 
inconsistent and ineffective laws. It is often the case that the use of existing legal 
methods to deal with an alien situation leads to inconsistencies, unfair and unclear 
judgments.20 Codification helps to reorganize and restructure old laws according to 
current situations. Under this process the revision of old laws is carried out and 
updates are made where necessary. This process of codification is actually a 
restatement of laws where the useful parts are retained and the remaining are altered 
or discarded.21  
 
17 As outlined in the previous chapters, there is a particular lack of clarity in Saudi Arabia as regards 
classifying and categorizing crimes and punishments since traditional Islamic methods continue to 
be followed.  
18 Craig R. Ducat, Constitutional Interpretation (10th edn Wadsworth Publishing, U.S.A) 8-12. 
19 ibid 22-28. Although the guiding principles of Sharia are available to judges in KSA to help them 
reach their judgment in particular situations, the rules are not codified in the form of laws as part 
of the legal system. At present, many critics state that Saudi laws are unclear and this may lead to 
serious inconsistencies between the decisions of different judges: by simply mentioning Sharia as 
a guiding principle, every decision maker is allowed to interpret rules according to his own 
understanding and background. Futuh Al-Shazly, Organized Discretionary Crimes in KSA (1st edn 
University Publications, Egypt 2012) 23-27. If, on the other hand, Islamic laws were codified, this 
would greatly reduce these inconsistencies between different judgments. Wahba Al-Zehaily, 
Efforts of Codifying Islamic Jurisprudence (1st edn Dar Al-Fiker for Publications, Damascus 2013) 
38-44. 
20 Linda D. Jellum and David Hricik, Modern Statutory Interpretation (2nd edn Carolina Academic 
Press, U.S.A 2009) 44-47. 
21 Jeremy Bentham, Legislator of the World (1st ed Clarendon Press, U.S.A 1999) 42-64. 
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In addition, codes entail logical reasoning insofar as decisions are made from fixed 
principles set out in legislation instead of being extracted from general rules.22 
However, significant judicial discretion may still remain depending on the precise 
way in which the code is formulated. Although Parliament enacts the laws, these 
laws still need to be interpreted, to a greater or lessor extent depending on how 
vague or clear the legislation is. Judicial discretion will often be required to clarify 
and build on existing points of law.23  The legislative body has the obligation to 
provide the judiciary with the tools to effectively interpret the laws. 
Apart from greater accessibility, greater coherence and an increase in Parliamentary 
sovereignty, codification also offers the benefits of uniformity and improved 
nation- building.24 In fact, it aims at developing political motivation and facilitating 
the building of a national identity for the country. In this way, codes can help not 
only to shape the legal structure of the state but also the political structure and the 
sense of being a nation.25 The system of codes or codification is based on the 
political administration and government of the country because that is where the 
codes are derived. So it can be stated that codification derives its substance and 
consistency from the domain of politics and administration.26   
 
7.4 Publishing Judicial Reasoning  
In democratic states, the publication of judicial reasoning is a fundamental and 
crucial activity. Reflecting the process by which a judge reaches a conclusion in a 
particular case, the subsequent publication of this judgment and the reasoning 
behind the decision may serve as a precedent for future cases. Requiring the 
 
22 Jellum and Hricik (n20) 54-56. 
23 Ducat (n18) 79-84. It is generally agreed that the meaning of different words in a language often 
depends on the meaning given through its usage and not necessarily the dictionary or generally 
accepted definition. This can be important if there exists some confusion between the meaning 
which the legislator intended and the interpretation that a judge may attribute. For example, laws 
determining what is or not obscene are notoriously unclear and in recent years the definition of 
what exactly “hate speech” is similarly confused.  
. 
24 ibid 62-69. 
25 Jellum and Hricik (n20) 101-108. 
26 Bentham (n21) 191-195. 
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judiciary to clarify what the law is and how it applies to a particular situation,27  
aids in strengthening the system of social equality and democracy, consolidating 
the morality of law.28 When courts openly express their verdicts, people will 
recognize them as legal and authentic. Explanation of judicial decisions provides 
citizens with reasons to comply and obey the rules.29 
The system of publishing judicial reasoning is also supported by two liberal theories 
of law. The first is Rawls' doctrine of public reason and second is Dworkin's 
conception of constitutional democracy.30According to Rawls's doctrine of public 
reason, publishing the explanation of judicial decisions is an essential duty of a 
liberal and democratic society.31 Rawls gives the US Supreme Court as a model of 
judicial reason-giving. According to Rawls, a state is regarded as liberal and 
democratic when government and the decision makers of that state provide reasons 
to justify their decisions. Rawls writes:  
“The point of the ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct their 
fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards as a 
political conception of justice based on values that the others can reasonably 
be expected to endorse and each is in good faith, prepared to defend that 
conception so understood”.32  
If equal rights are to be granted to all members of any given society then these 
members must not be compelled to obey laws with which they disagree and they 
must be given a clear and comprehensible rationale explaining the reasoning behind 
a particular judgment or law. Rawls writes: “Citizens affirm the ideal of public 
reason, not as a result of political compromise, as in a modus vivendi, but from 
within their own reasonable doctrines”.33 
In a democracy, there are many forums where citizens can hear and evaluate the 
proposals, reasons and viewpoints of their elected officials including, for example 
during an election campaign or Parliamentary or congressional debate. However, 
 
27 Steven J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning (3rd edn Aspen Publication, U.S.A 
2007) 28-32. 
28 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, U.S.A 1996) 225.   
29 ibid 96-101. 
30 Scott Brewer, The Philosophy of Legal Reasoning (Routledge, U.S.A 1998) 66-71. 
31 Enrico Pattaro, The Law and the Right (Springer, U.S.A 2007) 4-9. 
32 Rawls (n28) 226. 
33 ibid 213. 
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Rawls notably states that the judicial forum - and especially the reasoning given by 
judges - is the most effective way of providing reasons for public decisions. For 
him, publishing judicial reasoning is more important than voting or any other form 
of public decision.34  
Dworkin argues for a planned conception of democracy which he calls the 
"constitutional conception of democracy”.   According to this theory, citizens must 
be given principles of fairness and justice and when people disagree about justice 
there should be a fair way of reaching decisions. Dworkin recognizes the judiciary 
as the central body of contemporary political societies. While criticizing the role of 
contemporary politics, he notes the importance of courts' open decisions and further 
claims that public argument is improved by legal adjudication.35 
He argues that by strengthening the process of final verdicts by courts on a matter 
of principles, the participatory role of legislation can be improved further. Dworkin 
mentions the word "integrity" for the formation of political legality and this 
conception is centered on the role of courts. Justice is therefore fundamental for the 
system of judicial reasoning and decision-making to be effective.36 Political 
decision-makers should exhibit the same loyalty and consistency in their decisions-
making that exists in the decision-making of a single individual. According to 
Dworkin's conception of constitutional democracy, societies should be concerned 
about justice and publishing judicial reasoning.37 
 Numerous benefits of publishing judicial reasoning have been identified by 
theorists who have praised this feature of liberal democratic societies.38 Three 
significant benefits provided by judicial reasoning are participation, accountability 
and accuracy.     
• Participatory Benefits  
Proponents of procedural justice suggest that the publication of judicial reasoning 
supports participation. Liberal democracy believes that individuals within a society 
 
34 ibid 212. 
35 Massimo La Torre, Constitutionalism and Legal Reasoning (Springer, U.S.A 2007) 64-68. 
36 ibid 114-118. 
37 ibid 76-79. 
38 Pattaro (n31) 85-88. 
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possess the right to be treated with equality and dignity.39 Thus when a free citizen 
has the right to be treated justly, judicial reasoning becomes essential. Citizens 
should not be considered as mere objects on whom rules are to be implemented. 
Rather, they should be considered as independent agents who can participate in the 
enactment of laws acting through their representatives within a political structure. 
When the judicial authority fails to publish reasons, the citizen is merely a passive 
recipient of the law-making and implementation process. This leads to a loss of a 
citizen’s liberty which undermines the basic principles of liberal democracy.40 
Judicial reasoning endows citizens within a democratic system with an important 
role and citizens in such system participate as active agents in the legal system 
being able to evaluate and ultimately contribute to judicial decisions.41 This means 
that not only does every citizen have the right to appear in court and participate in 
legal decision-making but it also places a responsibility on judicial decision-makers 
to provide a coherent fair and just resolution to individuals' disputes. Having a 
decision-making process based on rational argument ensures that verdicts made in 
any given legal situation must equally fulfill the test of reason.42 
Fuller regards the participation and involvement of judicial subjects as essential to 
the decision-making process. He states that judicial decision-making is unique in 
its form because it gives the opportunity to the affected party to present proofs and 
arguments to obtain a verdict in their favour. When faced with opposing arguments 
and proof presented by the affected parties, judges must make their decisions public 
and explain their rationale to show that they have considered and are responding to 
the arguments presented to them. By explaining their decisions, judges make it clear 
to what extent the proofs presented by the affected parties have been understood, 
agreed or supported in the process of reaching the final decision on the case. Fuller 
does not expect judges to publish reasons for every verdict, but he argues that 
without clear reasons for a decision being given participants might lose their faith 
in the judicial process and feel that they have been unfairly excluded from or not 
 
39 ibid 6-9. 
40 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Reasoning (The Davies Group Publishers, U.S.A 2008) 18-25.  
41 Chaim Perelman, Justice, Law, and Argument (Springer, U.S.A 1980) 83-86. 
42 ibid 66-69. 
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adequately considered during the decision-making process thus calling into doubt 
the fairness of the final ruling.43 
Empirical work has also supported Fuller's argument about the participation of 
citizens in the decision-making process. Studies in social psychology have shown 
that when the decision-maker pays consideration to the views and proofs of the 
plaintiffs, then their acceptance of the court’s authority and their satisfaction with 
the decision reached increases.44 In this way, the legal process works more 
smoothly because those who participate in it have greater faith in its efficacy and 
fairness.45 
 
• Accountability Benefits 
One of the major benefits of judicial reasoning is that it enhances accountability 
and transparency. When judges are obliged to provide a justification for the verdicts 
produced, the system of judicial decision-making becomes more transparent. When 
judges are held answerable for their decisions, inconsistency and unfairness can be 
restricted. Reason-giving develops a monitoring system through which information 
is transferred to the general public by judges.46 Judicial reasoning plays an 
important role in restricting discretionary decision-making.47  
When judges are held accountable and answerable for their decisions, they cannot 
issue a verdict of their own choice. In addition, when judges publish their decision 
those decisions can be examined and reviewed by the judges of higher courts. It can 
be said that judicial reasoning depends for its efficacy on stringent and continuous 
judicial review.48  
 
43 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (2nd edn Yale University Press U.S.A 1969) 49-51.  
44 Robert Salisbury, ‘Research on Political Participation’ (1975) 19 (2) American Journal of Political 
Science 323, 327-335. 
45 Norbert Paulo, The Confluence of Philosophy and Law in Applied Ethics (1st edn Palgrave 
Macmillan, U.K 2016) 15-21. 
46 Perelman (n41) 77-81. 
47 Burton (n27) 27-31. 
48 Brewer (n30) 201-204. 
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Judicial reasoning thus provides a check against judges who may abuse their 
powers. The common law system greatly increases the accountability of judges 
through its use of “stare decisis”, the establishment and following of legal 
precedents. Within the common law system, precedents are established which serve 
to inform future decisions.49 This system obliges court decisions to follow a 
particular precedent and leads to more consistency and logic which in turn 
encourages plaintiffs to trust the legal system and thus the public’s view of the 
system is enhanced.50 
 
• Accuracy Benefits 
Along with participation and accountability, the publication of judicial reasoning 
also obliges judges to come up with more accurate decisions. In effect it leads to a 
system where a judge’s behaviour is open to scrutiny and where the verdicts issued 
by the court must be of a certain standard. If a judge has to take precedents into 
account and be able to justify his decisions, then he is obliged to find a legal 
justification for his judgments which leads to greater impartiality, consistency and 
fairness in the legal process.51  
When there is no precedent available on which a judge can base his judgment, then 
he is obliged to find a legal justification for his decision and this justification is 
open to scrutiny. Therefore, the system ensures no court verdict is produced which 
cannot be legally justified and this acts as a safeguard against illogical, unfair or 
abusive judgments.52 The fact that judges must give reasons for their judgments 
therefore helps ensure that they have considered all relevant factors pertaining to a 
particular case and that their judgment is in line with previous cases of a similar 
nature. This system also reduces the scope for cognitive bias on the part of judges 
as studies have shown that if people are required to give a reason for their decision, 
this decision would be better-founded and free from personal bias. 
 
49 ibid 103-108. 
50 ibid 170-174. 
51 L. Karl Branting, Reasoning with Rules and Precedents (1st edn Springer, U.S.A 2010) 24-27. 
52 Kennedy (n40) 22-27. 
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 Although the political system of Saudi Arabia is not democratic, the judicial 
reasoning system is as important for Saudi Arabia as it is in any other state with a 
greater or lesser degree of democracy. Al-Judhlaniu argues that great efforts should 
be made to publish and justify judicial judgments, as this significant effort will not 
only have a positive effect on the progress of the court’s work but will also play a 
significant role in developing and conducting legal and judicial research schemes 
in the universities and among legal experts which will show the fairness of Sharia 
rules inside and outside the country. In addition, it would also be an effective way 
of allowing the international society to know about the Saudi judgments and 
judicial procedures. In short, the publication and justification of judgments should 
be considered as a priority of judicial authorities.53 
 
7.5 The Saudi Legal System in the Light of the Strategies Discussed  
These three essential strategies which have been adopted in a variety of 
jurisdictions and which aim to facilitate adherence to Fuller’s principles as 
discussed above, are worthy of particular consideration in Saudi Arabia. If there 
was an effective and clear categorization of crimes then this would have wide social 
implications because it would change the general public’s negative perceptions of 
the current justice system which is considered unfair and arbitrary. The justice 
system would gain validity because the public would be fully aware of the laws of 
the land and the penalties they would incur if these laws were broken and therefore 
justice would be seen to be done instead of punishment being decided on apparently 
arbitrary and contradictory grounds. This has the effect of discouraging illegal 
activity and reducing crime rates.54 The introduction of greater crime classification 
in KSA could greatly facilitate the administration of justice and could quickly 
become the norm. This classification could also have profound psychological and 
practical effects as it could greatly clarify and bring order to the current confused 
 
53 Mohammed bin Saud Al-Judhlaniu, “he was a previous judge and recently a lawyer” Al- Riyadh 
Newspaper, (1 June, 2011). The codification and organisation of the laws in Saudi Arabia could lead 
to greater homogeneity and encourage the creation of a distinct political identity as well as helping 
the process of building a nation and a state which enhances the citizen belonging toward the 
country. It would also be important for the country’s development and stability. Abdulmuhseen 
Ryan, The Comparative Saudi Administration Order (Dar-Havize, Jeddah 2008) 72-77 
54 Andrew Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts, Principled Sentencing (3rd edn Hart 
Publishing, U.S.A 2009) 119-120. 
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system existing in the jurisdiction and would educate the people about the specific 
consequences of their crime.55 By contrast, as Fuller writes: “It is … plain that if 
the laws are not made readily available, there is no check against a disregard of 
them by those charged with their application and enforcement”.56   
There is also a pressing need for criminal law statutes to be re-organized and 
codified, in order to resolve inconsistencies and at the same time eliminate outdated 
laws which no longer serve a useful purpose.57 It is argued that the codification of 
laws in the legal system of Saudi Arabia would go a long way towards solving the 
problems caused by the disparity in judges’ interpretation of Sharia teaching and 
in this way every crime and its punishment could be sufficiently defined with their 
different circumstances, including modern crimes which are not mentioned in 
Sharia teaching.58 The codification of laws in KSA could provide many benefits to 
the judicial system and to society as a whole  by organizing a set of rules as opposed 
to a series of arbitrary disconnected judgments, thereby bringing about greater 
consistency, openness and accessibility, improving the rule of law and facilitating 
reform and the improved internal coherence of the legal system.  All these benefits 
would limit the discretionary powers of judges and would bring about a more 
systematic legal structure.59 
Furthermore, if sentences are explained via public reasoning, this improves the 
commitment of the citizenry to the moral and political values of their society and 
thus encourages greater social cohesion and adherence to the status quo when 
citizens are aware of the legal basis on which judges have reached their decisions.60 
Dworkin writes “the cost to society would not simply be incremental but would be 
of a degree beyond the [social] cost paid to grant the original right, a degree great 
enough to justify what-ever assault on dignity or equality might be involved”.61 
 
55 Hala Al-Arise, Identification of Discretionary Punishments in Islamic Sharia, (1st edn Dar Al-Falah 
for Publications, Biuret 1997) 24-28. 
56 Fuller (n43) 51. 
57 Abener J. Mikva and Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and the Legislative 
Process (Aspen Publishers, U.S.A 1997) 9-11. 
58 Hisham Al-Alshiek, ‘Writing and Codifying Sharia Rules’ Al-Riyadh Newspaper (Riyadh, 16 
December 2014).  
59 ibid.  
60 Rawls (n28) 224-225. 
61 Roland Dworkin, Taking Right Seriously (Harvard University Press, U.S.A 1977) 200. 
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Thus, it may be suggested that publishing judicial reasoning is of pressing concern 
and has significant importance in the context of K.S.A and in implementing even 
the minimum level of Fuller’s principles of legality. Judges before sentencing, will 
be aware of the previous judgment which has the same characteristics of the case 
and they will not judge randomly. This will result in considerable improvement and 
help reduce the inconsistency between judgments especially in similar cases 
because judges will have access to and the possibility of revising cases and making 
the best assessment in light of the similar previous cases. Moreover, when judges 
know that their judgments will be published, they will be cautious while sentencing 
because all the citizens will criticize the judgment if it differs greatly from Sharia 
rules and it will be easy for the appellate courts to review judgments from time to 
time and ensure that judges are precise while implementing Sharia rules.62 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
The criminal law system of Saudi Arabia has, in particular, been harshly criticized 
for its inconsistency, its lack of secure foundations and its legitimacy in modern 
times both by the Western world and Muslim jurists.63 This chapter has highlighted 
those discrepancies in Saudi Arabia’s legal system caused by the lack of adherence 
to the principles that Fuller identified when developing his morality of law thesis. 
As the investigation in this chapter shows, the Saudi legal system needs to be 
radically and urgently restructured to better conform to Fuller’s principles.  
This chapter as well has discussed different approaches to ensure the 
implementation of Fuller’s principles which may better support an official, 
trustworthy and legitimate legal system, and has clarified how the Saudi legal 
system urgently needs these reforms to be implemented. The next chapter will now 
discuss different kinds of sentencing mechanisms, specifically, which may also 
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Guiding the Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing 
8.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapters, particularly serious concerns have been 
raised about the breadth of discretion afforded to the judiciary in deciding 
punishment and sentencing in Saudi Arabia. The widespread perception by both 
internal and external critics is that the system often operates randomly owing to the 
lack of clear and fixed rules or guidelines which results in judges often making 
arbitrary decisions which are significantly different in similar cases. Criticisms 
levelled by external international bodies such as Amnesty International have added 
to this perception. In 2015, Amnesty International stated:  
“If the authorities wish to show their commitment to rigorous fair trial 
standards they must implement reforms that will bring Saudi Arabia’s 
criminal justice system in line with international law and standards”.1  
The need for reform, with an emphasis on limiting and/or better guiding judicial 
discretion, particularly when it comes to sentencing, appears especially urgent. At 
a fundamental level, it is absolutely essential to enact reforms to reduce the number 
of vague and ill-defined judgments and for legislation to be introduced which 
ensures that the severity of any given sentence in a case depends on clear objective 
criteria rather than on a judge´s whim.2  
The basic challenge is that in the Saudi Arabian judicial system not only does the 
judge consider factors such as the prior record, the defendant’s age and family 
circumstances in sentencing, but every time the law is applied it is subject to the 
particular judge´s personal and often divergent view of what exactly the law is. The 
situation is made worse by a tendency to focus on the facts of the case, and to 
consider that no two cases are alike.  It is true that a certain degree of subjectivity 
in judicial discretion cannot be avoided in any legal system. However, it is clear 
this decision-making process needs clear parameters and guidance in order for this 
 
1 Saudi Arabia: Rampant Executions Fuelled by Justice System 'Riddled with Holes' ( Amnesty 
International 2015), < https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/saudi-arabia-rampant-
executions-fuelled-by-justice-system-riddled-with-holes/ >, accessed 4 March 2019. 
2 Quasem Al-Tuhery, Importance of Codifying Discretionary Punishments- Applied Study in KSA (1st 
edn Law and Economy Library for Publication, Riyadh 2015) 42-46. 
151 
subjectivity to be minimised and for fair and more consistent decisions made. As 
Ashworth writes:  
“[A]lthough passing sentence will always require an element of judgment, 
that judgment should be exercised within a framework of principles and 
guidelines set out in advance, so that court decisions are consistent in their 
approach and their starting points, if somewhat different when the facts of 
the case have been taken into account”.3          
Injustice occurs in sentencing when similar cases are dealt with differently, and 
where different cases are treated without adequate consideration of those 
differences as tends to happen in the absence of a well-structured legal system. 
However, deciding how to resolve these disparities and choosing mechanisms and 
techniques to promote consistency is not a simple matter. Much will depend on the 
political climate and on the legal traditions of the country. Consequently, any 
sentencing reform should be formulated and promulgated in the most appropriate 
way for each jurisdiction, and it must be applied faithfully by the judiciary if it is 
to achieve its objectives.4      
At a basic level, in order to be efficient and fair, the sentencing process must firstly 
be carried out in a professional way. Moreover, it must adhere to all of Fuller’s 
criteria of procedural morality which were discussed comprehensively in Chapter 
Six. As Padfield, Morgan and Maguire argue, sentencing processes  
“raise important questions about the transparency, fairness and 
accountability of the quasi-judicial decisions that significantly affect the 
lives of both offenders and victims. They also raise questions about the 
extent to which different kinds of offence, suspect or offender are, or should 
be, treated differently in terms of the locus of decisions made about them 
and the safeguards that surrounded the process”.5  
Different approaches, based on different policy choices, may be adopted.   In 
formulating guidelines for judges to follow when deciding on punishments, 
different approaches fetter judicial discretion to a greater or lesser extent. For 
example, some jurisdictions have adopted approaches which give judges a degree 
 
3 ibid 23. 
4 Susan Easton, Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, 
U.S.A 2012) 38-42. 
5 Nicky Padfield, Rod Morgan and Mike Maguire, Out of Court, Out of Sight? Criminal Sanctions and 
Non-Judicial Making-Decision-Making (5th edn Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Oxford 
University Press 2012) 956. 
152 
of flexibility, for example the sentencing guidelines applied in England and Wales. 
Ashworth writes in regard to the importance of providing judges with essential 
guidelines:  
“The essence of offence guidelines is to provide ranges of sentence for 
different levels of seriousness of each type of offence”.  
He explains the reasons for adopting a sentencing guideline:  
“The aim of the technique is to structure judicial discretion not to take it 
away, but to provide a framework within which the court can locate the 
particular offence with which it is dealing”.6  
On the other hand, other jurisdictions have provided their judges with a strict 
sentencing framework which means that judges in this context have limited 
discretion, one example of this are the Sentencing Grids adopted in Minnesota.7  
This chapter offers a brief examination of a range of approaches which seek to 
increase consistency and limit judicial discretion. It begins with Minimum and 
Maximum Sentences, followed by the most notable approach to guidance on 
sentencing in the US, specifically Sentencing Grids. The latter half of the chapter 
then examines the example of a technique used in England and Wales, sentencing 
guidelines developed by a Sentencing Council. 
8.2 Minimum and Maximum Sentences 
In this section we will examine mandatory minimum and maximum sentencing. We 
will define what they are, look at the contexts in which they occur and evaluate 
their advantages and drawbacks using examples from countries which have adopted 
this practice. Firstly, however, we must define and make a distinction between 
“rules” and “standards” as this is vital to help us understand the thinking behind 
different sentencing policies and to evaluate their impact and effectiveness. 
Rules and Standards 
The legal framework of a state works as a means for implementing numerous social 
and political norms, such as justice, fairness and truth. These standards are achieved 
 
6 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (6th edn Cambridge University Press, U.K 
2015) 23. 
7 Andrew Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts, Principled Sentencing (3rd edn Hart 
Publishing, U.S.A 2009) 6-10. 
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through establishing laws. Laws inform the members of a society about the type of 
acceptable and desired behaviour and define the punishment for any violation of 
those standards and behaviours. Laws may take two basic forms which are “rules” 
and “standards”. There is a significant difference between them.8  
A "rule" is something that is a set limit associated with the applicable code. Limits 
defined by the rules act as a trigger, the violation of which makes the penalty 
compulsory. For example, a 70 mile per hour limit on a traffic road is a limit and if 
exceeded a penalty is triggered and imposed. If a person drives at a speed of 80 
miles per hour he violates a rule and punishment is binding. However, a person who 
is driving below 70 miles per hour has not violated any law.9     
A “standard” is a qualitative analysis which applies a principle to a certain set of 
circumstances or situation. Judges following a standard will decide on a situation 
according to the law but they will take into consideration the particular 
circumstances of each individual case. For example, if driving at 70 miles per hour 
is a standard rather than a rule, then it is not treated as a limit whose violation brings 
a penalty. The law here is just defining a standard for safe driving according to the 
circumstances. A judge announcing the verdict on the violation of such a standard 
will take into consideration the circumstances of the case and then decide whether 
a violation occurred or not.10   
In the context of sentencing, rules work as fixed penalties which reduces the 
discretion to be exercised by judges. In contrast to sentencing standards (which only 
provide guidelines and continue to allow judges to render a subjective judgment), 
rules are more restrictive, leaving little room for inconsistency and subjective 
practices by decision makers.11  
Mandatory Minimum and Maximum Sentences 
Approaches to sentencing vary from one legal system or jurisdiction to another. 
Some legal systems allow judges to exercise complete discretionary power and to 
 
8 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, U.S.A 1978) 21-25. 
9 ibid 28-32. 
10 ibid 34-38. 
11 Susan Easton and Christine Piper, Sentencing and Punishment (4th edn OUP Oxford, U.K 2016) 
62-68. 
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decide verdicts and sentences on their own. Other legal systems seek to limit the 
discretionary power of judges by developing fixed or mandatory penalties.12 
Minimum and maximum penalties are a broader form of mandatory penalties.13 A 
mandatory sentence is a fixed penalty prescribed by the relevant legislative body, 
for committing a criminal offence. The term “mandatory sentencing” often refers 
to the severity or quantity of the punishment.  Although the term “mandatory 
sentence” refers to a prescribed kind of punishment, it does not necessarily provide 
a particular minimum or maximum sentence level.  For example, a mandatory 
sentence of imprisonment does not of specify the minimum duration of 
imprisonment.   
Despite this, the concept of mandatory sentencing is often used interchangeably 
with the idea of mandatory minimum sentences. Mandatory sentences generally 
determine both the type of punishment and its minimum level. The “three strikes” 
law in the Northern Territory in Australia, for example, sets minimum punishments 
for adults in cases of certain property offences such as shoplifting and home 
burglaries. It states that an adult should be sentenced to 14 days for a crime 
committed for the first time, 90 days for the second time and 12 months for three 
or more times. In this case, the court also has the authority to impose higher 
penalties where it is appropriate.14 
Nevertheless, if we examine fines and penalties imposed in modern legal systems 
we find that declaring a sentence as mandatory is a relative issue. When the lower 
limit is set for a violation of a particular law, legislation may provide leeway for 
the minimum fixed sentence to be avoided when the specific circumstances of the 
situation are allowed to be taken into account. Many offences which carry 
mandatory penalties are administrative and do not involve verdicts by courts. For 
example, on the spot fines for traffic offences or for environmental crimes such as 
littering, are mandatory penalties which do not entail any extent of judicial 
 
12 Andrew L.T Choo, Abuse of Process and Judicial Stays of Criminal Proceedings (2nd edn Oxford 
University, U.S.A 2008) 6-10. 
13 Easton and Piper (n11) 23-25. 
14 George Zdenkowski, ‘Mandatory Imprisonment of Property Offenders in the Northern Territory’ 
(1999) 22 (1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 302, 302-314.  
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contribution and the penalty cannot vary irrespective of the seriousness of the 
violation.15 
The opposite of mandatory minimum sentences is mandatory maximum penalties 
which define an upper limit for an offence. Many examples of set maximum 
punishments can be found in Islamic rules where the upper limit is fixed and the 
sentence cannot exceed that limit in accordance with three different schools of 
thought as explained in Chapter Five. For example, the Hanafi school of thought 
asserts that the maximum number of lashes should be pre-determined by notable 
jurists and scholars and should not be exceeded.16 In this regard, a maximum limit 
of thirty-nine lashes was fixed by Abu-Hanifah for all discretionary cases.17 
Following this school of thought, therefore, even if a judge believes that exceeding 
maximum number of lashes in some particular case is necessary and would prove 
a deterrent, he simply cannot impose these since he would then exceed his own 
discretionary power.18 According to this, a judge can decide on his own whether 
the offender should be punished through flogging or not but he cannot by any means 
extend the upper limit set by Sharia laws.19 
The maximum number of lashes for flogging in different Islamic schools varies but 
all of those agree to limit the discretionary power of judges when an upper and 
lower limit is established. In three schools, Hanafi, Hanbali and Shafi'i, in a case 
where a judge inflicts the maximum number of lashes but still believes that it does 
not serve the purpose of deterrence, he has the authority to issue an additional 
discretionary punishment along with the flogging. As discussed in earlier chapters, 
the additional punishment could either be a fine or imprisonment but an additional 
number of lashes cannot be given.20 
 
15 However, courts become involved if an offender fails to pay the penalty but during the court 
proceeding, judges are allowed to exercise their discretionary powers, ibid. 
16 Mohammad Al-Zehaily, Judiciary Order in Islamic Jurisprudence “Comparative Study” (2nd edn 
Dar Al-Fiker Al-Muasier, Beirut 2002) 45-49. 
17 Ahmed Kalifa, Judges Prestige Ensures the Judiciary Independence “Comparative Study between 
the Islamic Jurisprudence and Modern Law” (1st edn Dar Al-Fiker Al-Jameai, Egypt 2010) 35-40. 
18 Mohammad Al-Nehaily, Judiciary in Islam (Dar Al-Maktaby, Syria 1998) 42-48. 
19 Mohammed Al-Dehiem, Independence of Judiciary in Islamic Jurisprudence (Dar Ibn Al-juzy, 
Riyadh 2016) 63-69. 
20 Semi Awad, Theory of Judicial Judgment in Islamic Jurisprudence and Modern Law, with a Study 
of the Saudi Judicial System and Judicial Judgments (1st edn Dar Al-Nawader Al-Lebnania, Lebanon 
2014) 78-83. 
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Mandatory minimum and maximum penalties are ways of restricting a judge’s 
absolute power and are designed to reduce the inconsistencies arising from 
discretionary practices by judges. Only by minimizing the application of discretion 
and by limiting it to specific pre-determined circumstances can the process of 
sentencing be considered consistent and fair.21 
On the other hand, this system has certain identified drawbacks. For example, in 
US federal sentencing, the growing tendency to increase the number of mandatory 
and mandatory minimum sentences by the Congress has created serious problems. 
As Tonry explains  
“U.S federal guide-lines and mandatory sentences, prescribe sentences for 
offenders who are like situated in terms of their crimes, but at the cost of 
ignoring differences in their lives and circumstances that many judges (and 
others) believe ethically relevant to thinking about just punishments”.22  
In addition, this system is not achieving its declared goals of which the most 
significant are: deterrence, public protection and reducing judicial discretion. In 
practice, there are many fundamental problems with the system applied. Tonry 
points out that “[t]here is little basis for believing that mandatory penalties have 
any significant effects on rates of serious crimes”.23 Similarly, in England, although 
the 1997 Crime (Sentences) Act assigned mandatory minimum penalties to “serious 
offences”, little evidence has been found that these penalties had any significant 
impact on the crime rate.24   
Presumptive minimum and maximum sentences 
Presumptive sentencing on the other hand is a concept related to mandatory 
sentencing, and can take a range of forms, covering different levels of prescription. 
A presumptive minimum sentencing regime is one where it is presumed that a 
predetermined minimum sentence established by legislation will be implemented 
by a court in sentencing criminals. The legislative body lays out both the type of 
sanction and the minimum level of severity for any given offence which must be 
imposed by the court unless there is a demonstrable reason which justifies a 
 
21 Hirsch, Ashworth and Roberts (n7) 243-246. 
22 Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters (Oxford University Press, New York 1996) 6. 
23 ibid 138. 
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departure from this. The legislation for this kind of regime also serves as the basis 
for the court to decide whether this minimum sentence should be exceeded and to 
what extent. Presumptive minimum sentences can be applied to control different 
parts of sentencing. They can therefore theoretically be used for imposing financial 
and community service punishments as well as imprisonment.  
The most effective way for analysing and evaluating the different systems of 
presumptive minimum sentences is by determining to what extent the presumptive 
sentences can be departed from.  If there is a lot of leeway granted when 
determining sentences, then courts will have greater liberty to decide the length and 
type of sentence imposed. If the legislative authority only provides a very strict 
range for a presumptive minimum sentence to be imposed or departed from then 
the mechanism will closely parallel mandatory sentencing.  Some presumptive 
minimum sentencing legislation, as well as determining the factors that can lead to 
the minimum sentence not being imposed, may also affect to what extent the 
minimum sentence can be disregarded. Some will permit a departure only in order 
to increase the severity of the punishment while other legislation will allow for 
departures either to increase or decrease the sentence from the presumptive 
minimum, as the decision-maker sees fit.25 This approach has been adopted by 
several jurisdictions around the world in recent years such as in South Africa, 
Australia, Canada and England and Wales.        
It is worth stating that in cases where the presumptive sentence is inappropriate (i.e. 
either too harsh or too lenient given the facts of the case) judges are sometimes 
allowed to ignore the stated guidelines provided they can justify that departure by 
providing reasons in writing which can then be reviewed by higher courts if need 
be. This will, in theory, increase the fairness of the verdict in that particular case 
and also opens the way to the laws themselves being reviewed and even reformed 
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8.3 Sentencing Grids 
Other jurisdictions meanwhile adopt what are known as sentencing grids. In these 
jurisdictions, a standard penalty is fixed and must be imposed, unless a recognised 
reason not to do so is provided. Central to such a system is that provides a grid of 
factors which can be used to account for the departure from a fixed penalty. The 
system of grid guidelines is most common in the United States where it is referred 
to as the Numerical Sentencing Grid or Presumptive Sentencing Grid. Different 
states within the US adopt different approaches in their respective grids. The 
systems adopted differ in their format, in the existence or absence of overall aims 
or polices, and in the level of the leeway left to courts in individual cases.26 
As far as the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines are concerned they were based on 
the guidelines which the Sentencing Commission drafted.27 The Commission was 
established by the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and was directed to draft, 
within certain legislative constraints, guidelines for the sentencing of federal 
offences. The guidelines became law in 1987.28 However, there were structural 
flaws which affected their application in practice. Although identifying the 
rationale behind sentencing is fundamental and the presence of an explicit and well-
articulated guiding aim is essential when it comes to deciding what factors should 
be considered aggravating or mitigating and in guiding judges in how they ought to 
exercise the discretion which the system allows them,29 one major problem was that 
Commission refused to specify one primary rationale of sentencing and preferred 
to present an indiscriminate mixture of rationales. Another serious flaw was that 
the federal guidelines were high on complexity and arguably low on clarity. The 
Commission’s “Sentencing Table” defined crimes within one of 43 “offence-
levels” and six “criminal history categories”. For each type of offence, a “base 
level” was indicated by the guidelines.  There were also different “enhancements”, 
for which the judge should raise the offence level if present, and there were factors 
such as “acceptance of responsibility” (an ambiguous and practically troublesome 
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reference to a plea of guilty) which may reduce the offence level if present.30 
Moreover, the guidelines in practice were considered to be too rigid, as the Federal 
Courts Study Committee found as far back as 1990,31 and resulted in a transfer of 
considerable power to federal prosecutors. Although this is a natural consequence 
of rigidly drafted guidelines, the situation has been more complex because of the 
uncertainty about the sentencing discount for guilty pleas. This system received so 
much criticism for the tight constraints that it imposed on sentencers that these 
constraints have now been loosened by a series of Supreme Court decisions.32  
Among the state systems, the amount of flexibility and the breadth of ranges are 
usually greater than under the federal guidelines, and, in some states, are 
considerably greater.33 The most common and arguably most successful 
presumptive sentence system applied at state level in the USA is the gridline system 
in Minnesota which is the best known system owing to the fact that it has been 
largely successful in achieving its goals and it has since been adopted for use in 
other states such as Oregon, Virginia and North Carolina.34   
The sentencing commission in Minnesota started its work in the late 1970s. Its 
primary rationale for sentencing was a desire to make sure that criminals paid for 
their crimes. It then started to make stricter policy decisions. The commission 
divides all offences into just 11 severity levels, and then has seven criminal history 
scores resulting in a grid that resembles a road mileage chart. The result was 
Minnesota’s “Sentencing Guidelines Grid”, in operation since 1981. The sentencer 
in this system identifies the relevant severity band for this offence, and the relevant 
criminal history score for this offender, and then finds the square in the grid where 
they intersect.35 The judge is obliged to apply a sentence within the range of 
presumptive sentence for a specific crime unless there are “essential and 
compelling” circumstances in the individual case permitting a departure from that 
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range. In such cases, the judge has to articulate the reasons which led him to pass 
the pointed punishment including the factors he considered relevant or not in 
reaching a decision in this particular case. His decision is therefore open to scrutiny 
by relevant parties.36  
Undoubtedly, there are weaknesses in gridline systems. The division of all serious 
offences into only 11 categories in Minnesota is rather crude, and the elements of 
discretion remaining in the system have enabled judges and prosecutors to 
circumvent some of the guidelines.37 Reflecting on the weaknesses of such systems, 
Tonry argues  “Few presumptive guidelines systems are well-designed and 
reviewed and as a result few realize their goals”.38 Nevertheless, pursuant to the 
Minnesota grids system, sentencing consistency has improved, property offenders 
have been sent to prison less frequently and the state’s Supreme Court has 
developed a jurisprudence of permissible and impermissible departure, with the 
offender’s criminal history being less influential than the seriousness of the 
offence.39 Moreover, sentence levels are calculated so as to ensure that the numbers 
sentenced to imprisonment remains within the capacity of the prison system. In 
practice the system is also more flexible than predicted to be from it is stated 
definition, and some categories have departure rates of around 50 per cent.40 This 
indicates that although the Minnesota grid itself looks restrictive and forbidding, in 
reality there seemingly remains considerable room for the exercise of judicial 
discretion.41  
It is also interesting to note that there are many states in US which have even less 
restrictive guidelines systems which are described as “advisory or voluntary” as is 
the case in Maryland and Virginia. In these examples, the jurisdictions have a 
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sentencing grid but its application is voluntary which permits a much larger degree 
of judicial discretion.42 Such systems place minimal limitations on judicial 
discretion.   
8.4 Sentencing Guidelines and a Sentencing Council 
Sentencing guidelines produced by a so-called “Sentencing Council” are another 
mechanism which can act as an aid to control judicial discretion in relation to 
sentencing. The Council supports judges in the application of their discretion, 
promoting fairness and consistency, by producing a series of guidelines for them 
and providing them with professional consultation and advice with regard to the 
offence and the relevant procedures to be applied in each case. Its role and tasks 
may be defined by the Constitution of the country concerned, for example, laying 
out its relationship with the legislative body, its degree of power over judges and 
the part it plays in the sentencing procedure.43 To understand how such councils 
work, it is useful to consider the experience of England and Wales. 
Sentencing Councils in England and Wales 
England and Wales has witnessed a considerable debate about consistency in 
sentencing for over 100 years. Reports show that as far back as 1892, there were 
calls for an appellate court to review sentences.44 The Court of Criminal Appeal 
(now the Court of Appeal) was created in 1907, and six years earlier the Lord Chief 
Justice Alverstone oversaw the preparation of a “Memorandum on Normal 
Punishments”, a kind of informal sentencing tariff which the High Court judges 
followed in response to public criticism. However, this debate about consistency 
did not clarify the general aims or principles to be applied and it can be said that, 
for most of the Twentieth Century, sentencing in England and Wales was 
characterized by wide judicial discretion.45 
The notion of a sentencing “system” was not used, and even if it was used it would 
be applied to an agglomeration of sentencing powers provided by legislature for 
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courts. The normal legislative approach in England and Wales was to create a range 
of sentencing options (including imprisonment) or establish maximum penalties for 
offences, leaving the courts to exercise discretion within the wide range.46  
Despite this, the Court of Criminal Appeal - occasionally in the early 1900s and 
more frequently from the 1960s onwards - started to lay down different general 
principles of sentencing in its judgments on sentencing appeals and these gradually 
formed the basis of defined sentencing principles.47 In the 1980s, the Court of 
Appeal started to play a more active role. Periodically, the Lord Chief Justice would 
choose a specific appeal case on which to deliver a guideline judgment, setting out 
the parameters of sentencing for a whole range of variations of the crime in 
question. 
This kind of “self-regulation” through Appellate review has both advantages and 
disadvantages. It provided judges with guidelines which created for them a 
framework within which they could locate the individual case. Simultaneously, it 
did not prevent them from exercising judicial discretion when dealing with a case 
which had unusual features. However, the guidance took the usual form of an 
Appellate Court’s judgment and thus while such judgments clearly created 
sentencing policy, only judges were involved.48 Guideline judgments also tended 
to be sporadic as there was no overall strategy and many frequently occurring 
offence types (such as burglary) were hardly covered at all.  
As a result of these perceived problems in England and Wales, in 1998 the Crime 
and Disorder Act introduced the idea of a Sentencing Advisory Panel. This Panel 
was designed to carry out the sentencing advisory function of the Court of Appeal 
and it was made up of 14 representatives: four were sentencers, three were 
academics, four had recent or current experience of the criminal justice system and, 
representing the wider community, three were laypeople with no connection to the 
criminal justice system. Its purpose was to ensure a consistent approach to 
sentencing, to clarify court practices, to explain the system of penalties to those 
concerned and to society in general and to enhance trust in the criminal sentencing 
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system. This Advisory Panel produced advisory sentencing rules and procedures 
and it was responsible for consulting widely on sentencing guidelines, analysing an 
extensive range of decisions concerning sentencing and then transmitting “advice” 
to the Court of Appeal.49 As Ashworth explains:  
“The court was free to accept, reject, or accept in part the Panel’s advice. 
The constitutional effect of these arrangements was that the laying down of 
guidelines was seen as part of the judicial function, to be carried out (as it 
had been at common law) by the Court of Appeal. Even though it amounted 
to policy formation, albeit within parameters established by the legislature, 
it remained under the direct control of the senior judiciary”.50 
In 2001, the arrangements were reviewed by the Halliday Report51 which argued 
that further steps needed to be taken toward the formulation of comprehensive 
sentencing guidelines. It concluded that new machinery should be considered 
noting the concerns raised that the Court of Appeal was not the most suitable body 
for creating guidelines by incorporating them into its judgments on appeals.52 The 
2003 Criminal Justice Act established a Sentencing Guideline Council [SGC] in the 
UK. In contrast to the Sentencing Advisory Panel, this Council was comprised of 
only seven members of the judiciary and magistrates. The members of this Council 
were supervised by the Lord Chief Justice. The mission of the Sentencing Guideline 
Council was to: 
"Produce codified guidelines for application by all criminal courts, taking 
account of existing guidelines and the need for their further development 
and modification in the light of changes resulting from this report. Such 
guidelines should be permanently available to all in their up-to-date 
reform”.53 
In a significant change, the rules stated by the Council had binding force. Judges 
were obliged to follow them and had to give reasons for any departure from these 
rules thus limiting the role and authority of the Court of Appeal. The role of the 
Sentencing Advisory Panel was also diminished with the establishment of the new 
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Council because the Panel functioned as an advisory service whose task was to 
advise the Council and not the Court of Appeal.54 The role of the new SGC was to 
develop a system of guidance for sentencing having first consulted government 
ministers and a Parliamentary committee which had a voice in the creation of 
guidelines. The SGC was composed entirely of judicial members in order to fully 
recognize “the importance of an independent judiciary”.55  
The guidelines issued by the Council for various offences tended to consist of two 
parts: a first part, which discussed the features of the offence and factors that might 
increase or decrease its seriousness, somewhat similar to parts of the 1999-2003 
Court of Appeal judgments based on the Panel’s advice; and a second part which 
set out three or four levels of seriousness of the offence and assigned a sentencing 
range to each of them. The first part can be described as narrative while the second 
part consisted of a sentencing table for the offence. The SGC published, for 
example, a one pager entitled, “The Decision-Making Process”, which set out an 
eight-stage structure for deciding on a sentence in light of the guidelines. The 
proper relationship between the appropriate starting point, range and aggravating 
and mitigating factors was also explained in each guideline.56  
Next came, the Gage Report in 2008 which was the report of a committee which 
was given six months “to examine the advantages, disadvantages and feasibility of 
a structured sentencing framework and permanent sentencing commission”.57 The 
report favoured an evolutionary approach to sentencing guidelines, rejecting 
American-Style Sentencing Grids and preferring an approach building upon the 
style adopted by the Penal and the SGC. It made strong recommendations for 
improvements to the system of collecting data on sentencing and for thorough 
research into sentencing practices. As a result of this, a new Sentencing Council for 
England and Wales was created by the Coroners and Justice Act in 2009. The 
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Sentencing Guidelines Council and Sentencing Advisory Panel were disbanded in 
2010.58  
The membership of the Sentencing Council consists of eight judicial members, 
from all levels of the criminal courts, and six non-judicial members with experience 
of one of seven specialities: criminal defence, prosecution, policing, sentencing 
policy and the administration of justice, victims of crime, relevant academic study 
and the use of statistics.59 The Sentencing Council is an independent department 
sponsored by the Ministry of Justice and it is supposed to function more effectively 
than the Sentencing Guidelines Council because it has a higher level of remit on 
studying and research which enhances and improves the evaluation of each 
guideline than the disbanded bodies. In addition, there is a greater involvement of 
the public when it comes to explaining the judgments decided upon and it has an 
important role in measuring the effect of the judgment on the victims as was laid 
out in its initial remit.   
Moreover, section 125 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 states that every court 
must, in sentencing an offender, follow any sentencing guidelines which are 
relevant to the offender’s case, and must in exercising any other function relating 
to the sentencing of offenders follow any sentencing guidelines which are relevant 
to the exercise of the function unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary 
to the interests of justice to do so. Its responsibilities include developing sentencing 
guidelines, monitoring the operation and effect of its sentencing guidelines, 
promoting awareness among the public regarding the sentencing practice in 
Magistrate’s and Crown Courts, and providing an annual report including a report 
on both sentencing factors and non-sentencing factors. It may also be required to 
consider the impact of policy and legislative proposals relating to sentencing when 
required by government. The Offences Guidelines issued by the Sentencing 
Council are based on a remodelled format and they incorporate the ranges and 
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starting points within an eight or nine step process which embodies the whole 
decision- making process from start to finish.60          
8.5 Analysing the Merits of the UK and USA approaches  
After the detailed explanation of mandatory and presumptive sentencing, 
sentencing grids and sentencing councils, it is vital to analyse the merits of each. 
With regards to the English and the American approaches, it is first of all important 
to note that the English strategy in providing guidelines by the Sentencing Council 
is significantly less strict than the American grids in four major aspects.  
• Firstly, the English-style approach does not take into account previous 
convictions which means that the starting points and ranges are based on a 
first offender’s conviction after pleading not guilty. The amount of increase 
for any previous convictions is left to the judgement of the court and there 
is no information about how the criminal record of the offender should be 
assessed.61  
• Secondly, when offenders are sentenced for more than one offence, and 
when there are several offences, the court may not simply add all the 
sentences up together, but must apply a “totality principle” to reduce the 
overall sentence. The guidelines are unclear about this.  
• Thirdly, English courts are permitted to move the sentence up or down from 
the appropriate starting point in order to take account of aggravating and 
mitigating factors. This means that when one such factor is very strong, the 
court could justify the application of a sentence outside the normal range, 
and the guidelines do not define the proportionality of these factors which 
affect the courts’ judgment .62   
• Fourthly, the current English legislation requires a court only to “have 
regard to” the guidelines and to explain any departure from them. By 
contrast  in the US, the judge is obliged to issue a sentence within the range 
 
60 Intimidatory Offences Definitive Guidelines (Sentencing Council 2018), available at  < 
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61 Ashworth (n6) 52-53. 
62 ibid 80-83. 
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of predetermined sentences set out in the relevant sentencing grid unless 
there are substantial and compelling circumstances in the individual case 
permitting a departure from that range. In such circumstances, the departure 
is allowed upon the court’s giving reasons, and the guidelines include a list 
of factors which may and may not be used as reasons for departure.63  
All these characteristics lead to English courts being given more authority which in 
turn grants judges more flexibility when compared to some of their US counterparts 
operating under a sentencing grid system. 
When the approach of the English guidelines was put under scrutiny in 2008, the 
Gage Report was clear that a grid-style approach along the lines of many US 
jurisdictions, would not be considered suitable for adoption in England and 
Wales.64 This was due to the fact that  the English system relies significantly on the 
narrative style guideline documents which were developed by the Court of Appeal 
and which were subsequently adopted by the Sentencing Guidelines Council. 
Consequently, the approach of the Sentencing Council under the framework of the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 continues to be based on the narrative approach 
albeit that it does incline towards a grid-based layout since these guidelines appear 
in the form of tables for each offence.65 The guidelines also differ in that they also 
include different kinds of guidance, such as guidance on matters of general 
principle and guidelines on new forms of sentence.66 
The characteristics mentioned above could either be considered as strengths or 
weaknesses in the English system. One of the strengths of the English system is 
that there is a balance between the formation of definitive guidelines which are 
derived from the notion of the importance of the rule of law and at the same time 
there is sufficient leeway for the court to decide on a sentence outside the guidelines 
especially when unusual circumstances occur. It is arguably a weakness, however, 
that the English system still gives the courts wide flexibility in sentencing which 
restricts the level of consistency which can be achieved.67 Ashworth writes:  
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“The reality, however, is that the sentencing decision requires the judge to 
balance all the ingredients of the case, whether aggravating or mitigating, 
in order to produce the appropriate sentence. There is no grid plan. There is 
no points system. Although consistency of approach is undoubtedly to be 
encouraged, guideline, whether provided by this Court or the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council in accordance with its responsibilities, remain 
guidelines”.68  
While these factors may be regarded as weaknesses by those who argue for tighter 
constraints on the exercise of judicial discretion, they have not led to calls for a 
move towards American style grids, but have rather highlighted to the perceived 
need to tighten the existing English approach. Ashworth writes:  
“The Sentencing Council should do more to structure sentencer’s 
assessments of aggravating and mitigating factors, of the significance of the 
criminal record, and of the totality of sentence. Such developments could 
bring rule-of-law values into areas of sentencing where they currently 
appear to exert insufficient influence”.69 
With regards to mandatory sentencing - which is comparatively different in nature 
to sentencing grids and sentencing council - there is a basic disagreement between 
advocates and opponents. Its opponents argue that it exacerbates inconsistency and 
inequality by denying flexibility. Its advocates meanwhile argue that it creates 
consistency by reducing discretion and avoiding unduly lenient or harsh sentences.  
Whether this view actually withstands scrutiny, however, is open to some debate. 
It is important, for example, to point out that it would be impossible to completely 
remove discretion when it comes to examining specific individual cases. Although 
judges and parole officials may be taken out of the discretionary loop, this still 
leaves prosecutors with unchecked power to file charges under the mandatory 
provision, to decline to do so, or to bargain down to a less serious charge with such 
decisions made away from the public eye.70  The US Sentencing Commotion Study 
(1991) concluded that federal prosecutors have been selective in their use of 
mandatory laws and have pressed charges in only a fraction of the case in which 
such laws apply. Usually when such prosecutorial discretion is exercised, no 
remaining governmental decision-maker has the necessary authority to challenge 
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the decision.71 Thus the legislators’ attempt to impose uniformity can be thwarted 
by the decisions made when processing each individual case.  In addition, as Tonry 
explains mandatory sentences are also often circumvented by prosecutors and/or 
judges, leading to the return of the discretion that the mandatory provisions were 
intended to remove. Mandatory sentencing can also have a disproportionate effect 
on some categories of society. Cases are arbitrarily grouped together even where 
compelling sentencing factors exist that differentiate them in terms of culpability.  
This may lead to unjust sentencing outcomes. For example, pursuant to the 
mandatory sentencing regime applied in Western Australia a charge of aggravated 
burglary could cover conduct ranging from a violent home invasion to the random 
theft of a can of soft drink by reaching into an open window. Offenders convicted 
of this offence, whether in the former or the latter category, are liable to the same 
mandatory minimum penalty of 12 months’ imprisonment.72 The fairness of such 
an approach appears questionable. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
Sentencing is a controversial and difficult aspect of any legal system. It requires 
considerable regulation and control if it is to be effective. If excessive discretion is 
given to those who issue sentences then it often appears arbitrary and unfair. The 
exercise of discretion must not only be fair, it must be seen to be so and some of 
the tools mentioned above, if utilized appropriately may represent positive ways of 
achieving a balance between too little and too much control.73  
The question of the most appropriate technique for ensuring that sentencing 
complies with the principles of the rule of law also depends to some extent on legal 
traditions. In some countries, the enactment of statutory principles, formulated after 
the appropriate constitutional study and debate and presented as a framework for 
judicial sentencing, may help to bring about a consistency of approach. A more 
binding structure, such as that in England and Wales may be achieved by 
introducing sentencing guidelines. Greater control over sentencing decisions may 
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also be exerted through a numerical sentencing system akin to a Sentencing Grid 
such as that adopted in Minnesota. This approach can be more or less restrictive 
and could be adopted as a way of providing principled guidance without entirely 
limiting the exercise of judicial discretion.74 
Unfortunately, in the case of Saudi Arabia there are no stated core principles for 
sentencing on which to base judicial decision-making. The first step for those 
wishing to reform the Saudi system must therefore be to draw up core principles 
for sentencing, paving the way to the implementation of the necessary sentencing 





































Nature of the Saudi Constitution and a Proposal for Reform 
9.1 Introduction 
As established in Part I of this thesis, the legal and judicial system of Saudi Arabia 
is governed by Sharia. Judges are required to exercise their discretion and interpret 
any violation of criminal laws in light of the Islamic legal system and pronounce a 
verdict. However, any interpretation of Sharia laws is subject to each judge’s 
individual understanding and thus a variety of judgments can be seen in similar 
cases judged by different judges as was explained in Chapter Four. These wide 
ranging discretionary powers are creating problems in Saudi society. First, there is 
a degree of uncertainty and ambiguity among the public regarding their rights and 
the penalty for the violation of those rights. A lay Muslim who has less knowledge 
about Sharia principles will usually seek advice from some Islamic scholars with 
different scholars providing different interpretations. It is also evident that different 
verdicts on similar cases further increase the general public’s confusion concerning 
legal matters.1 Secondly, nowadays there are more legal cases involving more 
modern issues, for example cyber-crimes, which are appearing before the courts 
which are not covered by Sharia law. In these cases, especially, the need for reform 
is pressing. Aware of these shortcomings, on many occasions the Saudi government 
itself has admitted a need for reforms. The foregoing benchmarking of the Saudi 
system against Fuller’s principles and international norms conducted in Chapters 
Six and Seven only serves to further illustrate this need. 
Given the particular situation of the Saudi legal system and bearing in mind the 
issues mentioned in previous chapters, we can now turn to examining solutions for 
these problems and begin to come up with a proposal for reform. In order to 
investigate the viability of any proposed reforms, the chapter will look at the nature 
of the origins and development of the Saudi state, and give a brief explanation of 
the nature of the Saudi Constitution. It will discuss the different views scholars and 
government agencies such as the Ministry of Justice hold as regards what can be 
considered to constitute the Constitution of Saudi Arabia.  It suggests that the only 
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viable approach is to consider the Saudi Constitution to be customary as only this 
approach allows for all the necessary characteristics of a Constitution to be 
included, as will be explained below. After that it will examine the nature of 
proposed reforms in light of the criteria which were used to better guarantee the 
implementation of Fuller’s principles which were explained previously in Chapter 
Seven. It will then go on to discuss the potential for the adoption of sentencing 
polices taking into account the unique context of the Saudi state and, in particular, 
its legal system.  
 
9.2 Historical Context for Legal Reforms: Background of the Saudi State 
In order to understand the limited progress in legal reforms in Saudi Arabia as 
compared to other countries around the world, and the potential going forward for 
such reforms to be implemented, it is first necessary to consider the (late) 
development of this region.  
The contemporary Kingdom of Saudi Arabia came into being in 1932. Before that, 
it was called the Arabian Peninsula and it was part of the Ottoman Empire. The 
whole area consisted of barren deserts with a few habitants living in tribes.2 Only 
the cities of Makkah and Madinah had a major importance as many Hajj or pilgrims 
gathered there every year during Hajj season.3 Different tribes and towns had their 
own princes who governed the area. With the passage of time, the religious views 
of the people of Peninsula started to change. Instead of praying to Allah or God, 
people started to pray at the graves of famous personalities. As a result, they moved 
away from the basics of Islam and left its practice is it was in the 9th century.4 
During this time, however, people with original Islamic values tried to fight and 
save Islamic practices. The fight was won by a champion of Islamic principles and 
religious leader, Sheik Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. He belonged to Najd in 
central Arabia. He, together with Prince Mohammed bin Saud, abolished the wrong 
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methods of praying and restored original Islamic values in the country declaring 
the first Saudi state in 1744. At the end of the fight, Prince Mohammed bin Saud 
was made the political leader and King of the region.5  
By 1930, the region still consisted of scattered population in the desert with no 
international significance until huge resources of oil were discovered in this region 
in 1938. As a result, international interests began to be relevant along with political 
and religious goals.6Since then, the Kingdom has been subject to and governed by 
three diverse interests, in particular: governmental, religious and international. 
Political forces have sought to perform a balancing act in order to reconcile the 
demands of religious practices and the international pressure for modernization.7 
This task was complicated by the fact that thanks to the presence of immense 
sources of oil, the Kingdom had developed to a level in the 1950s where the 
majority of individuals were living in modern cities with rapidly changing cultural 
and social views generating severe and opposing social alignments.8  
Meanwhile, the Kingdom was continuing to expand. Under the rule of King Abdul-
Aziz, the grandson of King Mohammed bin Saud, other areas of the Arab Peninsula 
were conquered. Accomplishing the goals of his forefathers, he combined the main 
areas of the Kingdom to design a state with an integrated form of Islam. For the 
first time, the base of the Constitution was developed and principles of Sharia were 
given the status of the Constitution of the Kingdom.9 
Across the Arab world, the majority of the Muslim states have taken religious rules 
as the guiding principles for running the political and social affairs of the country. 
These Sharia principles are usually interpreted according to the teachings of four 
Islamic schools which are Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi and Shaf'i. Although these 
schools do not dominate the law, they do have a strong influence on the laws of 
some Islamic states.10 However, the implementation of Sharia law varies according 
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to the social life of each Islamic country with each state influenced by a mixture of 
religious and modern values. Where modern values play an important role, it may 
contribute to the formation of an Islamic state with the appearance of a modern 
state.11  For example, Malaysia is a modern country with a modern economy and 
political administration while Islamic values and principles are deeply rooted 
within the society. Other Islamic countries, meanwhile, place more emphasis on the 
implementation of pure Islamic values, albeit that within each state there exists sub-
societies whose traditions vary from representing, to greater or lesser extent, 
Islamic or modern values.12 
Since its foundation, and with a view to combatting those tribes who had turned 
away from the basics of Islam, Saudi Arabia has been more inclined toward the 
implementation of pure Islamic values. In this context, at the very beginning of the 
formation of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sheik Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
selected the Hanbali school of thought as a guiding light for the matters of the 
newly formed state. He studied and implemented this system for establishing 
purified practices of Islam.13 The Holy Quran therefore had a great effect on the 
Constitution in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Islamic political and judicial matters 
were (and continue to be) decided upon in the light of the teaching of the Holy 
Quran and the other sources of Sharia.14 
 
9.3 Definition of the Saudi Constitution    
Although the answer to the question of whether Saudi Arabia has a specific 
Constitution is still pending due to the absence of codified rules and codes, there 
are many documents that are referred to as the Constitution of the country.15 On 
one hand, the Holy Quran and the Sunna are considered the Constitution of the 
country by various government agencies. On the other hand, influential scholars 
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insist that certain prepared documents of how the government operates and 
organizes the functions of the country make up the basis of the country and they 
should be called the main Constitution of the country.16 This section will explain 
the different viewpoints of individuals regarding which document should formally 
called the “Constitution” of the country. 
Some government agencies including the Ministry of Justice consider Quran and 
Sunna as the Constitution of the country. On the one hand although many scholars 
approve of this view because it has a religious basis, critics have pointed out such 
an approach is too broad to be used to formulate an effective Constitution pointing 
that for example worshipping rules and principles cannot be included in a 
Constitution.17 Moreover, the fact that different verses have different 
interpretations inevitably leads to a lack of clarity when formulating a consistent 
and logical Constitution.18  
Today, the majority of the legal profession and people interested in this field hold 
one of three main views regarding the nature of the Saudi Constitution. These are 
firstly those who hold that the “Governing Order” document is the basis of the 
Constitution; secondly, those who say it is the five administrative documents along 
with the Governing Order; and finally those who say is a customary Constitution.  
On one hand, some such as Kailed Al-Muslih, regard the document of “The 
Governing Order” – issued by the Royal Order (A/90) in 1992 and constituting 83 
articles - as the legal Constitution of the country.19 This attracts criticism from 
religious scholars such as Dr. Rashied Al- Sharief,20 however, who believe that this 
document merely contains the description of administrative rules of the different 
institutions of the country. It outlines how the government and public bodies 
operate and how they are connected and interlinked.  If this document is accepted 
as the Constitution of the country then this means that “The Governing Order” 
theoretically has the power of a legal document that outlines the legal workings of 
the political system, governmental, public and economic sectors of the country. If 
 
16 Barakat (n14) 39-44. 
17 Hallaq (n2) 42-46. 
18 Al-Sadlan (n4) 21-24. 
19 Jurisprudence scholar in Al-Qassim University, Al-Qassim, Saudi Arabia.   
20 Religious scholar and a previous president of Makkah University, Makkah, Saudi Arabia.  
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this viewpoint is accepted, it will not just be a document explaining the functions 
of the country but the legal Constitution of the country.21 
On the other hand, others such as Al-Kahtaney believe that the six primary 
documents written by the government of state establishes the Constitution of the 
country. 22  The first, the Document of “The Governing Order”, defines the diverse 
roles of the government. As noted, the document specifies how government works 
administratively, what roles are to be played by it and it includes general statements 
about the rights and duties of the country’s citizens. The Second is “The Order of 
The Council of Ministers” which was issued by the Royal Order(A/13) in 1993. 
Where the previous document indicates the administrative function, this document 
specifies the administrative techniques that the Council uses to develop and 
implement national plans.23 The third document is “The Order of Consultative 
Council”, which was issued by the Royal Order (A/91) in 1992. This document 
aims to specify the method for choosing the Council’s members, their 
responsibilities and how they relate to the Council of Ministers. The fourth 
document is called “The Order of Regions” which was issued by the Royal Order 
(A/92) in 1992. As the name specifies, it describes the regional boundaries of each 
area along with the specification of sub divisions of each division.24 The fifth 
document is “The Law of Judicial” and was issued by Royal Order No. M/78 in 
2007. It clarifies the structure of the courts and defines their specialists and 
procedures. The sixth and final document is called “The Law of Allegiance 
Commission” and was promulgated by the Royal order (A/135) in 2006. It 
describes the mechanism of the transition of authority in the Royal family in Saudi 
Arabia and under what conditions this may occur.25 
Adopting Al-Kahtaney’s view, it is thought  that these six documents together make 
up the Constitution of the country because they cover all the aspects that a country 
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requires for a Constitution.26 All these documents are developed by The Order of 
The Council of Ministers – headed by the King (who is the head of the three main 
authorities in the country, legislative, executive and judiciary) - which means that 
all these papers must be regarded as essential guidelines for the country. These 
orders are considered unique and diverse from any other guidelines.27  
However, and unsurprisingly given the contested nature of the Saudi Constitution, 
this view is also subject to criticism. Opponents argue against making six different 
documents the Constitution of the country. They assert that, commonly, only one 
document constitutes the Constitution of the country with additional documents 
merely used to interpret the constitutional provisions. Thus, they advocate the 
enactment of one specific document to be referred to in order to interpret the 
provisions instead of interpreting a different order from a combination of 
documents.28  The existence of several documents to be referred to when making 
decisions results, according to opponents, in ambiguity and incompatibility. In their 
opinion, making one document the Constitution of the country would result in more 
focused and fewer discretionary practices by public bodies provided this was 
referred to and its guidelines followed on any given occasion.29 Moreover, 
opponents believe that in order for the six documents to be considered the main 
Constitution of the country these documents would need to be used to organize 
people’s lives by stating and interpreting their rights and duties and by elaborating 
on what insures the implementation of these rights. However, the aforementioned 
documents do not focus on legal matters and there is not enough mention of 
obligations and rights. This means that significant aspects of the legal and social 
life, economic perspective and political agenda of a society are ignored under this 
approach.30  
Opponents assert that the documents achieve four goals, each of an administrative 
nature. Firstly, these documents develop and describe the powers of public 
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institutions and develop the link between them. Secondly, they define the measures 
which regulate how these relationships should operate effectively. Thirdly, they 
establish general rules of freedom and human rights. Lastly, they describe the 
standards and ideologies that the government follows when performing its 
functions. All these points, they argue, make these documents administrative only 
and they therefore lack the scope needed to be a basis for a Constitution. The Saudi 
government, moreover, refers to these documents as a means of organizing the 
orders and functions of the different public institution and does not refer to them as 
a legal Constitution.31 .  
The only document of these six official documents that uses the word 
“Constitution” is “The Governing Order”. It however states that the main source 
for regulating all aspects of life is “Sharia” which comprises the Holy Quran and 
Sunna and also methods of consultation in Islam which are the secondary sources 
as detailed in chapter one. This claim endorses the view that the Holy Quran and 
Sunna are the main ingredients of Saudi Arabia’s Constitution and these make up 
the law of the country.32 This view generates questions regarding the presentation 
of the Constitution in diverse documents and the reference to Sharia as the law of 
the country.33 
In practice, there is no universal unique fixed form of any Constitution as it varies 
from country to country. Nevertheless, the essential characteristics of a Constitution 
are usually the same.34  For instance, Ireland has one document consisting of fifty 
articles covering the establishment of the branches of the government and the courts 
and their working procedures in addition to citizens’ rights.35 Similarly, in Egypt, 
there is only one document that is called the Constitution of the country and it 
contains the majority of principles and laws for the country. France meanwhile has 
one document as the Constitution of the country but that document is related to 
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some other documents which complete the national Constitution.36 In Britain, the 
Constitution is considered customary but it is also supported by written documents 
and different bills and legislation can be enacted  to supplement the general 
constitutional provisions such as a bill of the House of Parliament and bill of 
Kingship.37 Thus, it can be said that in the case of non-availability of a specific 
document of the Constitution there are many other documents which can be referred 
to as sources of constitutional law.   
An analysis of different Constitutions shows that the most important and primary 
characteristic of any Constitution is the presence of legal principles and governing 
laws.  The main characteristics of any Constitution should determine the limits of 
the authorities of the state, their duties and rights along with citizens’ duties and 
rights, the relationship between different authorities, the structure of the state and 
the functioning of the government irrespective of whether this Constitution is 
written or unwritten.38  
It is at this point that we can turn to the third view which holds that that the Saudi 
Constitution is a flexible customary Constitution. Under this view, in terms of 
Constitutional form, the Saudi Constitution could be considered as customary in 
one part, that is represented by Islamic principles and values, and written in another 
part, that is published administrative rules. The other unwritten part represents local 
customs when dealing with law and political issues. As a flexible customary 
Constitution, it contains all of the administrative rules of the six documents and 
religious principles, and is able to easily incorporate any new suggestions for 
development and change.39 Although to date there is no academic literature on this 
subject, this view considers the customary Constitution to include both the religious 
and administrative views, and other modern and international concerns. Therefore, 
 
36 Ahmed Abu-Sinah, General Theories for Transactions in Islamic Sharia (Dar Al-Taleef Publisher, 
Cairo 1967) 77-82. 
37 Al-Fuzan (n10) 55-63. 
38 Mohammad Ibrahim Hafiz Ismail Surty, Studies on the Islamic Judicial System (Qur'anic Arabic 
Foundation 2012) 52-55. 
39 This view of the Saudi constitution as a customary one first began to be voiced over the last four 
to five years. 
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any discussion of religious or international issues still falls under the umbrella of 
constitutional debate.   
A clear example of the flexibility of the Saudi Constitution stems from the fact that 
the vast majority of Saudi citizens consider their ultimate resort is the country’s 
leader. In fact, when facing a serious problem or question in the interpretation of a 
legal or national law and a solution needs to be found, the normal procedure in KSA 
is to have recourse to the King. The problem could be of any nature, social, 
economic, administrative or related to security matters.40 The Royal Office exists 
for this purpose, that is to swiftly respond to citizens demands. Providing a quick 
and direct answer to citizens’ queries has been the policy of Saudi King since the 
establishment of the Kingdom.41 In almost all cases, answers have been found 
which satisfy most parties.  
This Office derives its supreme power over all country’s agencies from the power 
of the King as the head of the state. This tradition existed before the Islamic empires 
in the Arab tribal communities. The head of Arab society enjoyed supreme power 
whether this was limited to thousands of people or to millions like in the era of the 
Caliphs.42 
When the society is large as in the present-day state of Saudi Arabia (which has a 
population of 20 million), the King delegates his powers to the princes and 
ministers, who in turn delegate the responsibility to agents in an administrative 
hierarchy with different titles.43 However, if a case is resolved unsatisfactorily in a 
plaintiff’s opinion,  the citizen can appeal to the Royal Office or start his case from 
the beginning with the Office.44  
The flexibility therefore relies on the fact that the final decision comes from one 
powerful decision maker depending on the various consultants and information 
 
40 Abdulmuhseen Ryan, The Comparative Saudi Administration Order (Dar-Havize, Jeddah 2008) 
21-25. 
41 Adel Kaliel, The Saudi Administrative Law (Musbah Library, Jeddah 1991) 25-29. 
42 Ali Hub-Allah, Studies in Philosophy of Jurisprudence, Sharia and the theory of Aims (Dar Al-Hady 
for publications, Beirut 2005) 53-57. 
43 Ryan (n40) 53-58. 
44 Kaliel (n41) 34-37. 
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sources.45 This powerful decision maker is also the only power which can alter the 
decision and modify or change it on the advice of various consultants and 
information sources.46     
It should be noted that traditionally most Royal decisions are taken in order to 
satisfy the people’s concerns and therefore normally reflect their beliefs and 
customs and often serve to correct a previous decision that has been found to be 
impractical or unworkable.47       
It is interesting noting that there is some opposition to the idea of codification by 
traditionalists such as Sheik Mohammed Al Shankiti, Sheik Baker Abu Zaied and 
Sheik Abdulla Al-Bassam who oppose codification on the following grounds. 
Firstly, they are concerned that codification would put a stop to the process of 
Itjihad i.e. scholars and jurists would no longer use their independent reasoning to 
reach a legal solution based on the Holy Quran and the Sunna.48 Secondly, they 
believe codification would lead to a loss of authority of the Holy Quran and Sunna. 
Thirdly, codification would contradict the way legal decisions were reached in the 
days of the Caliphate or indeed the Prophet when Sharia teachings were used 
directly, without being codified.49 Finally, they are concerned that codification 
might replace Islamic laws with man-made ones.50  
However, scholars who support codification such as Sheik Saleh Bin Gohoson, 
Sheik Abdullah Kayat and Sheik Abdulaziz Al-Shik have provided the following 
answers to these objections. Firstly, they point out that the process of codification 
is in itself a form of Ijtihad as it relies on a study of the Holy Quran and Sunna. 
Secondly, they argue that as codification and the resulting law codes will be based 
on the Holy Quran and Sunna, then the authority of these texts would in fact be 
reinforced, not diminished. These sources will be more important, not less.51 
 
45 Mohammed Al-Marzoki, The Organizing authority in K.S.A (1st edn Al-Shabaka Al-Arabia for 
Research 2014) 54-56. 
46 ibid 58-60. 
47 Quasem Al-Tuhery, Importance of Codifying Discretionary Punishments- Applied Study in KSA 
(1st edn Law and Economy Library for Publication, Riyadh 2015) 28-32. 
48 ibid 35-39. 
49 Al-Marzoki (n45) 61-65. 
50 ibid 51-55. 
51 Abdulaziz Al-Sakier, Discretion in the Light of Islamic Sharia (1st edn The National Center for 
Legal Publications, Egypt 2016) 52-57. 
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Thirdly, they point out that it is natural for any field of knowledge to be developed 
over time but that this development does not mean a departure from the core 
principles of the holy texts. Finally, when answering the fourth objection, they 
highlight the comprehensive and detailed nature of Sharia writings and the 
existence of the ongoing process of Ijtihad.52 In conclusion, it appears that those in 
favour of codification are gaining ground although we are still waiting for the 
government to make its decision.53  
 
9.4 Proposal for Reform 
The Saudi government is putting effort into policy reforms in many fields for the 
effective development of the country. The judicial field is one important focus for 
reform. It is increasingly well recognized that merely stating the Sharia is the 
Constitution of the country and the guiding light for the justice system is 
insufficient unless Sharia rules are interpreted in the form of codified laws and are 
sufficiently well applied to modern issues.  
Unfortunately, Sharia rules are not codified in Saudi Arabia and are subject to 
individual interpretation by judges which is the root cause of the problem of the 
unlimited discretionary powers of judges as was explained in previous chapters.54 
When it comes to considering the potential for sentencing reform in Saudi Arabia, 
for example, it is clear that there are significant hurdles to be overcome. As 
discussed, given the current state of affairs, crimes remain undefined and judges 
enjoy almost unlimited authority in interpreting the seriousness of offences and in 
determining the appropriate punishments in Sharia law.55 If one (or a combination) 
of the sentencing polices discussed in Chapter Eight were adopted in the absence 
of such definitions or in the ignorance of the nature of the influencing factors which 
are supposed to be applied according to Sharia law - such as the criminal history of 
the offender or their age and of the lack of formal legal recognition of other 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances - these polices would not operate fairly 
 
52 ibid 61-65. 
53 Al-Tuhery (n47) 24-28. 
54 ibid 52-56. 
55 Al-Alshiek (n30). 
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or justly. The lack of a clear legal framework would also necessarily impact on the 
utility and practicality of sentencing polices.  
However, if the reforms discussed in Chapter Seven were introduced, namely the 
categorization of crimes, the codification of laws and encouragement for the 
publication of judicial reasoning, a much more solid base for sentencing reform 
would exist. In such an environment, decisions regarding the most appropriate 
approach to sentencing in the specific Saudi context and based on identified laws 
extracted from Sharia teachings, could be reached and the underlying guiding 
policies identified. 
After analysing the Saudi Constitution and clarifying its nature, it is moreover, clear 
that given its flexible nature, it does not present any obstacle towards the needed 
reform. On the contrary, its flexibility and the way it was formed proves that the 
King has unlimited authority in doing what he sees fit for the country. For example, 
a Royal Order is an essential channel. Such a formal written document reflects the 
direct and individual will of the King and is considered as the highest and strongest 
organizing tool in the Kingdom. It is issued in specific form with the King’s 
signature as a president of the country, not as a president of the Council of 
Ministers.56 These orders do not have to pass through any further process to be 
activated. In other words, in the Saudi context, when the King wishes to do 
something, he can easily do it without any kind of procedures or conditions to go 
through such as the approval of other authorities as is the case in the majority of 
countries. What actually distinguishes the Royal system of the Kingdom from other 
governing systems is that the complete authority of the country rests purely in the 
King’s hands.57 This, it is argued, could prove highly influential in pursuing any 
reforms effectively. Implementing these ideas would bring about effective reform 
especially since they need not rely on approval from the country’s legal authorities 
but can be implemented by a Royal Order as mentioned above. In the case of other 
countries if they were to rely on approval from the legal authorities, this would take 
considerable time and moreover lead to unproductive debates and discussions about 
the proposed reforms. This is obviously not the case for the Saudi system given its 
 
56 Hashiem (n29) 28-32. 
57 Al-Sakier (n51) 23-27. 
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unique characteristics and improves the chances for reform to take place. It is 
important to highlight that the King in Saudi Arabia is the head of all the country’s 
legislative, executive and judicial authorities.58 So there is no separation of these 
powers and this will allow any proposed reform to have the necessary authority to 
affect these authorities’ functions when needed.      
The purpose of reforms of the judicial system of Saudi Arabia should be to ensure 
the necessary transparency, legality and clarity for the legal system on the one hand 
and to introduce the principle of a fair ruling by judges in criminal cases on the 
other.  
In particular, the criminal law in Saudi Arabia, as in any legal system, should be 
found in a coherent, consistent, unified and comprehensive piece of legislation.59 
Consequently, in Saudi Arabia, the first essential reforms should start by changing 
from a system which is characterised by a lack of a comprehensive legal code, to 
one that is governed by well-thought-out, logical rules and guidelines. Apart from 
the broad and general Sharia law teachings, no set of rules has been derived and 
there is even a lack of comprehensive guidelines for its interpretation in order for 
the most suitable law from the extensive body of Sharia to be implemented in 
whatever case is examined.60 Different factors could affect a judge’s determination 
of the proper decision and no set of rules even states how these factors should be 
weighed. The result is significant disparity in sentencing outcomes.61 In addition, 
because there is no requirement which states that judges must explain their 
sentencing decisions, this could lead to a lack of accuracy in sentencing and a lack 
of willingness on the part of judges to take responsibility for their judgments.     
To remedy these shortcomings, it is clear that Fuller’s principles and the strategies 
explained in Chapter Seven which seeks to guarantee the implementation of these 
principles and contribute to the formation of an official legal system must form the 
basis of any proposed reform.  
 
58 Fahad Al-Dwian and Mohammed Nasib, The Constitutional Law and it is Application in the KSA 
(1st edn Dar Al-Nasher Al-Dawle, Riyadh 2018) 44-49. 
59 Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law (1st edn Oxford University Press, U.K 2011) 8-10. 
60 Shakier Al-Essamy, ‘Codification of Discretionary Rules from Textual Crimes, and its Role in 
Actualizing Justice’ (PhD Dissertation, Naief University for Security Science, Riyadh 2014) 51-54. 
61 Al-Alshiek (n30). 
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In addition, along with the support and backing of the King (and his deputies), a 
major step towards the creation of a functioning legal system and in ensuring 
greater consistency in sentencing, would be the establishment of a National Judicial 
Council which would be responsible for two major roles. The first component of 
this Council would be a Codifying Commission whose role would be to codify 
Islamic rules for Saudi Arabia. At the same time, there would be a second 
commission, which is the Sentencing Commission, and its role would be to guide 
judges in their decisions vis-à-vis sentencing. The two commissions would need to 
function in tandem.  
First, the Council, through the Codifying Commission - provided it is endowed with 
enough authority and is sufficiently comprehensive and flexible in nature - would 
firstly perform a key role in overseeing and guiding the codification process by 
compiling a set of clear law codes from Sharia teachings. This codification process 
would guarantee two significant aspects of criminal law, which are legitimacy and 
procedural fairness, by giving each person a better opportunity to know what the 
criminal law commands, what and when conduct is criminal, et cetera. This 
clarification of the law's commands would also provide a basis for accusing and 
ultimately punishing the violator of these laws who could no longer legitimately 
please ignorance. If an action is known to be prohibited then the offender can be 
punished fairly. In addition to more effectively deterring criminal behaviour, by 
requiring a prior, concise set of rules to be developed, the authority of judges will 
be limited in their ability to alter the scope of offences or defences. This in turn 
would promote consistency in the adjudication of similar cases and limits the 
potential for abuse and prejudice. Finally, the process of codification would ensure 
that the criminal law would better adhere to pre-existing ethical standards as a code 
would enable citizens to find the law more easily and to understand it better than 
(as at present) if they had to search for such information in the general and wide 
Sharia with their different individual attitudes and understandings of Sharia 
teachings.  
 
Second, the Council would, through the Sentencing Commission, be responsible 
for providing clear guidelines for judges based on the codified law codes on 
proportionality of punishments, and would discuss what individual factors ought to 
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be regarded as aggravating and mitigating for sentencing. The Sentencing 
Commission should also have an educative role, and should push for reforms and 
initiatives that promote clarity and certainty in relation to criminal law offences, 
that promote the publishing of judicial reasoning and the justifications for particular 
sentences, that supports the collection of data on sentences, that provides 
information on sentencing on other jurisdictions as well as those that support the 
organization of conferences on sentencing principles and best practices in 
sentencing.  
Such a Council could be formed in the Kingdom and could lead a fundamental 
reform of the legal system and the judicial authority by codifying Islamic law 
teaching and guiding the sentencing process. The Council would, however, need to 
be headed by the King who has the advantage of unlimited power, and the necessary 
influence to carry out such a reform, to guarantee the effectiveness of its role. 62  
 
Indeed with the engagement of the King, a National Judicial Council such as that 
proposed is a realistic clear option for reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for 
three main reasons. The first is the consideration that the King is the supreme 
personality in charge, which is from a religious point of view, stated in the holy 
verse: "Obey Allah and obey the messenger and those in authority among you" 
Surat al-Nisa, 85. His involvement would thus prove pivotal. The second relates to 
the fact that only the King has the power to pass the Consultative Council proposed 
drafts of laws again emphasizing the opportunity presented by his participation.63 
The third reason is that there is no verse in Sharia or any provision in the 
“Governing Order” document or any of the rest five basic governing documents 
which prevents the creation of proposed Council.    
Admittedly, even with the involvement of the King, the first attempt to codify 
Sharia along modern legal lines and taking into account contemporary issues would 
be a difficult and demanding task. In addition, there are some religious individuals 
 
62 The King has the ultimate authority to implement statutes complying with Sharia, and he is the 
supreme authority when it comes to the implementation of different judgments (The Basic Law of 
Government of the Kingdom, articles 48 and 50). The practice of the authority is represented in 
the example of the discretionary rule of Al-Katief women as was previously explained in Chapter 
2. 
63 Ryan (n40) 62-67. 
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and scholars who resist the idea of reforming the traditional judicial environment 
and its characteristics.64 Nevertheless, the need for such action can no longer be 
avoided. Without the introduction of a Council such as that proposed to articulate 
the very essence of Islam in terms that are both modern and transparent, authorities 
will continue to engage in a circular dialogue with those who resist development in 
the legal field. These conflicts, which are already evident, will only worsen as the 
ever-changing climate of today’s modern world brings about new and as yet 
unaccounted-for legal scenarios.          
 
9.5 Conclusion 
Sentencing practices have been guided by developed legal mechanisms around the 
world. A number of developed Western countries have come a long way towards 
the establishment of effective and workable official sentencing practices guidelines. 
These guidelines are essential for judges to be able to issue any verdict with a 
reasonable degree of fairness and consistency. Unfortunately, in Saudi Arabia, 
however, fairness and consistency in sentencing (in particular) are in ever shorter 
supply. Stating Sharia as the Constitution and the guiding principles for the 
judiciary is merely extending the discretionary power of judges.  Hence when 
judges are told that they can give judgments according to Islamic laws, they may 
rely on the Quran, Sunna and different schools of thought as guiding principles. 
The interpretation of Islamic laws, however, varies from one school of thought to 
another school of thought and from one individual to another individual.65 This 
allows the judges to issue verdicts according to their own interpretation and 
understanding of Sharia laws and hence they enjoy an almost unlimited 
discretionary authority as explained throughout this thesis. This discretionary 
power is problematic when similar types of cases produce different verdicts by 
 
64 Abdul-Aziz Al-Sakeir, Capital Punishment in Sharia with Accordance with Saudi Law (1st edn 
National Center for Law, Cairo 2015) 24-28. 
65 Hala Al-Arise, Identification of Discretionary Punishments in Islamic Sharia (1st edn Dar Al-Falah 
for Publications, Biuret 1997) 24-28. 
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different judges. Uncertainty and ambiguity arise among the public and the legal 
system becomes inefficient.66  
On the other hand, as this chapter has explored, reform is possible. All required 
resources and circumstances are already in place to start carrying out these reforms 
as soon as Saudi Arabia decides to improve its legal system. Giving political 
approval to the proposed reform would moreover add to its credibility and therefore 
increase public support. In addition, as mentioned earlier, given that Saudi Arabia 
is not the creation of any constitutional or legal body, the reforms proposed would 
not face any kind of significant legal obstacles, and could be undertaken very 
quickly. The King possesses the ultimate authority to enact what he sees is suitable 
for the country and in the public interest, thus simplifying the implementation of 
such a process and ensuring much less delay in its realization than would be the 




























The central research question of this thesis was focusing on a critical examination 
of discretionary punishment in the Saudi legal system with a view to reform.  
In order for this thesis to comprehensively answer this question, it has been 
necessary to detail the way in which punishments are arrived at in Saudi law and to 
understand the exact mechanism of sentencing and how these laws are applied to 
any particular case. The thesis then examined the extent of discretion with which 
Saudi judges are endowed and evaluated the overall credibility of the Saudi legal 
system using, as a benchmark, the main criteria normally used to assess morality in 
law along with the normative criteria of international law. This analysis clearly 
identified fundamental flaws in the current system and established the need for 
reforms. 
In order to provide a succinct and clear summary of the thesis’s concept and 
findings, the conclusion will be presented in three subsections considering the 
problems identified, the possible solutions analysed and the potential for reform in 
Saudi Arabia. 
1.The Problems 
Having provided a critical analysis of discretionary practice among the judiciary 
and the complications which this causes when this practice is applied to cases of a 
more modern nature, it became clear that discretionary practice - although it affords 
considerable leeway to judges to deal with each case on its own merits - is also 
liable to prove an impediment to a transparent and fair legal process. In the context 
of Saudi Arabia, it was concluded that given the breadth of discretion afforded to 
the judiciary in the jurisdiction, its practice has in some cases led to the public being 
alienated from the legal system and being critical of it.1 In addition, the many harsh 
penalties which have made headlines all over the world and been the subject of 
international controversy and condemnation were highlighted. The thesis found that 
judges in Saudi Arabia operate within a system where, despite the fact that, in 
theory, clear edicts and laws do exist, in practice, the existence of sometimes 
 
1 Quasem Al-Tuhery, Importance of Codifying Discretionary Punishments- Applied Study in KSA (1st 
edn Law and Economy Library for Publication, Riyadh 2015) 42-45. 
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unlimited discretionary powers in certain circumstances tends more often to lead to 
inconsistent and arbitrary judgments and punishments.2  
The discrepancies or inconsistencies within the Saudi legal system were then 
carefully examined in the light of Fuller’s law of morality. The study explored 
Fuller’s internal and external moralities and his famous eight principles at length. 
In particular, the discussion on internal and external moralities helped shine a 
spotlight on how inconsistent and unclear laws and edicts, such as those identified 
in Saudi Arabia, could result in immorality in law. This discussion of internal and 
external morality made it clear that when judges wielded unjustified and unchecked 
discretionary powers in line with unclear laws, then this inevitably led to unjust and 
inconsistent rulings and judgements – as had been identified in the jurisdiction at 
hand. The fact that these powers lacked any real formal or institutional control only 
served to worsen the situation. 
Moreover, it concluded that the Saudi legal system could be characterized as one 
which is based on a poorly defined collection of Sharia laws (of which the public 
are all too frequently ignorant) and which can’t keep pace with the contemporary 
world. In addition, it was concluded that it could be described as one which, if 
examined using Fuller’s principles, shows fundamental weaknesses in the 
principles it is based on. These flaws not only lead to it being considered immoral 
by proponents of justice systems used in Western countries but also mean that it 
lacks public trust and faith in it.   
It was further concluded, based on this analysis, that the categorization of crimes 
and judicial reasoning in Saudi Arabia is not up to par with internationally 
recognized standards and norms. Both these areas also show significant deviations 
from what would be considered moral by Fuller. It was thus concluded that 
significant reforms need to be made for crimes to be adequately categorized and for 
the process of judicial reasoning to be sufficiently fair and transparent if Saudi 
Arabia wishes to comply with contemporary legal standards.  
 
 
2 Shakier Al-Essamy, ‘Codification of Discretionary Rules from Textual Crimes, and its Role in 
Actualizing Justice’ (PhD Dissertation, Naief University for Security Science, Riyadh 2014) 23-27. 
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2. The Possible Solutions 
Part Three of this thesis then considered the possible solutions available to remedy 
the identified deficiencies. It emphasized that in order for reforms to be brought 
about, the first step must be to set up a clearly-defined judicial framework.  It 
concluded that the first step should be the adoption of special mechanisms which 
ensure the implementation of Fuller’s main principles of morality in law. Examples 
of this would be the codification of laws and the categorization of crimes. In this 
regard, lessons can be learned from other jurisdictions which have successfully 
undertaken such reform producing greater clarity, fairness and efficiency in the 
practice of law as was explained in Chapter Seven.  
3- The Potential for Reform  
 
Finally, having conclusively proved that Saudi law system does not fully comply 
with international normative law criteria, and having made the case for major 
changes in the legal and judicial systems of KSA, the thesis then turned to consider 
the viability of various reforms in the jurisdiction.  
The study points out that any change or reform to the Saudi justice system must 
have regard to the basic aspects of sentencing in Saudi Arabia. While the ultimate 
aim of reform must be to align the Saudi justice system with Fuller’s laws of 
morality and with best practice as identified in the justice systems currently 
operating effectively in other developed countries, the customary traditions, 
cultures, constitutional and political factors of the country must be acknowledged 
and any reforms to be carried out must do so bearing this in mind. Sentencing in 
Saudi Arabia operates generally without established minimum and maximum 
sentences and as has been discussed before, judicial discretion heavily influences 
the outcome of cases and sentences.3 In this context, for example, the simple 
introduction of Sentencing Councils of itself would not represent an effective way 
of bringing about the systematization of sentences awarded by the judges. 
Appropriate, supplementary, measures would also have to be considered. 
 
3 ibid 32-36. 
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In this context and with a view to demonstrating the most appropriate (and viable) 
avenues for reform, the study provided an explanation of the particular nature of 
the structure and formation of the Saudi state and it is Constitution, highlighting in 
particular the flexibility of the Saudi Constitution. It concluded that constitutional 
considerations would not pose an obstacle for various reforms considered given the 
fact that the Saudi state has a customary Constitution.    
Thus, this thesis concludes that the first step towards the modernization of 
punishments in Saudi Arabia should be to set up a working group of experts, 
including Sharia scholars, to carry out a codification of Sharia teachings. This 
would not only lead to an improvement in the efficiency and functioning of the 
justice system but would also facilitate its implementation and acceptance by the 
general public because the decisions would be based on impartial rulings informed 
by Sharia law. This codification would greatly facilitate the reform of the Saudi 
legal system as the existence of a clear set of laws would then serve as guidelines 
for the implementation of other mechanisms intended to bring about sentencing 
reforms. Given the particular characteristics of the Saudi state, and bearing in mind 
the need for a practical mechanism for reform, the thesis proposed for example the 
establishment of a Council which would be charged with the codification of laws 
and carrying out sentencing reform.      
Final Thoughts 
The underlying thought presented in the study is the need to unite and clarify Sharia 
laws in a way that limits the discretionary powers of the judges. If this is achieved, 
Saudi citizens will benefit from having a reformed legal system where more 
legitimate and just solutions are provided to them. The study considers that the 
clarification of the laws would lead to positive developments in the legal system of 
Saudi Arabia in particular and in the lives of the public in general. In particular, it 
would likely ensure greater public confidence in, and support of, the Saudi legal 
system. As Osama Al-Quahtani writes: ‘judges recently in KSA are apart from the 
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legislative and judicial operation which is completely against the real judicial 
principles which isolates these authorities from each other’.4 He concludes:  
“The codification of Sharia teachings in clear law forms and publishing 
them is considered as very urgent need for judicial development in K.S.A, 
and in my point of view the most urgent demand for guarantee the fairness 
and the protection of citizens from any corruption and lack of integrity and 
for keeping the Saudi law in line with the fair principles of international 
laws criteria, this is a basis of the fair governing around the world”.5   
Still, there is some hope for this step to be carried out as Ministers have declared 
that studies are underway by the Ministry of Justice to investigate the possibilities 
of reforming the Saudi legal system. 
As this thesis has shown, notwithstanding the doubts that have been raised as to 
their viability, such reforms (and more) may be undertaken in Saudi Arabia and 
would in fact be facilitated by the Constitution. It is to be hoped that reforms such 
as those presented here will be implemented sooner rather than later.
 
4 Osama Al-Quahtani – Saudi writer and legal consultative, Why We Insist on Codification, (The 
International Arabs Economic Journal, 2017), available at: 
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